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CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION * CURRENT CONTEOVBRSY 
SURROUNDING THE WAGE-PRICE ISSUES »
U InOation ®a a Universal problem
A current economic problem ehared by many conntrlee#
either developed or developing, I» price inflation. It may not be a real
problem for some of the planned socialist ectmomies like the USSR and
East Germany* On the other hand, a gallqping inflatimt, which has
faced some developing countries Ws» Chile and other Latin American
countries, must be a serious threat to the normal operation of their
economy. In most of the developed industrial countries, however, a
creeping inflation, characterised by the gradual but persistent rise of
the price level, prevails today. An inflation of this type, though
perhaps not so  immediately harmful, s till raises various medium • or
long-term problems* such as misallocation of resources, unequitable
distribution of income, unfavourable effects on the balance of payments,
and so  on.
Table 1^1
Index of Consumer Prices and Earnings in Manufacturing 
Industry for Selected Countries in 1008 (1060 •  100)
Country Consumer Earnings Country Consumer Earnings
prices prices
Chile 006 050 Australia 120 133
Colombia 246 270 West Germany 120 288
Ghana 188 165* Tanxania 110 365
Philippines 180 130 United States 118 133
Turkey 157 102 Ceylon 118 116
Denmark 155 220 Belgium U4 176
Finland 184 102 Switaerland U3 173
Japan 153 201 Poland 111 133
Italy 137 102 Bulgaria UO 142
Netherlands 134 212 Caechoslavakla 106 120
United Kingdom 193 161 East Germany 101 103
France 127 181 USSR 100 136
Canada 122 190
« Figure for 1967.
Sources United Nations Statistical Yeathook.
One of the chmracterletiee of tfioee industriel ecmiomies 
is  that despite the rising price level, the real income level of the 
natimi has been increasing steadily and substantially but at a slower 
rate than the mon#^ income level since the Second World War (I). 
Besides, income from employment like wages and salaries represents 
by far the largw t share in national income in the industrialised 
countries, so that the movements of wages and salaries have much 
greater bearing on the trends in national income than those of incomes 
from other sources*
Although the money wage level has so far risen faster 
than the general price level in the developed countries, (2) the increases 
In money wages have lagged behind those in prices, so  that the real 
wage level has actually fallen, in some developing countries like 
Ceylon and the Philippines (and probably Ghana). As regards the 
omnipresent fact that money wages and prices go up concurrently, 
however, there is  no clear-cut relationship between their rates of 
increase, tuiiversalfy applicable to a ll countries. Even if we lim it 
outselves to Üm cases of Western countries between 1960 and 1968, 
for example, the Banish rates of increase of consumer prices and
wages were both quite high, as compared with other European countries,
(1) B.H . Phelps Brown, A Century of Fay (1968), showed that this was 
not a peculiar post -war pKenomeaon but, since the close of the last 
century at least, the real Income level had continually risen with 
frequent fluctuaUons in Western industrial countries (p. 301).
(2) Both Uie average annual rates of Increase in money and real wages 
have been much idghor after the Second World War than before, in 
Western countries (See Phelps Brown, op. cit. pp. 87, 221 241, 312), 
Moreover, before the war the real wage level sometimes fell in the 
short run, say, in le ss  than ten years > period, even in these 
countries (ib id ., pp. 169, 268 #9).
and those of Britain were both rather moderate, while in West Germai^ 
the price increases were mild but the rate of increase In wage# was very 
high.
Hot only the levels of prices and money wages have risen  
but also the stm cture of prices and wages has lost downward n^ihlU ty  
in many advanced economies since after the Second World War; in 
other words, prices and wages generally have come to rise  
unidirecticmally <1). It seem s that this phenomenon is  also observed 
in many developing countries In recent years, for as far as the United 
Nations index numbers of consumer prices are concerned, they 
scarcely drt^ped below the previously attained level in these countries 
during the period between 19W and 1968.
Another fact characteristic of the developed economies 
suffering from creeping inflation is  the achievement of continuing full 
or near-full employment after the Second World War. These countries 
have experienced mild recessions since 1945 but not a serious, prolonged 
depression and unemployment rates are much lower timn the pre-war
average throughout the industrial world (2). A  third fact is  the ubiquity
(11 There were more fluctuations in the level of prices (and even mwtey 
wages in severe depressions) wiUi die trade cycles before the Second 
World War, though money wage rates ojKered strong resistance to 
downward pressures, which was true long before 1914 mû did not 
seem  to depend on trade unionism (Phelps Brown, ^^ The Long-term  
Movement of Real Wages", in the Theory of Wa^e Determination,
J . Dunlop (ed .) (1957), pp. 48-$6)^' 'KuT'0w%after'ï^  ^
and prices did not fall below a previowly attained level and have had 
persistent upward tendency In developed market economies. This 
is  also the case in developing countries in more recent years (Sources 
UN Statistical Yearbook).
(2) L.G. Reynolds, Labour Economics and Labour Relations (3064),
p. 340. Also see  OËC0 e<mno3c indicators and Wh»îsm Brown, 
op. c it ., pp. 222-3 and
of market power In the modern economy. In the labour maik^et there 
ha# been the rise of trade untontem and the general acceptance of a 
collective bargaining, as part of the normal economic life, which met# 
wage» and other cmtditiona of work over a wide area of the modem
economy. P aralle l to this has been the development of big bualneeeee 
and other producers* pressure groups which Interfere with the price- 
determining processes of the competitive market.
2. Cost Push versus Demand Pu# Arguments
In the face of those facts, new controversy ha# arisen  
around these contrasing hypotheses of demand-pull and cost-push 
inflation. The essential difference between them is in the question of 
which, a cost increase o r excess demand, initiates the particular 
inflationary process. PQr,ifj one inflation of either origin get# under 
way, cost increases and demand expmsions tend to proceed hand in 
hand as long as a high level of employment is  maintained. In thi# 
context, if we borrow the concept# which F . Machlup ha# Invented to 
elucidate the point# of the present arguments, the prime mover of m 
demand-pu# inflation is "autonomous” expansion# of demand, Wdch 
are foUowed by "responsive (competitive)" increase# In prices and 
wages, while the trigger of a cost-push inflation is  "aggressive" 
Increases In wage rates and/or matesdal prices, which are followed 
by defensive increases in price# and wages in other sectors of the 
economy and "induced" and/or "supportive (compensatory)" expan#ions 
of demand (I). Am a matter of fact, however, it doe# not seem  so
(I) F . &mchlup, "Another View of Cost-push and Demand-pull 
Inllaticm", Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 42 (liSO), 
pp. 125-38.
easy to discern between autonomous end «npportîve (or induced) 
demand expulsions or Wiwesn sggresslvs and responsive Incresses 
til wage rsiss  or prices In mn inllsllon s ir e s #  in progress.
The ides of nggressive mû defensive tnoreaees In priées 
and wage# presupposes the existence of market power which i# able 
to interfere in the price - (or wage determining processes and ths 
ides of supportive ernprnmim» of demand, the active intervention of the 
government or the monetary authorities in the free market economy to 
maintain full employment. For, If a ll prices and wages are determined 
under perfect competition, a# classical economics te to u s , Ihon there 
is  no room for the practical application of either of such ideas because 
fuH employment is  automatically aclileved through adjustments hy 
competitive market forces and the stability of the general price level 
mainly depends on the quantity of money supplied. In actuality, it is 
widely believed that # considerable number of prices and wages are 
mors or le ss "administered" by powerful economic interests grotqis, 
such m  big businesses, trade untons, farmers* organisations, and 
associations of other self-em ployed persons, although we do not know 
for certain how far the influence of these groups on prices or wsjg^s 
reaches, and that the interference# of these groups with individual 
prices and wages at the fnlcro-econointc level w ill svontually result 
in the Increases In money Incomes exceeding those in national output 
at the macro-^eeonomic level. Since it is  essential to the stability of 
the general price level that the changes in the structure of relative 
prices should he such that the increases In some prices are offset by
6reductions in other prices, especisUy those in sectors with high 
prodnctivl# growth, some industries or socio-econom ic groups may 
have to acquiesce in price reductions or falls in their incomes relative 
to those of other groups. But in practice, affected groigM offer a 
strong resistance to such reductions of prices and relative money wages 
In which they have a stake, if they are able to do so* As a result, the 
general levels of prices and money wages are said to be inflexible 
downwards. Under these circumstances füU employment is  not 
always achieved automatically through market adjustments of prices 
and wages. Thus, if deficient demand arises at a given level of 
prices and wages, the monetary authorities are obliged to supply 
enough money to expand demand. This logic, however, contains 
some unquesticmed but questionable assumptions. Why do trade unions 
demand such large wage increases that uneziqiloyment among their 
members would result? Or why do managers concede such large wage 
increases that they might be obliged to pass on to the consumer as 
price increases, which would result in a fall in their sales (and 
possibly in sm aller profits) unless the demand for the commo#ty 
concerned is  quite inelastic? If they behave in anticlpatlcm of that 
demand-spending policy of the government which makes up for 
losses which they would otherwise suffer, what is  needed is  to put an 
end to such anticipations by suspending the expansi<mist policy.
It is  debatable, particularly in Japan where full enq>lcyment 
has failed to be considered a major objective of the national policy in 
practice, that the mmietary authorities do only passively create more
money or lower interest rates as preventive measures in anticipation 
of an increase In unemployment. It may be more correct that the 
monetary authorities in Japan have deliberately expanded m<mey 
e # p ly  so  as to facilitate capital formation in industry, in the long run, 
and have sometimes been obliged to contract it. in the short run# 
when the balmice of payments turned unfavourable* Here the questlcm 
is  s till to be answered whether the increases in prices and money 
wages arising in the full-employment are the results of
aggressive actions of market power or the mismanagement of fiscal 
and monetary policies. If the price inflation has ensued from excess 
demand, the policy to be adapted is obviously the one of controlling 
demand, if the inflation has resulted from the aggressive increases 
of prices and wages by powerful economic groups, then a policy, such 
as an incomes policy, which puts a curb on, or persuades these groups 
to restrain from actions potentially imrmful to the national interests 
will be required for price stability* In the case of creeping inflation, 
it  Is often said that the traditional policy tools like fiscal or monetary 
policies have proved not to be very effective for price stability in a 
growing economy* More exactly, it is  argued that it is not politically 
feasible for the government committed to full employment and steady 
economic growth to pursue such demand-curbing policies as far as to 
entail high unemployment and economic stagnation in return for price 
stability. Neither have the incomes policies been very successful but 
may, in Britain, later have increased wage inflation as the unemployment 
level rose (1).
( ïr '” Sso'e . G^ ' 5psey'«md '
Re-appraisal". Economies vol. X30CVII, no. 146 (May, 1970).
8One of the reasons for the virtual collapse of those policies 
In face of creeping inflation is the inadequacy of our knowledge of the 
actual price * (or wage determining mechanisms in detail. Unlike 
#perinflation , creeping W lation seem s to require a more detailed and 
more precise diagnosis * There are  many m arkets with different 
s tructu res, ranging from competitive to monopolistic m aikets, and the 
mechanisms determining prices and wages probably differ from one 
market to another accordingly. Besides, these individual markets 
for different commodities and production factors are  intertwined with 
one another. F o r example, a  change in the price of some basic 
m aterial may have impact on the prices of the products using it as an 
input. Or a change in the price of a commodity may influence the 
prices of other consumers* goods through a change in the allocation 
household expenditure* And consequent changes In these prices may 
bring about repercussions on the prices of other commodities, 
including the price which has caused the initial change, which may bs 
followed by further repercussions on.prices. Thus a chain reactions 
continue, which may eventually bear on the general price level. 
Advocates of the cost push hypothesis a sse rt that wage Increases in a 
high-productivity or excess-demand sector spread out o r spiU over 
into the re s t of the economy and eventually pushfrt, up the general 
money wage level a t a faster rate than national productivity r ise s .
But our em pirical knowledge in this field is s till lim ited. How far 
will the impact of a particular wage increase in a sector reach and 
how much will the wages in other sectors be affected as a result? 
Furtherm ore, what a re  the effects of this particular wage increase 
together with a subsequent chain reaction in other wages on the
general price level on the whole? Theme questions seem  to be 
particularty important in relation to creeping inflation.
In a growing economy with a coti«tantly changing structure 
of supply and demand the concttmence of excess demand In some 
sector# of the economy and deficient demand In others la normal, 
even if demand and supply are balanced on the aggregate basis. As 
C .L . Schultz pointed out (1), the impact of excess demand in industries 
producing basic materials is  transmitted to the rest of the economy 
as a rise in the cost of production in the latter. If we assume 
perfect markets for factors of production, an excess demand in a 
sector would promptly be offset by deficient demand in other sectors 
through the transfer of factors of production from the latter to the 
former, and the state of the market would become uniform over the 
economy. Then we could solve the problem of imbalances between 
demand and supply on the aggregate basis. But in the real world 
where factor mobility and competition are lindted and prices and 
wages tend to have a downward rigidity, an excess demand in a 
sector, even if balanced by deficient demand in other sectors. Is
liable to lead to a rise in the general level of prices (2).
(1) "Recent Inflation in the United States" in Employment, Growth and 
Price Levels (Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee,
8@th Congress, 1st session . May 25-g, 1959), pp. 4-10.
(2) E.G . IJpsoy used this sort of argument to explain the phenomenon 
of the "loops" in the relationship between the rate of wage increase 
and the level of unemployment (See "The relation between the level 
of unemployment and the rate of change of unemployment in the 
U .K ., 1861-1957; a further analysis", Economica, (February, 
1960), pp. 21-23.)
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Among the individual prices and wages, some have a greater 
bearing on the general price level than others, so that the movements 
in the form er have more important policy implications # F or example, 
the impact on the general price level of a change In the prices of basic 
m aterials o r those goods which fetch a large share of the national 
expenditure may be greater than that in the prices of commodities witli 
a limited demand, like Jewels and curios. The same argument holds 
true of the wages. In America manufacturing industries the practices 
of what is term ed "pattern bargaining” are rife in which an industrlsl 
federation of trade unions singles out «me leading employer (a "wage 
leader") in the industry concerned and negotiates with him for wags 
increases and improvements in other conditionsof work and the term s 
and conditions of employment so settled between them are applied, at 
least as a target In the following negotiations, to a ll other employers In 
the same Industry. (1) The wage Increases settled with a representative 
employer thus spread out more or less throughout the Industry concerned. 
Obviously the policy m easures directed towards these "strategic" 
price© and wages will be more effective and more important than those 
towards other prices and wages.
3. Incomes Policies as Beclpes for Price Stability
The causes of creeping inflation are  s till debtable. So are  
the appropriate recipes for price stability. After the Second World 
War many governments of the Western countries whose economy
(1) L .G . Eeynolds, op. c i t . ,  pp. 185 # ?.
11
actually aulfeirctd from persistent inflation and which found the traditional
policies of demand management not quite effective against it have 
embarked upon the experimentation of various policies lumped together 
under the heading "incomes policy", besides their continued dependence 
on demand-management policies. Although those policies are  more or 
less sim ilar in that their major aim is to secure economic growth (and 
full employment) without inflation by directly interfering In the processes 
of income determination and that they are  implemented mainly through 
voluntarj»- cooperation on the part of m ajor powerful socio-economic 
groups, especially trade unions and employers’ associations, they differ 
considerably In detail from one country to another (1).
In the United Kingdom the germ  of the idea of an incomes policy 
already existed immediately after the Second World War and ’every 
chancellor has emphasised the need for incomes to be kept v/ithin the 
Emits se t by productivity increase in the economy’ (2). An appeal for 
restrain t was made in a White Paper "Statement on Personal Incomes, 
Costs and P rices" in February, 1048. It was not until July, 1961 when 
the Conservative government decided to take severe restric tive m easures, 
including a "pay pause", in order to cope with recurren t balance of 
payments crise s , that the idea was embodied in a government policy with 
concrete proposals, such as the fixing of a "guiding light" for wage 
Increases, the establishment of a wage review body (the National Incomes
(1) For brief description of incomes policies of Western countries, C .T .
Saunders, "Macro-Economic Aspects of Incomes Policy", InA .D . 
Sm ithied .), The Labour Market and Wlation (1968), Chapter 2.
(2) Peter Donaldson, Guide to the British Economy (1969), p . 199.
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Commission), ote* But the Conservative policy ended In frustration 
partly due to lack of trade unions’ cooperation. Then the Labour 
government which took office in October, 1064 Inherited the general 
framework of the Conservative Incomes policy and developed it on a 
more comprehensive basis, that is , a poHey covering not only wages 
and salaries but also all other forms of income and prices (it was 
therefore christened "Prices and Incomes PoEcy") (I).
The basic rationale of the Britlah income# policy mo far 
developed Is that in order to keep the general level of prices stable, 
total money incomes should not be allowed to rise faster than real 
national output. More specifically, the average rate of annual incraame 
of money income per head should fee kept within the lim its (called » 
"guiding light" under the Conservative policy and a "norm" under the 
Labour’s policy) sot by an average annual rate  of growth In output per 
head, though this requirement ’does not mean that a ll forms of income 
should increase at the same rate* (2). Increase in income# above the 
norm may fee permitted, if required in the national Interest - to Improve 
productivity, to facilitate labour mofeiEty, or to meet the claim# of 
social need and Justice (which are regarded as eases of exceptional 
treatment), but such exceptional income Increases need to be balanced 
by lower than the average Irmreases to other groups in order for the 
increase# in income# over the economy as a wlmle to be kept within a 
fixed norm. A# for the actual application of a norm and the criteria
(1) For more detailed descrlpttcm* Brian Tew, The British Economy, 
Problem# and Frospect# (1988), Chapter 4.
(2) White Paper on the Price# and Income# FoEcy (April, 1985),
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crite ria  for oxmpiUmel treatm ent, a National Board for Price# and
Incomoa, which was created as the machinery for Income# policy
under the Labour adm inistration, put under review particular case#
of price and wage Increase# referred  to it by the government. Apart
from short-term  incomes restra in t and these rough c rite ria  for
exceptional treatm ent, the B ritish income# policy, declaring that *it
would be impracticable and undesirable to lay down detailed rule so
as to provide an indication of what changes in wage# and salarie# ware
warranted case by came’ (1), did not se t out what the general pattern
of iiicomo distribution ought to be in future so that there was In practice
no principle for guiding specific movements of incomes. This seem#
to have ensued from a rather hurried and easy compromise between
different interested parties, which the government was obliged to
make in face of the urgency of the bîüance of payment# c r is is . €#e
student of the subject pronounced tlmt ’Britain has no income# policy. ’
( # .  Bure enough it i# extremely difficult, in a  democratic society
with a capitalist market economy, to secure political consensu# of
uE members of the society for a  policy which may a lte r the relativ#
share# of national Income adversely to the interest# of «orne members,
even If it doe# not mean decreases in their absolute levels of income.
It Î# said that the B ritish trade unions have strong inclination to
maintain their established wage relativities. <3). !«i addition, although
(1) White Paper on the P rices and Income# Policy (April, IQ@5> cmmd
 — ~ — ^ -
(S) J , Corina, The Development of Incomes Policy (1966), p. 29.
(3) See E . A. Turner, "Inflation and Wage Differential# In Great Britain", 
tn J .T . Dunlop (ed .). The Theory of Wage Determination (1957),
1%). 123-35. Also see B.H. Phelps '#rowh'hhd%"W(se A Course 
in Applied Bccmomic# (1964), p. 230.
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the government repeatedly emphaeleed that the ir Incomes policy was 
intended to cover a ll forme of Income and that meaeuree would be 
taken to m rh  oxoeasive proEt inoreaees, the policy a tîll centred on 
earned income# becam e #my were the moat Important element in the 
coat of production, representing about 70 per cent of national incomef 
In Britain.
The means of Implementing the British imomes policy, as 
in most W ester» countries, la in principle an informal control over 
Incomes, such as direct persuasion by the government of trade mEons, 
employers and •all others concerned with the determination of incomes’ 
(1>, o r Indirect persuasion of them through the p ressu res of public 
opinion, for restra in t. Immediately after returning to power, the 
labour government started  preparations for the Implementation of an 
incomes policy by winning a form al support of the policy by both sides 
of industry. The result wm  published in the form  of a Joint Statement 
of Intent, signed hy reprcsontativos of the government, the T0C and 
the major em ployers’ organisation. In which the principal directions 
of national policy were laid down (2). Although at the early stages 
of the policy the government expected much of trade unions and manage­
ment for their voluntary cooperation, prices and wage# contlmied to 
r ise  further during the ensuring year. Subsequently ilw government 
gradually Increased element# of compulsion In the policy, for example,
the adoption of an ’early warning system ’ In 1065 and the enactment of
(1) White Paper (op. c it. )
(2) The Joint Statement of intent on Productivity, Prices and Incomes 
(1984).
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legtslfttiom for the poHoy (the Frioes and Inqome# Act) in 1966# which 
îorxm tfy  invested the govermment with statutory powers on prices and 
incomes# such m  the power to delay pay and price increases (1).
Despite the strengthening of compulsory elements* there was no sign 
that the effectiveness of the policy particularly increased, but the 
government at last put Into operation controversial P art IV of the Act 
prescribing the government’s powers to stop price and wage increases 
for a certain  period* Even these severe m easures ended in frustration* 
which eventually led to the devaluation of the pound sterling In November# 
190t, After the enforcement of the P art IV trade unions were inclined 
to be m ore hostile towards the policy* and especially towards statutory 
controls over wages • Thus Britain’s  ’voluntary’ incomes policy 
completely collapsed.
The British experience reminds us of how difficult to carry  
out an incomes policy based on the voluntary cooperation of conflicting 
Interests groups effectively. A ’true’ and long-term  incomes policy 
cannot rem ain os a pure ’economic’ policy (8). It has become c lea re r 
that the influence of an incomes policy is more complicated and more 
far-reaching than economists might have originally thought. It has 
profound socio-political implications as well: what is the ideal
pattern of Income distribution for different socio-economic groupai 
how the freedom of Individual member* of the society in seeking their
self-in terests should be curbed before the general objectives of the
Cl) Drake* Labour Law <1969)* pp. 104-7.
<3) L .B .J . G rlj n*r'''incom es Folicief and the European Economic 
Community** (Chapter 5) and F . Se liier* **€oHective Wage 
Bargaining and the Conditions for Active Mediation** (Chapter 6)* 
ln A .0 . Smith# op. o il.
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soctetyi how national Income should be divided between investment 
and consumption; and so  on. The problem* Involved touch the very 
foundations of the Western society* The true nature of the problem 
is  related to class struggles which Karl Marx regarded as the central 
forces of social evolution in his celebrated Communist Manifesto (1)* 
But his model is  too abstract and rather oversimplified* Uke that 
of marginal analysis* and equally divorced from the real world. The 
proletariat as well as the bourgeoisie is not so  homogeneous a socio­
economic group as he assumed* just as labour is not so  homogeneous 
in quality as assumed in marginal analysis* The differences between 
trade union and management may often be overshadowed by the 
differing interests within either the union or management organisation 
or by the common interests of management and union men at various 
levels in the plant (2), The working class has increased in sise  and 
power, as Marx predicted in the middle of the last century* but not in 
unity. More recently* as toe workers have become a predominant 
group in industrial countries* the division of interests within the 
working class has become more evident. This has complicated 
matters further. ’The long run case for an incomes policy is that 
it can create order out of an industrial jungle.* <3) For all that* 
the conflict between the capitalist and the worker has not ceased nor 
is likefy to cease to exist. The organised hmbour strives for a
U> E. ïi^eedman (ed. )* Marx on Bcw%omics (1962)* pp. 11-23.
(2) James W. Kuhn, W r^ining in grievance Settlements The Power 
of mdustrial Work G^wups (lAtll).
(3) J . Corina* op. cit.* p. 54.
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la rger share of output and the capitalist tr ie s  to prevent their profits 
from being eroded. When the la tte r fails to re s is t the form er’s  demands* 
he passes on as price increases in order to maintain his share of 
output* Thus the capitalist - probably together with the organised 
labour - can indirectly exploit the consumer* particularly the unorganised 
part of the working class and pensioners* instead of openly and directly 
exploiting his employees who are  organised* as was often the case at 
early stages of industrialisation* In advanced industrial countries* as 
the organised part of the working class has expanded and become 
conscious of the magnitude of its collective power* this method of 
exploting through inflation the consumers of which the organised labour 
constitutes a large part has proved to be a dead-end expedient because 
it only induces a price-wage sp ira l. Besides capital and labour* there 
are  other socio-economic groups which want to insist on their own 
existence* in the present society. It makes s till more difficult the 
formulation and implementation of an effective incomes policy as policy 
of coordinating differing sectoral interests of different members of the 
society.
4. Controversy over Anti-inflationary Policies in Jap«m
In Japan there has been much controversy over the causes of 
the current Inflation. As we shall see in Chapter 3* during the last 
decade o r so* consumer prices soared while wholesale prices were 
relatively stable. What is more* Japanese export p rices were almost 
constant. As a result* Japan has not had serious balance of payments 
difficulties in recent years (I). Partly on this account* despite public
<1) See foot note ( 1 ) in Chapter 2, p. 26
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resentment the rising consumer priees* the Japanese govern­
ment has concentrated its  efforts on promoting economic growth rather 
than seriously pursued policies for price etafoillty which might have 
thrown cold water on her rapid economic growth. It proclaimed in 
March* 1803 its intention of adopting comprehensive price statoility 
measures including the hardening of the anti-monopoly legislation* a 
labour market policy* restra in t on public charges and fees* -etc. But 
consumer prices went up by nearly 7 per cent In the course of the 
same year, In the following year a consultative committee on the 
price problem was se t up under the Economic Planning Agency but in 
practice nothing but a tem porary standstill of price increases in the 
public sector was achieved. The accelerated consumer price increases 
coupled with gradual rises in wholesale prices in the la tter half of the 
1960*0 has worried the government and induced it to tackle the problem 
more wholeheartedly. Subsequently a  Price Stability Policy Council 
directly rcspoiiaifolo to the Prim e Minister has been se t up to look 
into the problem of rising prices and to seek appropriate anti - inflationary 
policy m easures. Thus the priority  given to price stability has 
apparently been high amongst the major objectives of Its economic policy 
ill recent years* though it has rarely  been accompanied by further 
concrete m easures.
One reason for the government’s unreadiness to combat 
Inflation is* besides favourable balance of payments* its persistent 
attachment to that economic policy looking to the in terests of producers 
in industry and agriculture and neglecting those of consumers - the re
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are oovoraX powerful Minlotrioa promoting the interests of producers 
but no Ministry exclusively designed for the protection of those of 
consumers. According to a research work on wholesale prices In 
Japan (11* the government hm  been In one way o r another înterforing 
in favour of producers with the determination of the prices of os many 
m  342 out of 770 commodities covered by the survey o l  movement# in 
wholesale prices by tlie Bank of Japan: For example# many domeatic
farm  products ore protected against competition from, abt'oad by import 
re s tr ic tio n  or protected In favour cfifarmera by price-pegging meaaurea 
which allow the priecQ of auch products to move upward# but not 
dowmvardBi A considomblc numhex' of email lir.ma are allowed to 
form cartels (whether or not on the govornmont’s tacit Initiative) to 
support o r ralcm the pricca of their products; and so forth. The .Pti ce 
Stability* Policy Council rightly pointed out In one of its recommendation# 
and proposals that such a gevex'nment protection of pi'oducers contributed 
to increases in prices (0),
Another reeaon# equally important# i» lack of national 
con#en»tw about the true cauaea of the current inflation and neceaeary 
policy m eaeures. Although the problem of price inflation ha* been 
under diacuaeion in Japan# a* in other countriee# mince the Second World 
War# there I# yet no eatabliehed theory explaining the current inflation 
but opinlona on ft« cauiee a re  «till divided among acholara. The coat 
puëh hypolhcala ha»# a» might be expected* attracted atrong support
Cl) ¥ .  Koike and S, Ohki# *T)r0»hiurl-bukka ni Miru Hondo to Eochoku- 
»ei”# H, Kimmgai and T, Watabe (eda*) Nihon no Bukka (1969)# 
Chap, 9.
(2) Gyoael Eanaho to Bukka (April# 1979).
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from employer^* organWatlon and certain government otroloe. In 
tM$ connecUon* th e  B oonom io CounoU* a  P r im e  M inW ter’n adviaory  
body In charge of national économie planning* aaked an Independent 
group of five aalverslty profeaeora to atady the appMcahlHiy of an 
Ineomom policy to the Japanese caao# In February# 1907 and received 
fi mpùH  from the group In September# the following year Cl). The 
%'epert# which did not analyse the going Inflationary proceea nor did 
particularly anpport the adoption of an Ineomee policy but anggeated 
the naefulneaa of the policy under certain eondltlone# wee a etartWg- 
point of current controversy ovex^  the policy i n  Japan C3). The advocate» 
of the wage-ooot posh hypothesis have emphasised the fact that wage 
Increaoes outpaced productivity growth over the economy m  a whole In 
recent years# end that the sl%e of the wage advances settled through 
collective bargaining haso tended to Increase over tim e. But this fact 
Is not neceesarlly the evWence of cost posh# ae F* Moohlnp pointed out
(3);
•Even so m e  h ighly sea so n ed  eco n o m ists  have fa llen  v ic t im  to  
an w h er  lo g ic a l sn a re; that any In crea se  In m on ey-w age  ra te s  that 
ex ceed ed  the in c r e a se  in labour produ ctiv ity  w as a su r e  s ig n  o f  a  wage  
pu sh . Y e t, ev en  If th ere  were no. labour union In th e country m û  n o  
w orker e v e r  a sk ed  fo r  h igh er  w ages# a dem an d -p u ll Inflation would  
even tu a lly  p u ll up the w age le v s #  and if  the dem and p u ll w ere  su ch  that
W ÏI. K um agal ot a l. # Bukka, €hingln*shotoku, Be i s a n se l iCcnkyulmt 
Report (196$). 
iU) %eé T%yo-keisai# npecW  issu e  (24 Oct.# 196$).
(3) F . m c m g ;  op: c a .
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pricGo and wagoo rose by percentage abovvetwo o r three a year 
<• , . , )  money-wage ratee would he itp by more then the rate of Increase 
in productivity, *
A more aophigstleated hypothesis along the sam e lines# which 
has won a substantial support among professional economists and some 
government policy makers# Is the so-called '^productivity gap inflation 
hypothesis'* (1>* The gist of the hypothesis is as follows:
In the process of economic growth labour productivity over 
the economy as a whole rises but its rate of Increase differs from one 
sector to another. The Japanese economy has been characterised by 
a so-called "dual structure"# i .e .  a structure in which a liigh-productivity 
sector# consisting of large manufacturing firm s pi-^Qducting capital goods 
with superior technology (hereafter called the "modern ooctor*')# coexists 
with a low -pro due t ivlty sector of sm all manufacturers# distributive 
trades# service industries# and agriculture.# mainly supplying consumer 
goods and services (hereafter called the "traditional sector") (3), The 
increases in labour productivity are generally very much la rger In the 
modern sector than in the traditional sector. And the wage differentials 
between the two sect ora have been remarkably great in Japan (3). As 
the labour markota become tighter# the traditional sector which finds 
it more and more difficult to retain or recruit required manpower at
their going low wage levels Is obliged to pay higher wages, keeping up
il) F o r the same so rt of argument, see P , Streeteii, "Wages# P rices and 
Productivity", Eyklos# vol. 15 (1962), pp. 723-31.
(2) For further knowledge of this n a t te r , for example# see S. Broadbrldge, 
industrial Dualism in Japan (1966).
<J) For tu rther analysia# see Chapter 5.
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with wage increases in the modern sector where It Is relatively easy 
to absorb wage im rm m B  by rapid improvements in labour productivity 
and recru it workers at the going wage levels. As a result* the wage 
cost p e r unit of output "in the traditional sector rises* which causes an 
upward movement in prices of the ir products because of difficulty in 
raising labour productivity# while In the modern secto r wage cost and 
prices are  more stable. Thus price increases in the traditional 
secto r raise the general price level.
This hypothesis does not* hewover* account for the absolute 
level of prices but snerelj^ for changes in the structure of relative prices. 
The question which comes to our mind at once is why prices In the 
modern sector# despite reW ively large Improvements In labour produc­
tivity# have been stable Instead of falling to such an extent that the increases 
in prices in the traditional sector are  offset (1), Some blame market 
power for adm inistering prices but it is difficult to find em pirical 
evidence to support this view in fact. As shown in Chapter 2# in Japan# 
even oligopolietie or monopolistic firm s have been subject to potential 
competition because of the market expansion accompanying rapid economic 
growth and there does not appear to be a definite correlation between 
industrial concentration and price movements in Japan (2), Another view 
Is that downward rigidities in prices are  due to general excess demand. 
According to this view, the potential downward tendency of prlcea in the 
modern sector* resulting from high productivity improvements# hm
(1) See H* Kato# "Klmetononsl Bukka-ronso"# Ekonomlsto# special issue 
(20 March* lOfWT” ' '
(3) gee S, Seikigttchi# "Bukka Mondai nlokeru Dokusentekt Eanrl-kakaku"
B, Kumagai and T# Watabe (ed s .) op. cit.# pp. 308-4S,
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boon weakened by strong demand pressures for their produoto (mnlnly 
producer’s goods) brought about by the bmcbing of Investment# which 
10 encouraged by a genorom money-lending policy of banks, m  shown- 
in the next chapter, Either of the above-mentioned views admits that 
in the traditional geetor the m arket is so competitive that there Is 
little room for price administration by market power# though some of 
the prices In this sector arc deliberately administered through cartels 
o r other restric tive practices formed under the government proWctlve 
policy# and therefore, that the increase In the prices in tlds sector is  
supported by excess demand resultingÊrom the rising general level of 
wages.
As mentioned ea rlie r , the process of creeping inflation Is 
extremely complex and It is difficult, as a practical m atter, to trace  
back the Initial causes of the going price-wage spiral# which is essential 
for the distinction between cost push and demand puE. One possible 
way of avoiding a vicious circ le  of reasoning Is to examine the structure 
of particular m arkets and the likelihood of cost push aW then to watch 
price or wage behaviour in the m arkets, Unfortunately our arguments 
are  often based on ambiguous or treacherous factual groimds and 
differences of opinion between disputants often a rise  from there. We 
need# therefore# more facts to elaborate a more precise theory of 
inflation and anti - Inflationary policy measures, \¥ ith  this In mind we 
may be able to proceed further by taking Into account the British experience 
of operating an incomes policy. From  this we may be able to throw 
more light on Japanese dlfficultlea. In particular, as an incomes
policy must be related to the facts of tho labour market* we must 
consider wbethor the structure of the Japanese labour markets and 
wago-flxing mecliamsms# as compared with those of Britain, have a 
propensity to bring about a cost-push inflation, which would necessitate 
an incomes policy (or in this context, more exactly, a national wage 
policy). Belated to this is the question of whether an incomes policy 
based on "voluntarism" would be workable under the present 
iastitutional framework in Japan and whether the operation of the 
Japanese labour market are  appropriate to an effective utilisation of 
labour.
2f.
CHAPTER 2.
GENERAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
OF CREEPING INFLATION
Before we proceed to tackle the questions raised at the 
end of the preceding chapter# it may be helpful to look over some 
basic facts surrounding the wage-price issues in Britain and Japan. 
Some of the most striking facts are that Britain is a mature 
industrial countxy (her economy was already highly industrialised 
by the beginning of this century - in 19U her agricultural population 
was only 8 per cent of the whole <1) )# while the Japanese economy 
with a relatively large proportion of agricultural population (17.6 
per cent of total occupied population in 1909 (2) > is  s till In the process 
of industrialisation. Partly on this account# the Japanese economy 
has been growing at quite a high rate in contrast with the slow growth 
of the British economy. Thirdly# Britain has notoriously been 
in balance of payments difficulties under the burden of supporting the 
value of the pound sterling as an international key currency since the 
Second World War# while the Japanese balance of payments has been 
increasingly favourable in recent years and is expected to remain so
(l> Source: W .H.B. Court# A Concise Economic History of Britain#
1750 to recent tim es (1954)# p. 205.
(2) Source: Statistical Abstract of Japan (1959).
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in the nonr future (1). Those éiîforemeee Imvo had a great Îu0uence 
on the choice and t!:e order of priority  ot economic policies In both 
countries. For example, the British government, obsessed with 
recurrent balance of payments c r ise s , has boon obliged to sacrifie# 
other ocoiiomic objectivea to the more imperative task of redressing 
them, whorea&ï the Japanese government has been preoccupied with 
the promotion of economic growth and, more recently, with the 
strengthening of the competitive standing of Japanese export industry 
in the world m arket, ae pressure from abroad for the liberalisation 
of trade and capital transactions has Inereasted. In consequence 
other national objectives have been aacrlRccd.
1. National Expenditure and Money Supply
How wo look at oome factors which may be contributory 
to inflation. During the last decade the annuel final expenditure «m 
groBB domestic product In real term s increased by 37 per cent in the 
United Kingdom and by 189 per cent in Japan, It le gross domestic 
capital formation that roglstorcd the highest ra le  of Increase In both 
countries. But In the U.K. the impact of an increase In the expenditure
(1) Balance of Payments
U.K. (£ million): Japan (ÜS f f  million):
Visible Curront Overall Visible Current Overall
balance balance bmlmc# balance balance balance
1964 -.019 US90 *084 + 377 .  480 139
190$ -237 - 77 *880 + 1,981 + 93B Î 405
1966 - 73 i' 43 .521 + 2,270 + 1,254 + i$7
1907 *313 *707 + 1,100 .  190 371
1909 *043 .319 .1,078 + 2,329 + 1,048 + 1,102
1969 -141 i410 +404 f  3,699 + 2.119 + 2,283
Source: Monthly Digest of Statistic# sud Bsnk of Jspsn Economic
Statistics Monthly,
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of this category on tatal expenditure has been moderate because it
accounts for a relatively sm all pert of the latter. More than half
of the increases in total expenditure registered during the period are
Table 2 . 1
Percentage Increases in Final Expenditure (revalued 
at 1963 prices) on Gross Domestic Product over the 
Period 1959 * 1969
U.K. Japan
Total final expenditure 37 (3.2) 189 (11,2)
Consumer’s expenditure 28 (2.5) 158 (10,0)
Government current expenditure 47 (3,9) 150 (9,6)
Gross domestic capital formattim 66 (5,2) 276 (14,2)
Exports of goods and services 35 (3.1) 162 (10.1)
Tabic 2 - 2
Share as Percentage of Total Final Expenditure
United Kingdom Japan
1087/59 1967/69 1967/50 1867/69
Total final expenditure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Consumer’s  expenditure 65,8 52.9 51.9 46.3
Government current expenditure 13.4 14.4 8 .9 6.8
Gross domestic capital formation 13.5 16.3 27,8 36.1
Exports of goods and services 17.3 17.1 U.9 10.8
Note:* 1. Figures in ( ) represent average annual rates (geometric
averages),
2. In order to weaken the effects of annual fluctuations caused 
by the short-term  trade cycles, we derived figures for each 
category of expenditure by multiplying its share averaged 
over three years’ period by total final oxpetidiiurc in 1959 
and I960 respectively,
3, Japan’s figures are for fiscal years and final expenditure on 
gross domestic product ia calculated according to the 
following formula: Fiiml expenditure on GDP « GNP + Imports 
of goods and services and factor income paid abroad.
Source: National Institute Economic Review and the Economic Planning 
Agency,
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accounted for by increases in consumer’s  expenditure and the rest 
Is ascribed to increases in government expenditure, domestic capital 
formation and exports rougWy by one third each. In Japan capital 
formation, whose share In total expenditure was already remarkably 
Eirge in 1059, continued to Increase rapidly over 1959*60. Consumer’s 
expenditure and domestic capital formation account for more timn 80 
p er cent of the increases in total final expenditure registered during 
the period. Government expenditure and exports have played a 
relatively less important part in Japan than in Britain.
The decreasing share of consumer’s  expenditure and the 
increasing share of domestic capital formation are  partly the reflection 
of tiio increasing personal saving® ratios In both countries. In other 
words, the average household’s propensity to consume has been on 
the decrease over tim e. The difference between the two countries 
in the rates of investment and economic growth ia partly ascribed to 
the difference In the proponsi^ to consume, i .e .  Japan’s savings 
ratio  lias been far g reater than that of Britain over tim e.
Table 2 * 3
Personal Savings as Percentage of Personal Disposable
Income
U.K. Japan
1959 5.0 15.1
1969 7.7 20.3
Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics and Bank of Japan Economic
Statistics Monthly.
Although a rise in the level of total expenditure may imve 
some impact on the general level of p rices, changes in its composition
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are aleo important in relation to the oompoaition of the nation’s 
productive capacity. The impact on the price level of an increase 
in (me constituent of total expenditure may differ from the impact of 
another, depending whether the increase comes from the consunption 
side, the investment side, or the exports side. An increase in 
consumer’s expenditure will have an immediate impact on the consumer 
goods market, while a rise in investment will primarily increase 
immediate demand for capital goods but contribute to the increase of 
productive capacity later, so that the long-run effects on the price 
level w ill differ between the two constituents of total expenditure.
In this sense a high level of expenditure on domestic capital formatiim, 
as in Japan, can be a disinflationary factor in the long run, whereas 
an economy with high employment and a low level of domestic 
investment, like Britain, is liable to incur inflation, other things 
being equal.
The role of the money supply In the inflationary process, 
which tended to be neglected by Keynesian economists, has been 
highlighted again since the 1950’a but there Is s till too much unknown 
about it. It seem s certain, a ll the same, that the money supply 
has something to do with the price level (1>. For instance, as 
shown in the table overpage, the amount of money supply has 
increased much faster than the national output in both Britain and 
Japan. Among other things, Japan’s rate of increase of money
(1) The correlation coefficient between the index numbers of money 
supply and consumer prices over 1856*69 is 0.9922 for the U.K. 
and 0.9940 for Japan (See Appendix iv ).
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Table 2 * 4
The Increase of Heal Groaa Domestic (or National) 
Product# Money 3iq>ply# and Consumer P rices, as 
on Index# 1956 » 100# and Changes in Bank Bate 
over 1956 - 69.
United Kingdom:
Beal Money Consumer Bank Heal Money Consumer Bank
GDP supply prices rate ONP supply prices rate
1956 100 100 100 5.50 100 100 100 7.80
1960 110 115 108 5.00 147 164 107 6.94
1961 114 116 U2 6.00 166 194 112 7.30
1963 115 123 117 4.50 175 226 120 6.57
1968 120 131 119 4.00 197 304 129 5.64
1964 127 136 123 7.00 218 344 134 6.57
1965 130 148 128 6.00 230 401 143 5.46
1966 132 154 134 7.00 256 462 150 5.46
1987 135 171 137 8.00 290 5#9 156 5.84
1966 138 163 144 7.00 330 600 165 6.21
1969 140 166 151 6.00 372 724 173 6.21
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics and Bank of Japan Economic
Statistics Monthly.
supply in the 196O’s is tremendous, as compared with that of Britain, 
even if we allow for the former’s rapid economic growth. The 
nominal growth rate of GDP (or ONF) has exceeded the rate of increase 
of money supply in Britain and vice versa in Japan, which seem s to be 
the results of a tight-money policy in the former and a loose monetary 
policy of the Japanese authorities in the past. This view is supported 
by another evidence, namely# movements of bank rates In both countries, 
The bank rate of Britain has been going up since the close of the 1850’s# 
whereas Japan’s bank rate has tended to drift downwards, despite 
inflationary trends In consumer prices# with the amelioration of her 
balance of payments since the middle of the 1950’s .
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The rapid increase of money supply has not been 
irrelevant to the remarkable increase of domestic capital formation 
in Japan. Her economy has always been short of capital and abundant 
in labour since her industrialisation started towards the close of the 
19th century# Most of her required funds for industrial investment 
have been raised from domestic sources. What have made it possible 
are the high propensity of the Japanese household to save and forced 
saving through taxation and an inflationary monetary and fiscal 
policies. As for the latter, the monetary authorities# with an 
overt or tacit consent of the government, have supplied as much money 
as possible within the lim its of her balance of payments, to finance 
investment for the technologically advanced sector of the economy, 
by keeping down bank rate (well below the market rates which would 
be high because of capital shortages) and allowing banks to overdraw 
from the central bank (1), Thanks to this expansionist monetary 
policy, Japanese banks have been ready to lend money to large 
enterprises ; As shown in Table 2 - 5 ,  their ratio of advances to total 
deposits have been well over 00 per cent, while that of British banks 
have been somewhere round 50 per cent, To put it another way, 
Japanese firm s are more retkdy to borrow from banks than the 
British counterparts. In order to obtain investment funds, the 
former look to banks rather than the securities market.
(1) The ratio of their borrowings from the Bank of Japan to total 
of their deposits and issued capital was about 20 per cent in 
1961 (Source: S, Sashara, "Infure ni Hoshisuru Kinyu", 
Ekonomisto (op. c it.) , p. 68 .).
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Table 2 - 5
Bank Advances and Investment as Percentage of 
Total Deposits
U.K. (London clearing banks): Japan (all banks):
Advances and Investment Advances Investment
other accounts
1963 48.7 15.6 93.0 1.5
1964 50.6 14.3 94.5 1.7
1965 51.8 12.1 93.2 1.9
1966 50.0 12.1 93.0 2 .0
1967 48.3 13.7 95.0 2.0
1968 48.6 13.2
1969 50.2 11.3
Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics and Bank of Japan Economic
Statistics Monthly.
In the United Kingdom about 28 per cent of total industrial investment
funds came from the capital market (net capital issues) in 1969# while
in Japan the proportion was only 8 per cent 1967 (1). The se lf-
financing ratios of Japanese firms were between 20 amd 30 per cent
during the 196O’s  (2)# which were well below those of average British
firm s. As a result# the burden of interest payments is  vety heavy
indeed# for Japanese firms# so that they may be rather happy with
mild inflation which steadily alleviates part of their burden. This
is  reflected in the attitudes of industrialists towards the problem of
rising prices.
(1) The British figure is derived by dividing the net capital issues
by quoted public companies in the U.K. by the addition of the same 
net capital Issues and the increase of bank advances less personal 
loans over the previous year.
(2) S. Sasahara, op. c it.
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In addition to the level of money stock and it» rate of
increase, we have to ctmaider whether the investment funds are channelled
in the right direction so as to eliminate bottlenecks in production. In
Japan, although some people resent agriculture and sm all-scale industry
being slow to improve their productivity and putting up their prices in
compensation for increases in wage cost, the question to be asked in
this context is  whether enough investment funds have so far been supplied
to these retarded sectors so as to enable them to equip themselves with
modern labour-saving technology. As shown in Table 2-6 below, there
are some remarkable differences between Britain and Japan in the
c omposition of money supply. For example, bank advances to overseas
Table 2 - 6
Analysis of Bank Advances by Industry 
(Amounts outstanding at the date specified below)
Britain: Japan:
as of May^ , as of Mar<
1970 1970
Total 100.0 100.0(33S)
Manufacturing industries 29.2 44,4(27*)
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4 .2 1.1
Mining and quarrying o.a 0.7
Construction 3.8 4,7
Retail 3.1 5.2
Other distributions 3.9 24.2
Financial institutiwm 5.1 1.2
Property companies 2.8 3.5
Transport and communication 1.8 3.9
Public utilities & national government 0 .7 1.3
Local government 0.6 1.0
Services 5.1 4 .4
Personal 7.8(3.2**) 3.0
Overseas residents 33,6
Note:- 1. The figures with * are the shares devoted to medium and
sm all-sised  firm s (with a capital of 60 million yen or less) 
in the total amoimt outstanding of a ll industries and services, 
and of manufacturing industry alone respectively.
2. The figure with ** is  the share devoted to house purchase in 
the total amount outstanding of a ll industries and serv ices.
Source: Bank of England and Bank of Japan,
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resident® are the most important single item on the British banks* 
accounts, while they are negligible in Japan. Instead# nearly half 
of the bank advances have gone to manufacturing industry and one third# 
to the distributive trades in Japan. The amount of bank advances 
devoted to manufacturing industry and distributive trades are  nearly 
one third and less than one tenth of the whole respectively in Britain. 
Another characteristic of the British structure of bank advances# as 
compared with the Japanese counterpart# is no meager proportion of 
advances devoted to personal loans for consumption purposes# like 
house or car purchase. The share of bank advances for Japanese 
agriculture is much sm aller than that for B ritish  agriculture# despite 
a much greater importance of agriculture in Japan. Japanese sm all 
manufacturing firms# which represent 98 per cent of all manufacturing 
firm s in term s of number and produce more than half of the industry’s 
total output (1)# have been supplied with only 27 per cent of total bank 
advances deV^oted to the industry.
2. Industrial Concentration
There are differences of opinion among economists 
about the Importance of monopolistic power and its impact on prices 
in Japan. The nature of the problem defies any simple solution# as 
thereTs no satisfactory indicator which shows the effect of market 
power and its performance in the market. For example# industrial 
concentration m easures only a single aspect of the m arket structure
(1) Source: Ministry of Industry and International Trade.
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at beat. A high concentration ratio doe» not nece»«arily demonstrate 
monopolistic behaviour in the market concerned. In an industry with 
a highly oligopolistic market structure where a few big firms dominate 
the market, there may yet be fierce rivalry between them. On the 
other hand, in an industry where there are a relatively large number 
of firms none of which is dominant, competition between them may be 
very limited or suppressed through some kind of collusion, like 
cartels, or through customary restrictive practices* Allowing for 
these and other llmitaticms attached to industrial concentration as a 
measure of market power <1), we shall give a preliminary appraisal 
of the market structures of Britain and Japan, though relevant 
statistical data available are scarce and fragmentary so that the result 
is  not expected to be very conclusive. Moreoever, a detailed and 
refined analysis of this kind is  almost impossible at this stage, 
because the coverage of industries by statistical data available at 
present Is far from exhaustive and the industry classifications differ 
considerably between the two countries.
The following analysis is  mainly based on the table in 
Appendix I. If we take a cursory glance through this table, we find 
that on the whole the general level of Industrial concentration Is 
apparently higher In Japan than in Britain, though the British industry 
classifications often contain a more heterogeneous collection of 
products so  that it is  quite likely that high concentration ratios of 
some products in a given industry group are offset by low ratios of 
others and consequently that the ratio for the group as a whole becomes
m  See A . Hunter, "The Measurement of Monopoly Power", Monopoly 
and Competition <1969), pp. 92*96.
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moderate (1). The reîatlonahîp holds true between Japan and the
United State®. Aeoording to a study on Industrial concentration in
these two countries (2), out of the 95 commodity groups covered by
the study, those which have a m arket concentration above 70 per cent
as defined in term s of the share held by the four largest firm s in the
industry’s output are  35 in Japan and 27 in the United States. If we
pick Industries with a concentration ratio of 50 per cent o r more in
both countries, there are  47 such industries in Japan, as compared
v/ith 34 in the United States. Since i t  is a general im pression that
the problem of monopoly and administered prices are  more serious
in Britain and the United States, it is a  little surprising at f irs t sight
but no wonder if we look into the situation more closely. Probably
the m arket concentration ratio  itself does not convey much information
about monopoly because It ’does not directly reflect the character of
competition or the likelihood of collusion within the Industry’ <3).
Generally speaking, the market concentration ratio  is  higher in those
industries where the use of large-scale capital-intensive technology
is Indfspensible, o r which are  ’new* in the som e that the ir products
have recently been either developed for market purposes at home o r
introduced from abroad. Particularly where the methods of production
used in the industry concerned a re  protected by patent rights or
highly sophisticated, the ratio  may be very high. Many new chemicals
like polyeaters, polypropylene, etc. fall under thio category^ One of
the reasom  for the generally high level of concentration in Japan is
that many product® of the heavy and chemical Indus tr ie s  are___________
(IjT'see M^A.''W<m,"' l n 5 t r W  (1970),' p i’81."
(2) F a ir  Trade Commission'(Jg]S^n)7" H ihoi^^ Bangyo-shucbu (1980),
pp. 208-8.
(3) A. Hunter, op. c i t . ,  p. 108.
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relatively new - introduced from abroad or developed at home after 
the Second World War - and require large-scale capital-intensive 
plants o r use produotton methods Introduced under the contract with 
foreign patentees. Another important factor bearing on the level of 
concentration is the size of the m arket relative to the scale of 
technology economically available. In a country where the siae of 
the economy (and therefore that of the domestic market) is small# 
like Australia# the degree of concentration is generally g reater (1), 
The difference in the general level of concentration between the 
United States and Japan may be partly accounted for in this context. 
Needless to any# the alze of the market for particu lar goods is  not 
always equivalent to that of the national economy. The m arkets for 
some commodities are  extremely localised, like building construction 
and laundry work# o r limited to particular consum ers, like railway 
carriages or locomotives# because of the nature of the eommoditiea 
without much regard to the absolute aim  of the national economy.
Milk products, except fresh  milk, and whisky a re  hii^ily concentrated 
in Japan but not so  in Britain and the United States, which is  mainly 
due to the difference In tlie size of the markets for those products 
(for which demand is relatively limited in Japan) ra ther tlmn the 
difference in technology used in the eountrios concerned,
Economic growth may work on the level of Industrial
concentration in a particular industry in two opposite way». F irs t,
the rise of the aggregate demand level concurring wifti economic
growth may generally expand the size of the existing market*, which 
(1) A . Hunter# op. c i t . ,  p . 120.
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wiîl facilitate the entry of new firm® or stimulate the competition 
among the existing firme to increase their share in the m arket and 
result in a lower level of concentration. Secondly, however, shifts 
in the demand structure incidental to the rise  of the per-caplta income 
level may expand the m arkets for some new products hut contract the 
m arkets for old products. In this esse firm s, faced with a 
contracting m arket for their products, tend to turn to collective 
curbs on production through coHmion or try  to maintain their preoent 
share « which is threatened with shrlnlisge « by merging weaker firm s 
in tho same industry. Tlie result may be a higher level of concen­
tration. The diversification of products, resulting from increasing 
specialisation, may slice the existing market through the invasion of 
new products unless aggregate demand expands rapidly enough. A 
higher level of concentration may ensue from it for each product, 
either old or new. The complicated interplay of tiiese factors makes 
the future trends in the general level of industrial concentration 
difficult to predict. It appears that in Britain m arket concentration 
has increased since tlie beginning of the 19S0*s, <1) wMle in Japan it 
decreased until the close of the 19G0*e but increased slightly thereafter 
<2>. As for the trends in the concentration ratios of individual 
industries, with a ll the differences in detail, some common 
characteristics are  observable in both Britain and Japan. High 
concentration ratios a re  found in both countries among such industries
<1) M.A. Utton, op. c i t . ,  pp. 84-Ô.
<2) F a ir Trade Commission, op. c i t . ,  pp. 57 * 67.
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m  chem icals, engineering, veMcles, watches, glass, cement, 
metal manufacture, etc. An interesting fact is tiiat in the older 
manufacturing industries like textiles and food-processing, market 
concentration appears to be on the increase after the war in the 
two countries <1). However, these industries include very 
heterogeneous aub-industry groups within themselves: On the one
hand, the m arkets for traditional goods like natural fibres, clotiting, 
bread, soya-sauce, sake, and the like have been competitive for a 
long time but in face of contracting demand for them, m arket 
concentration has tended to r ise  in recent years: on the otiier, 
there a re  relatively new goods like synthetic fibres, m argarine, 
chocolate, e tc ., which are  rather higlily concentrated.
On the whole the geneml tendency of concentration in a 
particular industry is supposed to be such that a t the early stages of 
its development the industry’s concentration is high because of a 
limited number of initiative enterprises; then* as demand for the 
industry’s  products expands, new firm s enter the industry, which 
results in intensified competition among firm s for a  la rger m arket 
share and probably in a fall in the concentration level; and finally, 
the m arket for the products Is saturated and demand for them becomes 
stagnant o r  often declines because of the advent of new substitutes, 
which results in the elimination of less efficient firm s and the
<1) See M.A. Htton, op. c i t . ,  p. 04, and F a ir  Trade Commission, 
op. cit.
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increase of concentration in more efficient firm s. It in believed 
that many Japanese inc te tries have oo far been at otages from the 
f irs t to the second and further to the third in some cases* while a 
considerable number of B ritish industries seem  to bo at or near the 
third stage as defined above, for there is no industry whose output 
decreased during the 1900*a in Japan but tiie production of some 
British industries actually shrunk (1).
(1) See Appendix IX f Index numbers of industrial production).
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CHAPTER 3.
RECENT TRENDS IN PRICES
1. Consumer Price»
It was in the 1950*# that both British and Japanese
economies begmt to break with remains of wartime or post-war
emergency controls and return to normalcy, and that the galloping
inflation caused by explosive demand immediately after the Second
World War and during the Korean War was thought to have changed
into a creeping inflation, which is  s till going <m today. As shown
in Table 3-1, the pace of price increase slowed down in the latter
half of the 1950's in both countries. By this period consumer prices
in Britain had already lost downward flexibility, which those in Japan
still retained (ctmsumer prices actually droj^ped, as shown in
Figure 3-1, in the years 1955 and 1958 in Japan). On entering the
1989*#, the rate of price inflation again accelerated, particularly in
Japan, and downward rigidities Table 3 - 1
in price movements became Average Annual Rates of Change
in Consumer Prices over Period;
apparent In Japan as well.
Although the annual rate of 
price inflation showed great 
variation in Japan, the basic 
trend in the price movements 
of both countries was strikingly sim ilar, as Figure 3-1 demonstrates 
(1). As regards factors having contributed to the increase of the
(1) The correlation coefficient between the movements in consumer 
prices of both countries is 0.4568 (See Appendix V ).
Britain Japan
% %
1952.54 4 .7 6 .0
1955-59 3.3 0.6
1960-64 2.8 6 .4
1965-69 4.2 5 .4
Source: UN Statistical Yearbook
Figure 3 - 1
A o
Rate o f  
change
Percenta e changes in  consumer 
p r ices  over the previous year
/o -! r i ta in  
Japan
O
• Ol-O
Figure 3 - 2
Percentage changes in  w holesale  
p r ices  over the previous year
 Bri ta in
 Japan
Source: See Appendix V.
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coiMiumtr price level, there ere elm llerltlee end dllferencee 
between the two eoimtrlee: Howeleg, eervlcee end m lecelleeeoe# 
good# regtetered e high rate of price in crtiee over 105#^6# In both 
coontriee; in Jepeo, food prices rose most rapidly and contributed 
most to the rise of the coneumer price level, while the rate of 
increase in these prices was lower than the average in Britain; the 
prices of fuel and light soared In Britain but remained fairly stable 
in Japan <1>*
Z* Wholesale Prices
The wholesale price level regained more stability, like 
the consumer price level, in the 1950*s emcept the first two years 
when the aftermath of the "backlog** inflatlw  (following the end of 
the Second World War and reinforced by the Korean Warl was still 
felt. (2) The average annual rate of increase In wholesale prices 
over the five years' period beginning in 1949 (when the pound 
sterling was devalued) was veiqr high, as compared with those In 
other periods, in both countries.
Table 9 . 2
A# shown in Figure
Average Annual Rates of Chmsge 
this is mainly due to extremely in Wholesale Prices over Juried
large price increases before United Kingdom; Japan;
Years Basic Finished A ll item s
1952. In the following
1949.54
materials goods 
T.O 4.8% 19.9 %
decade the wholesale price 1954.59 o.« a.4 0 .0
1959.94 1.0 2.9 0.4
level, except for manu. 1954.59 9 .3  9 .3 1.1
factured goods in the U .K ., Source: UN Statistical Yearbook.
(1) For l^rther analysis, see Appendix HI.
(2) Taking 1999 as a base year (1039 " 100), the index of British  
wholesale prices in 1950 was 299 for basic materials and 194 
for Hnlshed g o o # , while that of Japan was 17,500 (Source; BN
V earbo#).
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remained relatively stable. Although It# average annual rater, 
of inoreaae was higher In the latter half of the 1960'a than In the 
preceding decade, the pattern was not broken until the very end of 
the 1960'a,
The wholesale price level has displayed far more downward 
flexibility than the consumer price level in both countries, ¥et it 
seem s that in the second half of the 1960*8 the wholesale price level 
has also tended to become less flexible downwards, a develc^ment 
which was already apparent for British manufactured goods in the 
105O*s, Wliolesale prices of manufactured goods in Britain have 
been particularly respmwive to previous fluctuations in the prices 
of basic m aterials (1) and the movements in consumer prices were 
also related, though less a i^ ren t, to those in wholesale prices of 
finished goods there <2>, In Japan movements in consumer prices 
which showed a higher rate of increase in the 1960*# were not 
accompanied by corresponding movements in the wholesale price 
level which was more stable than in Britain <$), Thus discrepancies 
between the movements of wholesale and consumer prices in Japan 
were very much greater Bian In Britain during the 1060's,
(1) The correlation coefficient between movements in wholesale prices 
of finished goods and those of basic m aterials one year earlier
is  0,9044 (See Appendix V ).
(2) The coefficient of correlation between tlie rates of change in 
consumer prices and wholesale prices (of finished goods) over 
1052.69 is  0.5227 (See A j^ndix V ).
(3) The correlation coefficient between the rates of change in 
consumer prices and wholesale prices over 1961.68 in Japan is  
0,2786 (SeeAppendix V ).
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The most prominent feature of the wholesale prices for 
manufactured goods in Britain is  that since the middle of the 1050's 
the prices of steel, machinery, fuel, and chemicals - in short, 
products of the modern key industries * have continuously risen, 
while the prices of these products in Japan have remained fairly 
stfd>le or even fallen. In Japan, although the wholesale prices as 
a whole have been relatively stable, the prices of processed food, 
non-manufactures (farm products, e tc .) and sundry goods manufactured 
by sm all industries have increased considerably fast. Since these 
products are mainly consumer goods, increases in their prices 
tend to push up consumer prices directly, unless there are large 
productivity improvements in distributive trades (which is  not 
likely in practice). On the whole, one of the main reasons why 
the British wholesale price level rose faster is that those prices 
of products of the modem key industries which should be lowered 
because of great possibilities for productivity improvements (if 
price stability is  to be maintained) actually increased, while in 
Japan falls in some of these prices were offset by rises in the 
prices of products of the backward sector, which resulted in a 
relative stability of the wholesale price level. (1)
$. Import and Export Prices
British export prices have had a steady upward trend 
since the beginning of the 1860's, in contrast with the relative 
stability of the Japanese export prices, which were lower in 1969
(1) For fbrther analysis, see A j^ndlx m*
Fi g ur e  3 - 3
4 b
Rate o f
change ov e r  the  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
 Bri  t a i n
 J apan
V
F ig u r e  3 - 4
P e r c e n t a g e  changes  i n  e x p o r t  p r i c e s  
ov e r  the  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
  B r i t a i n
 J apan
Year
"lO -
Source;  See Appendix V.
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than at the hoglïïnüig of the 19(50*» (Ffgw%'o S 4) : U). In both
1
countries import prices fluctimted moro greatly in tho short run but 
remained more stable ovor tho period, exoopt for the early 1950*s and 
the last two yoaris (0b British Import prices soared imtncdlately after 
dévaluât ion in 1940 and 1007. Japanese import prioc» were relatively 
stable and ©till much lower in 1000 than in the early 1060%. Taking 
into account the hoarder dopendonce of the British economy on foreign 
trade (3), the increasee in import price# mm% have had a greater 
unfavourable effect on tho B ritish domestic prices, which hae in turn 
been likely to push up her export price#.
In Britain tho import prices of manufactured goods and foodstuff, 
which constituted two thirds of her imports (in 19601, rose considerably 
fast, v/hile in Japan tho imports of those goods which showed large 
price increases, like machinery, matais, e tc ,, were less important 
#0 that she did not suffer so much m  Britain did from  inflationmy 
trends in the world market, Aa for movements in export price», the 
pricea of products ©f key manufacturing industries, like machinery, 
metals, chemicals, e tc ., which constituted nearly two third# of total 
export,s in both countries, rose to a considerable extent in Britain end
(II The export price level was 7 per cent lower in 1069 than In 19S3 in
Japan, while it was 25 per cent higher in 1067 (even before devaluation! 
than in 1953 in Britain (Sourcsi National Institute Economic Review and 
Bank of Japan Economic statistics Monthly).
(2) The import price level was 15 per cent lower in 1059 than In 105S In 
Japan, while it gsoared in IBM and 1909 after devaluation, though also 
7 per cent lower in 1907 than in 1961, In Britain (Scmrcej The sum# 
as in B'ootnote (l> ).
(S) The ratio of the amount of foreign trade - export# pin# import# of 
goods and services  ^ to GKF in 1969 is nearly M  per cent for the 
Baited Kingdom and about 15 per cent for Japan (Source; The same 
a# above).
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fell in Japan (W#
Although import and export price# aeem to be more flexible 
than domestic consumer or wholesale prices in any country because 
of keener competition in t!ie world market, a sign of downward 
flexibility appeared in the British export prices, while it was not yet 
certain in those of Japan in the 1080%* If we look at Figure# 3-3 and
3-4, however, v/e find that dnere was a considerably close association 
between the British and the Japanese import prices over the period, 
except for the last two years, though the degree of association between 
the export prices of both countries was much lower, particularly in 
recent years. With all the differences, as might foe expected from 
the above analysis, the underlying trends in the price movements of 
both countries may be sim ilar. This is confirmed by correlation 
analysis: The coefficients of correlation between the rate# of change in
consumer prices <aa referred to In Section 1) and between those in imp(p*t 
prices and export prices, of the two countries over the period are 
0,41586, 0,7067 and G.3254 respectively (2), Tltere are, therefore, 
Supposed to foe some underlying causes common to both British and 
Japanese economies. Tlie similarity of the basic trends in price# of 
the two countries may be due to accident but It seems more reasonable 
to consider that they are linked with the condition# of the world market 
and similar shift# in îhû demand structure in the home market. Aa 
regards the export and import prices, Britain and Japan Imve common 
characteristics ; They are (I) importer# of basic materials and
<1) For further analysis, see Appendix 111.
2^) See Appendix V.
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foodstuff (though less important for Japan) and (it) exporters of 
manufactured goods. But. import prices are largely determined
by the conditions ruling In the world markets and differences in the 
movements of the general level of import prices between the two 
countries may be ascribed to differences in the composition of imported 
goods and services and In the movements of their Individual prices.
Export prices will also be subjected to international competition but 
much more sharply influenced by demand conditions in the home market 
and the cost conditions of domestic industry.
Finally, to sum up the movements in the different price 
indexes in the two countries, we can show the relationships between 
them by a chain of relationships as follows;
Import Wholesale prices Wholesale prices
prices ^ ^  for basic ^ -------->  for finished
(IP) materials (V¥B> goods (WF)
Consumer 
prices (CP)
Export 
prices < EP)
This diagram shows that (i) the impact on other prices of cost push 
arising from either import or wholesale prices will be transmitted 
from left to right; and (Ü) the impact on prices of excess demand 
arising from either the home or the export market will be transmitted 
from right to left, on the other hand. We have tested the degree of 
linkage of those relationships by correlation analysis. The results 
are in the following table, which shows the coefficients of correlation 
between the rates of change in price indexes of two different categories 
listed in the column and the row (for example, that between WF and 
BP is 0 .78SI). Generally speaking, the movements of aU pricei
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Table 3 . 3  
Correlation between Different Price Indexes
over the Period 1952.69
U.K..; Japan:
WB WF WB-fWP
IP 0.0695 IP 0.7661
WF 0.8044 CP 0.2785
CP 0.5227 EP 0.7618
BP 0.7861
SourceÎ See Appendix V.
indexes are, as might be expected, positively more or less related 
to one another in both countries. The degree of linkage of the 
movements in different price indexes is very much higher for Britain 
than for Japan. This may imply that a large rise in import prices 
will hit other prices in Britain harder than in Japan. And, taking 
into account a strong correlation between the movements in Import 
prices of both countries, their domestic inflations may be related to 
each other through price adjustmen^in the world market.
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C i m P T E R  4.
RECEMT TRE3XID8 IN WAGES
1. Movements in the Genez al Level of Money \?age«
Since the Second World War the money wage level ha© been 
rising, continuously and much faster than the price level, in both 
Britain and Japan (1), *Tho moat obvious characteristic of money wage# 
is that they rise  over the long run. ( . . • )  There waa little relation, 
however, between tho rate of increase in money and rea l wages, either 
as between countries or between different time periods in tho same 
country. * (2), As Figureo 4-1 and 4-2 siiow, the pace of money wage 
inoreaae differs considerably between Britain and Japan in tho last two 
decades or so: The money wage level tripled in Britain and more than
tjuadrauplcd in Japan, while the consumer price level approximately 
doubled in both countries. The Japanese rate of Increase in money 
wages was generally higher than that of Britain throughout the period, 
e25cept for 1065-8 (Table 4-1 and Figures 4-3 and 4-4). Tho British 
ra te  of increase in consumer prices was also higher during this short 
period, while it generally lower than that of Japan in the 1960*8,
(1) The most coiuipicuous feature of tho movements in wages after the 
%?ar la tho sustained r ise  of wages in industrial countries. E .H . 
Phelps Brov/n pointed out that *tho average rate of rise  is generally 
g reater than timt experienced before in all save ra re  years of high 
boom such as 1873 or 1910,* and that *ovon more unprecedented than 
the rate of the r ise  is its persistence for as much as 15 years*: 
hitherto it had been ra re  for rises to continue for more than five 
years together. * (*lrom 1645 to 1960: a note by tlm present writer) 
(op. c i t . ,  pp. 291-3).
(2) L.G . Reynolds, op. c i t . ,  p. 413 .(...) is abridged by tho present 
w riter.
s?
F i g u r e  4 - 1
U. K.  : Movements i n  e a r n i n g s  and
p r i c e s ,  as  on i n d e x ,  1951 = 100
Average  week ly  
e a r n i n g s  o f  a l l  
manual workers
3ôo
XOO
Consumer
p r i c e s
Year
Source:  UN S t a t i s t i c a l  Yearbook and Employment and P r o d u c t i v i t y  
G a z e t t e .
F i g u r e  4 - 2
Japan: Movements i n  e a r n i n g s  and p r i c e s ,  
as  on i n d e x ,  1 9 5 2  = 100
Average  monthly  
e a r n i n g s  o f  
a l l  workers
ioo <
Consumer p r i c e s
Year/frx
Source:  UN S t a t i s t i c a l  Yearbook; Yearbook o f  Labour S t a t i s t i c s .
Figure 4 - 3
P e r c e n t a g e  c hanges  i n  e a r n i n g s  and consumer  
p r i c e s  o v e r  th e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r  i n  B r i t a i n
%
Earnings  
Consumer p r i c e s
F i g u r e  4 - 4
P e r c e n t a g e  changes  i n  e a r n in g s  and consumer  
p r i c e s  o v e r  the  p r e v i o u s  y e a r  i n  Japan
%
Earnings  
Consumer p r i c e s
/trj.
Source:  See  Appendice  V, X, and XI .
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a@ ^howa in  Fignre 3-1 of the preood&ng clmpter. The real wage level
more than doubled in Japan and roee one and a half times in Britain
during the last two decadea. It is impreeaive that the high rate of
inoreaae in money wagea alwaya e:Eoeeded the high rate of inoreaae in
Table 4 - 1
Average Annual Rates of Increase in 
Wages and Consumer P rices over Period ■
(in percentages)
U .K x Japan:
Wages P rices wageo P rices (C)/(D)
(A) (B> (C) (D)
1051-64 6 .0 4*7 1.6 10.0 6 .0 1.8
1054.50 6 .0 3 .3 1.8 6 .3 0 .6 8.8
1059.04 6 .0 3 .8 3.1 0 .8 5.4 1.8
1064-60 6*6 4 .3 1.8 12.3 6 .4 2 .3
Notej- Per explanations And source# see Appendix IP*
consumer prices and# therefore# the real wage level continuously rose
throughout the period from 1053 to 1050 in Japan# whereas the real 
wage level oeaeed rising In those years when the increase in money 
wages decelerated# in Britain*
If we look# however# at the relation between tho rates of 
increase in money wagon and consumer prices in a longer term# things 
differ* There seems to be a loose relationship that tho rate of 
Incroaeo in money wages is high# as shown in Figures 4.3 and 4*4# 
whe%i that in consumer prices is aleo high or vice versa (1). Between
------- -—
(1) I he coefficients of correlation between the rates of cliange in 
wages and consumer prices over 1053-39 are 0.5133 for the U.K. 
and 0. 0340 for Japan (See Appendix V).
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1954 and 1950 the rises in both money wages and prices slowed down 
in Japan# as compared with tho preceding and following y ea rs . So 
did they !ti Britain between 1956 and 1983. Interestingly enough# the 
rea l wage level rose more# during those periods when both rates of 
Increase In money wages and consumer prices wore low (I.e . 1954- 
59 and 1950«84 In Britain and 1954-59 In Japan)# than during those periods 
when they were high (Table 4«1). The accelerated increases In money 
wages (In 1956# 1980-W# 1984# and 1968 in Britain; and In 1957# 1963# 
and 1905 in Japan) were followed by large rises in prices In the ensuring 
ono or two years (I .e . 1958# 1962# 1965# and 1969 in Britain; and 1957# 
1963# and 1965 in Japan), But in Japan# since 1988# the rise  in money 
wages has steadily accelerated one year after another a situation which 
can be genuinely term ed a **wage explosion**# while that in prices has 
remained fairly stable at a  high level round 5 per cent annually. (1)
Incidentally# tho **pay pauae" by the Conservative government 
In 1961-62 and the **atandetill" by the labour government in 1066-87 
left c lear traces on the movements in British wages on the graph in 
Figure 4-8# and tho same graph also shows that after these wage 
restrain ts wore lifted# greater wage advances followed.
Lastly# two things to bo added, which are  relevant to la ter 
discussion# are  (i) although the degree of correlation between the rates
(1) As analysed more fully la ter, the large wage increases In this
period# mainly induced by labour shortages# were absorbed by high 
productivity growth which was made possible by rapid capital 
formation in tlie past# so that their Impact on the price level was 
relatively moderate.
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of olwngo in wages aW  whoWalo prices was lower than that between 
tmgOG and consumer piioos In both oonntrioe, the movomento in wages 
were more highly oBGooiated with those in wholesale prices in Japan 
than Ib Britain; Cli) while the rate of vm go  Inereaso- has already 
ouQOQûod 10 por cQBt por mmnm since 1D0Î in Japan# the rate of 
productivity growth in mamfaetuf'Ing industry Im n  also been high ù n û  
far more strongly asaopiated with the rate of v-mgo inoreaae in Japan 
than in Brltah^ (1).
2, Wage Dipporoioa
The general wage level is oomotimea misleading becatiao it 
simply ropresonto tho average of the wages of all workers and takes no 
account of dWparitiee among them* A high general %vago level docs 
not always moan that all workers equally receive high wages 5 Some 
of them may reçoive lower wages in a high-wage country# region, or 
industry than the averagO' o r even low-wage workers in a îow-wage 
country# region# or Indnotry; equally# a rise  in tho general wage 
level may be the resu lt of an increase In the pay-packet of higher- 
wage workers# %vhilo low-wago workers roaoivo the same wages os 
before. Although tho wage level in Japan an well ao other Western 
eoimtrîoj? has soared since tho Second World War# there seem  to bo 
many low-wago workers who have been loft bohînd In wage advances#
(I) The coefficients of correlation between tho ratea of change In 
wages and wholesale prices over 1952 (1054 for Japan) - 108*9 are 
0.9014 for Britain miû 0.4550 for Japan Wee Appendix v)* The 
ooefficimit^ of corrolation between the rates of luoreaoe in v/egea 
and productivity in nmnnfaotoring Industry over 1959-09 are 0.20^5 
for BritRÎî'A and 0.5305 for Japan (See AppendhrxV).
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whUe some hlgh-wage workers may have further improved tW r 
position.
Tho distribution of wages among the workers is more or less 
positively skewed in most countries# that is to say# there Is more 
upward than downward spead in wages among the w orkers. This is 
also the case in both Britain and Japan (Figure 4-^5). Wage dispersion# 
particulariy downward spread# m larger in Japan (1) than in Britain 
where *there Is less spread in earnings now than in 1906# but more 
of an upward spread in 1060 than in 1338* (2). Even if we limit 
ourselves to male workers in some manual trades# there are  yet wide 
differences in earnings between them and the distribution of their 
earnings is also positively skewed in both countries (Figure 4 - 6).
While the pattern of upward spread is similar# the extent of downward 
spread is g reater in Japan than in Britain. What are  the causes of 
wage dispersion among the workers who were often supposed to be 
homogeneous and paid the same wages in classical economic theory?
What are the causes of wider wage dispersion or more downward spread 
in Japan than in Britain? Is there any relationship between the degree 
of wage dispersion and the rate of increase in the wage level? In
(1) One thing to be noted about Figui'o 4-5 is that the British data are  
for weekly earnings and the Japanese data are  for annual earned 
income of employees* Dispersion in annual earnings tends to be 
wider than that in weekly earnings because of differences between 
workers in tho security of employment# and tho forms of payment 
throughout the year - for example, about 5 per cent of all male 
employees and 12 per cent of female employoea woi'ked short-tim e 
during the year 1968 in Japan (Source: Employment Status Survey).
(2> L .C . Hunter and D .J . Robertson# op. cit.# p. 116. In this
connection# M. W. Ruder pointed out that in the United States there 
has also occurred# since 1941# a steady reduction of wage dispersion 
(Labor in a Growing Economy (1957)# p. 366),
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F i g u r e  4 - 5  
E s t im a ted  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  e a r n in g s
No. of workers 
as ^ of the 
whole
10 British male workers 
Japanese male workers
250 30020015010050
(Median)
N o t e : -  The e a r n i n g s  o f  B r i t i s h  workers are  f o r  t h e  weefcly^'earni ns  o f  
f u l l - t i m e  employees  i n  September ,  I 9 6 8  and t h o s e  o f  Japanese  
w orkers ,  f o r  annual  earned income o f  employees  i n  I 9 6 8 ,
Source:  Employment and P r o d u c t i v i t y  G a z e t t e  and Employment S t a t u s  Survey,
No. o f  
workers  
as  ‘vc o f  
th e  whole
15
10
F i g u r e  4 - 6
E s t im a ted  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  e a r n in g s  
o f  e l e c t r i c i a n s  and l a b o u r e r s  i n  
B r i t a i n  and Japan
 British electricians
 British labourers
 Japanese electricians
Japanese labourers
Earnings  
as ^ o f  
median
100
(Median)
N o t e : -  The w e e k ly  e a r n i n g s  o f  f u l l - t i m e  men pa id  f o r  a f u l l  week,  September,  
1 9 6 8 , are  used  f o r  B r i t a i n  and th e  d a i l y  e a r n i n g s  o f  male workers  
i n  b u i l d i n g  t r a d e s ,  A u gus t ,  19^7,  f o r  Japan.
Source :  Employment and P r o d u c t i v i t y  G a z e t t e  and Yearbook o f  Labour S t a t i s t i c s
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oMoy W w* Hrat 3jWe a$ the
mtfucWy*  ^cliff«f«*itiiil# wwpmtWw# h#w#$m r«gW##
W$###m Iîi^i4»trl««# &#W«em ftrm t, #$#, #- in  Bi?it»lti #md imp### mW#
Îîi ihm mmt mhmpwy# mttmmpt te memmtyeet m thtérett^ml IfmmmwerM for 
msplmleiof tM#e <ltll«rt«timlm* W# mm pmr##eMr% Ititmiftmtfsl I» 
ÊWer#Wü#try # # #  difimrtotimïii in rmlmtio# #  mevemmmt# i# prWe*# 
hmomemm* ,#.# tb@ prodmel mmrW teW# to h# mtrrered Im tht îmbomr 
mmrkrnt mmd te Mtmmîm  the ##ge »$rm#Wr#. * ilh $n other word*, 
therm t# mmppomed #  %# morne reîmtio» èetweea the movement# im priee# 
mm# wmge#. Hot oWy Im the prodoet mrnrket -mirrored Iîi the îmhomr 
market but the eom#ttom» of the Imhour iimrkel mmy mîmo he refleeted 
W the prodeot mmrket thwmgh the effeot of #mg# eo#t* m  prleem# ïn 
tM« #em# wmgem deterralnei în the ImWer mmrhet mmy he reîmte# to 
prtee# détermine# to the prWmet mmrhmt. The wage mtmeWr# t# m 
refleetto» of the tmhour market etroetore# . A# we mhmll dtoem#» îmter# 
the Mhmr market l i  mtrmetore# to vmrtou# way# an# wide wage 
differenllmîs between différent worker* nmy mrnggmt the tmiiteaee 
aeptrmte Imhnm mmrkete for them# laolmtecl from one another to m 
greater or Wmer degree*" The tmlBw of wage differentimî* may# 
therefore# help #* to «togto m i tlmm aopamto labour mmrWW and 
aaeertato how wage# a re  deter mine# in eaeh labour mmrket. We alao 
oomeWer whether the mlêimim of wifto wage dteperalon for the #amo 
category of worker* or wide wage differential# between differ## type* 
of workem may be to the inefficient operation of the labour
market#
(i) J.T* Dunlop# "The t w k  of Contemporary Wage Theo%T-\ to 0 # w . 
Taylor and F .B , P i^m m  led#,) Concept* in Wage ©etermtoatton 
(lesn# pp* 135.6* ^
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3# Ocoupational ï>iiîerentiaî«
An mentioned in the following chapter#, apart from some 
professions and manual trades* the labour market is not so rnuch 
developed for oceupations in Japan as in Britain o r  other European 
countries* so that sta tistical data for ooeupational wage differentials 
in Japan Is scanty and fragmentary* Despite this and other lim itations. 
If we venture a comparison, we find tw t  there is apparently a wider 
spread In earnings among different occupations In Japan ttian in 
Britain* Tables 4-8 and 4*3 in the following page show difference#
In earnings between occupations as on Index, taking the median (or 
average) earnings of labourers as 100, and how much the earnings of 
the worker at the lower o r upper quartile In the sam e occupation group 
deviate from the median. The mean coefficient of variation in the 
median or average earning# of different occupation groups I» higher 
for Japan than for Britain,
Tho ranking of occupation# by wage level is fairly sim ilar 
between Britain and Japan (1), Om  big difference is in the relative 
position of c lerical workers in the occupational wage hierarchy; 
their rank is s till lügh In Japan* while It has dropped considerably 
since bofore the F irs t l#>rld War (though thin trend has been somewhat 
reversed a lte r  1055) In Britain (2), One of tho reasons for this
(1) The pattern of occupational ranking in the United States is 
approximately sim ilar to that in Britain and Japan (See L.G, 
Reynolds, op. c i t . ,  p . 464),
(2) L .C . Hunter and D .J . Eobertson, op. c i t . ,  pp. 120*31. M.W. 
Eeder pointed out that there had been a decline in tho earning 
advantage of c lerica l over manual workem in the Dnited States 
(See op. c i t . ,  pp. 45# * 00).
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relatively high rank of c lerical workers in Japan is probably that 
clerical work is s till a man% Job: six out of every ten such workers
are  male there, v/hile the proportion i# seven twentieths in Britain, 
Occupational wage differentials shrunk during and immediately after
tho Second World War but have gradually increased since the middle 
of tho 195O’d in Britain <1), But the established ranking of occupations 
is said to persis t over a long period of time (2),
Table 4 * 2
Groat Britain: Weekly earnings (median) of full-tim e male employees
paid for a full week by occupation, as on index, 
earnings of a labourer * 100, September, 19G8
Administrative and management 187
All other professional 177
Educational, welfare and medical 163
Technical and scientific 154
Other (production process workers, etc, ) 120
Sales 119
Driver, docker* and other transport 118
Office and communication 113
labourer# 100
Service and security 99
Farming and horticulture 82
Note:- The mean coefficient of variation for these figures is 32,9.
Source: Employment and Productivity Gazette,
(1) L .C , Hunter and D, J ,  Hobertson, ibid.
<2) R,A, L ester, Economics of Labor (1984), p , 303.
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Table 4 - 8
Japan: Average annual earned income of male employee# by
occupation, aa on Index, average earning# of labourers « lOQ^
in 1968
Management and officials 370
Professional and technical 208
Clerical and kindred 173
Security 170
Seles 144
Transport and communication 141
Mining and quarrying trades 129
Production process workers and craftsm en 128
Service 110
Agricultural workers, lumbermen, and 
fisherman 102
Labourers 100
Note;*. The mean coefficient of variation for these figures is 73.3.
Source: Employment Status Survey (Bureau of Statistics, Prim e 
M inister’s Office).
Manual-nonmanual differentials are also wider in Japan than
in Britain, as shown in Table 4 «4. They are  narrow er for females
than for males in both countries. The percentage differential in
earnings between manual and nonmanual workers has been on the
decrease in the long run in Japan: it narrowed rapidly, n -
Table 4 - 4
Average Earnings of Manual Workers as Percentage 
of Those of Nonmanual W orkers by Selected Industries
U.K. :* Japan;
Male Female Male .Female
Mining and quarrying 68 73 67 76
Construction 73 83 64 66
Manufacturing 76 88 69 72
Note:- The British figures are  based on average weekly earnings
in 1909 and the Japanese figures, average monthly cash 
earning# of regular production and non-production workers 
in 1967.
SourceÎ Employment and Productivity Gazette and Yearbook of
Labour S tatistics,
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aa in Britain, during immediately a f te r  the Second World War and 
then widened until the middle of the lÛ50*a and diminished again there­
after (1).
One thing to bo noted is that ’the range of earnings within 
each occupation is usually a good deal wider than the average difference 
between it and neighbouring occupations, (2) There are  some 
workers who earn far m ore, while others earn much less , than the 
average in every occupation. For example, the earnings of the 
bottom ten per cent of male employees engaged in administration and 
management are  less than one third of those of the top ten per cent 
in the same occupation and lower than even the earnings of the top ten 
per cent of labourers in Britain <3), This also holds true in Japan: 
The top two per cent of labourers earned more than two and a half 
tim es as much as the bottom two per cent of managers and officials 
did in 1968 (4). As a resu lt, the median earnings in management and 
administration were 120 per cent higher than those in farming and 
horticulture, while In management and administration the highest- 
decile earnings were 240 per cent higher than the lowest decile  
earnings in 1968 in Britain <6). This fact that differences in earnings
(1) S. TJJihara, ”Sangyokozo-no Henka to Chlngin-selsaku'*, in Gendai
Eodo-mondai Koza, vol. 2 (1967), p. 30.
(2) L .G . Reynolds, op. c i t . ,  p. 477.
(3) Source: Employment and Productivity Gazette.
(4) Employment Status Survey.
(6) Source; Employment and Productivity Gazette.
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within a given occupation a re  greater than differences in the average 
earnings between occupations seems extremely conflicting with the 
hypothesis of classical economic theory that any worker in the same 
occupation would receive the same wages - even if we take account of 
imperfect competition in the labour market. This m atter will be 
dealt with in the next chapter.
4. Inter-industry Differentials
Table 4 - 5  and 4 - 6  show inter-industry differences in 
the average earnings as relative to those of manufacturing industry as 
a whole and percentage increases in the average earnings by industry 
over period in Britain and Japan. The ranking of industries by wage 
level is strikingly sim ilar between the two countries as far as 
manufacturing industry is concerned (1). This fact seems to be 
fairly universal, particularly among advanced industrial countries <2). 
In both countries the high-wage industries are  vehicles, metal 
manufacture, printing and publishing, chemicals, and so on, while 
low-wage industries are  clothing, textiles, leather goods, tim ber and 
furniture, and food processing (3). There is, however, no such 
sim ilar relationship in the ranking of services and industries other
(1) The rank correlation coefficient for 12 comparable manufacturing 
industries between the two countries is 0.8698 (See Appendixvil).
(2) See, for example, T.B. Papola and V. P . BharadwaJ, '^Dynamics 
of Industrial Wage Structure; an Inter-country Analysis", The 
Economic Journal, vol. LKXX, no. 317 (1970).
(3) R.A. Lester pointed out that high-wage industries in the United 
States, Canada, and other countries arc  petroleum refining, a i r ­
craft and automobile assembly, chemicai», printing, rubber tire s  
and tubes, steel, while low-wage industries are  cotton textiles and 
clothing, tobacco, leather goods, food processing, furniture, and 
fertilizer (op. c i t . ,  p. 307).
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Tablo 4
In d u s try  Wap;e le v e l ,  o.b on Indez 5 the Average o f A ll
ï'îaïiuPaoturing* In d u n tr ieo  -  100, in  3.969 and Percen tage
InoroasoG in  i t  ovor 1961—69 in the U nited kingdom
Page
le v e l
Wage
increai
A ll m anufacturing in d u s tr ie s 100 57
V ehicles 115 55
P aper, p r in t in g  and p u b lish in g 113 M«A,
ile ta l m anufacture 104 54
S h ip b u ild in g  and marine en g in eerin g 103 87
Chemicals and a l l i e d  products 101 60
Other m anufacturing In d u s tr ie s 99 61
E ngineering  and e l e c t r i c a l  goods 98 51
B rick s j p o tto ry ,  g la s s ,  oement, etc* 98 58
Metal goods not elsew here s p e c if ie d 97 54
Pood, d rin k  and tobacco 94 67
T e x tile s 89 58
Timberp f u r n i tu r e ,  e tc . 89 56
lioathor goods and :Pur 84 53
C lo th ing  and footwoa,r 84 53
T ransport and oonmiunioation 101 71
Mining and qucarrying (exclud ing  co a l) 96 58
C on stru c tio n 96 64
Gas, e l e c t r i c i t y  and w ater 89 57
C e rta in  m iscellaneous se rv ic e s 83 60
Publi Q admin i s t r a t i o n 75 60
N otes- The wage le v e l  i s  fo r  the  aver■age weekly ea rn in g s  of manual
malG voTkerGp A pril^ 1969*
Sources Employment and P ro d u c tiv ity  G asotte,
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than manufacturing by wage level. In Japan the wage level of these
Industries and aervlces, except distributive trades* is higher than
the average of all manufacturing industriee, while in Britain the
Table 4 . 8
Industry Wage and Percentage Increasee in it over Time for All 
Employees Working at Establishments with 30 o r More Employees* 
in Japan
Average monthly earnings: 
Wage level* us on Percentage
All manufacturing industries 
Petroleum  and coal products 
Iron and steel 
Tobacco
Publishing and printing 
Chemicals and allied products 
Non-ferrous metal goods 
t  ransport equipment 
Mechanical engineering 
Pulp* paper and allied products 
Instrument engineering 
Fabricated metal goods 
Bricks* pottery* glass* cement* 
etc.
E lectrical engineering
Rubber products 
Food and kindred products 
Leatlier and kindred products 
Other manufacturing 
Furniture and fixtures 
Timber and wooden products 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Electricity* gas and water 
Real estate
.Finance and insurance 
Transport and communication 
Mining 
Construction
Wholesale and re ta il trades
index* all manuk 
facturing • 100* 
in 1967
100
148
142
127
127
121
110
119
112
104
99
09
98
90 
89 
65 
05 
63 
70 
77 
67 
59 
159 
142 
129 
126 
109 
103
99
increase 
over 1958-68
173
193
185
157
166
134
192
148
178
212
182
147
229
174
168
N.A,
200
222
208
156
N.A.
132
160
138
194
153
Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics,
67
average wages of manual male workers in manufacturing industry is 
slightly higher than that In other industries and services* Although 
the above rem arks on the ranking of industries by the average earnings 
level are  based on the earnings of male manual workers for Britain 
and those of all workers* regardless of sex and inanual-nonmanual 
difference* for Japan* we must note that there are  considerable 
variations between male and female or between manual and nonmanual 
workers in the pattern of industry ranking by earnings level <1>*
Interindustry wage dispersion is generally wider in Japan 
than in Britain* The coefficient of variation in the average earnings 
among the male manual workers in different manufacturing industries 
im  percentage of the mean earnings of all manufacturing industries) 
is 9*36 for Britain and 14,87 for Japan, The same is true between 
British and Japanese nonmanual o r female w orkers. Interindustry 
wage dispersion is narrower for male nonmanual than manual employees* 
and for male than female workers* in both countries, <2), It is 
generally admitted that interindustry wage differentials tend to contract 
in the long run, L,G, Reynolds and C,H. Taft pointed out that in te r­
industry as well as occupational differentials in most countries which
(1) The same sources as in I ’able 4-6 and 4-7 te ll us that, for example* 
the highest-wage industry is transport and communication for female 
manual workers and public administration for female nonmanual workers 
in Britain; and that the wage level in petroleum and coal products is 
not high for female manual workers at a ll but wholesale and re ta il 
trades pay relatively high salaries to female employees in Japsm; and 
so on,
<3) For example* the coefficient of variation in the average earnings 
among the male nonmanual workers in manufacturing is 5.11 for 
Britain and 12,04 for Japan,
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they studied had declined in percentage term s since before the Second 
World War (1), though R.A. Lester asserted that 'the industry wage 
hierarchy has persisted over a half century with little change in the 
relative position of industries and little long-run tendency toward 
compression of percentage wage differences between industries •• (2),
As shown in Table 4-7* in Japan* the wage level of lower-wage 
Industries has risen  faster than that of other industries* while there 
has been a decline in the relative position of transport equipment* pulp* 
paper* instrument and electrical engineering* which were among the 
highest-wage industry group a decade before* But some of the lüghest- 
wage industries like petroleum and coal products* tobacco* publishing* 
printing* chemicals* and mechanical engineering have improved their 
relative wage level further during the last decade. The average wage 
level of manufacturing industry as a whole has also improved relative 
to that of non-manufacturing industries and services save construction. 
Among the broader industry groups, construction advanced markedly* 
while the rise  of the wage level in distributive trades* and finance and 
insurance was comparatively slow. As a result* the mean coefficient 
of variation in the average earnings decreased from 19.0 to 15* 6 for the 
broader industry groups and from 24.8 to 23.6 for manufacturing 
industries between 1958 and 1969 (3). Generally speaking* the wage 
level of low-wage industries and services rose faster than that of
(1) The Evolution of Wage Structure (1956)* pp. 352-3.
(2) Op, cit.* p. 308.
(3) These figures are derived from data in Monthly Labour Survey.
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Mgiier-wage industries in Japan (1),
On the other hand* in Britain* though Inter-industry wage 
differentials docreasod between 1938 and 1948 (3), no comparable 
contraction among these differentials has occurred in more recent years . 
In contrast with Japan* improvements in th.o wage level were slower in 
some low-wage industries like clothing and footwear* and leather goods 
and fur* than in some higher-wago industries. In addition* the position 
of manufacturing industry as a whole relative to non-manufacturing 
industries and services slightly fell* so that inter-industry dispersion 
seems to have widened in the 1960's in Britain* as fa r as the earnings 
of male manual workers are  concerned <3).
Ô. In ter-firm  Diffej’cntials
Within a given industry there is consMorable variation in
the wage level between firm s. There is a tendency for earnings to
rise  according to the eisse of establishment in both Britain and Japan*
as shown in Table 4-3* and 4^7^ though Britain haa some
exceptions like cotton c;pinning* bespoken tailoring, and clressmoidng.
The range of size-of-firm  diffex’ontxals within a given industry differs
considerably from one industry to anotlier in both countries. In
British high-wage industries tend to pay higher than the average wages
to aU workers employed in the industries <4) and in Japan firms in
<1) The correlation coefficient between the industry wage level and 
percentage increase in it over time (See Table 4-7) is <-) 0.4280.
<2) L.G. Reynolds and C.H. Taft, op. cit.* pp. 278-8.
<8) The correlation coefficient between the industry wage level and 
percentage increase in it over time (See Table 4-6) is 0.2092.
(4) The correlation coefficient between the highest-decile and the
lowest-decile earnings in given industries is 0* 6310 (See AppendixVII).
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Table 4 - 7
Gî'eat Britain: Average weekly earnings of men, 21 years and over,
in the last pay-week in October, 1988, as percentage 
of those for all establishments by Industry and size 
of establishment
Number of wage-earners employed;
Under 35 500 or more
Bread and floux’ confectionery 9S 101
Cocoa* chocolate and sugar confectionery 88 103
Preserving of fruit and vegetables 81 105
Brewing and malting 95 109
Tobacco 91 90
Cotton spinning, doubling, etc. 107 104
Cotton weaving, etc. 93 107
Woollen and worsted 99 102
Hosiery and other knitted goods 84 109
Textiles finishing, etc. 68 109
Heady-made and wholesale bespoken tailoring 104 100
Retail beapoken tailoring 100 #1
Dressmaking 104 07*
Manufacture of boots* shoes, slippers* etc. 00 101
Timber 94 100*
Furniture and upholstery 85 130
Paper and board 78 104
Printing and publishing of newspaper, etc. 74 111
Other printing and publishing* bookbinding 80 107
Chemicals and dyes 87 103
Pharmaceutical preparations* perfumery, etc 95 W4
Mineral oil refining 83 101
Other oils, greases, glue* etc. 88 107
Rubber 84 102
Leather (training* di’cssing, e tc .) 93 (104)
Leather goods 95 (106)
Bricks and fireclay goods 91 108
China and earthware 93 100
iron  and steel melting* rolling* etc. 83 102
iron foundries 90 104
Non-ferrous metals smelting, rolling* etc. 90 103
Machine tools 09 102
Textiles machinery and accessories 91 103
E lectrical machinery 82 102
W ireless apparatus and gramophones 87 100
Manufacture of motor vehicles and cycles 72 103
Motor vehicles repairs and garages 97 103
Manufact tire and repair of a ircraft 76 102
Manufacture of parts and accessories for 
motor vehicles and a ircraft eo 102
Scientific* surgical and photographic
instruments 88 104
Note: - The asterisked figures are  for establishments with 100 or more 
wage-earners and the parenthesised, for establishments with 
100-400 w ago-earners.
Source: Labour Gasette
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T ble 4 - 8
Japan: Average monthly earning» of regular employees as percentage
of those for all establishments with 5 - 2 9  employees by 
size of establishment (1967 average)
Number of workers employed:
1 . 4 5 - 2 9 500 or more
All industries & services 66 100 159
All manufacturing
male 74 100 153
female 80 100 145
Source; Yearbook of Labour Statistics,
7’able 4 - 9
Japan: Average monthly earnings of regular male employees as
percentage of those for all establishments with 5 or more 
employees by industry and size of establishment
All manufacturing industries 
Publishing, printing, etc.
Food and kindred products 
Ceramic, stone and clay products 
Timber and wooden goods 
Pulp, paper and paper goods 
Petroleum and coal products 
Instrument engineering 
Textiles 
Vehicles 
Clothing
Chemicals and allied products 
Iron and steel 
Mechanical engineering 
Furniture and fixtures 
Electrical goods 
Non-ferrous metals 
Rubber products 
Leather and leather goods 
Tobacco
Wholesale end retail trades 
Finance and insurance 
Real estate 
Construction 
Mining
Transport and communication 
Electricity, gas and water
Number of workers employed;
5 - 2 9 600 or more
78 119
77 145
76 132
73 124
90 139
78 123
67 107
83 123
82 118
77 no
94 123
75 104
71 108
88 114
96 120
84 107
86 106
88 107
94 107
102
85 165
80 130
78 124
85 126
78 109
84 U3
89 U5
Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics
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high-wage Industï’ies pay high wages, irrespective of oiae of firm , 
though the correlation botvveeu the Industry wage levels for sm all and 
large establishments is not very significant (I). But the average sise 
of firm s In a given industry is fairly strongly associated with the wage 
level of the industry in Japan (2): in other lyords, those industries
consisting of large firm s tond to have a high industry w^ age level.
Thus it seems that the wage level of all firm s in a given industry is 
affected by ruling conditions peculiar to the industry (profitability, 
technology, market structure, etc. >, while large firm s are  likely to 
have a high wage level in any industry (with a few exception»). We 
©hall discuss these m atters further in the next chapter.
Size-of-firm  wage differentials are generally wider in Japan 
than in Britain, The average earnings of workers employed at 
establishments with 500 employees o r more a re , as shown in Table
4-9, about 50 per cent higher than those at establishments with 5-29 
employees o r alternatively, 130 per cent higher than those at 
establishments with less than 5 employees. Such wide in ter-firm  
differentials are not found among the British industries listed in 
Table 4-8. The wage differentials between largo and sm all firm s 
in Japanese manufacturing industry widened before 1957 (when the 
average earnings of v/orkers employed at establishments with 5-29 
non-casual workers were 43 per cent of those a t establishments with
(1) The correlation coefficient is 0,3396 (See A.ppendi>: ^^).
(2) The correlation coefficient is 0.5784 (See Appendix ^^).
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600 or more employee» (1) > and, shrinking thereafter, the proportion 
was 02 p er cent in 1909 (&). More remarkable la the narrowing of 
difference» between firm s In the starting sa laries and wages of new 
school-leavers and other newly recruited older w orkers. The average 
starting wages of new school-leavers hired at an establishment with 
30-99 employees were 72 per cent of those at an establishment with 
500 or more employees in 1935 but these differentials have almost 
disappeared since the beginning of the 1960's, o r the wages of the 
form er sometimes even exceeded those of the la tte r (3), The 
narrowing of size-of-firm  differentials is reflected in improvements 
in the wage level of some low-wage industries like clothing and 
textiles, tim ber and furniture, e tc ., because the average size of firm s 
in these industries is sm all.
Lastly, we ra ise  one question for discussion in the next 
chapter. Although the in ter-firm  differentials may be partly 
ascribed to differences in the composition of workforce by occupation, 
sex, etc, between firm s, if we limit ourselves to some manual trades 
in the construction industry for which data on size-of-firm  
differentials are  available for Britain, there is s till  the same 
tendency, i .e .  the earnings of workers in an identical trade rise  
according to the size of firm  (Table 4 - IS). How can we explain 
this?
CD S. UJihara, op. c i t . ,  p . 29.
(2) Ministry of Labour (Japan), Eodo-hakuefao (1969).
(3) Rodo-hakusho (op. c it.) .
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Table 4 - 1 0
Great Britain: Occupational analysis of average weekly earnings
as percentage of those for firm s with 24 or less 
employees by size of firm  in construction (other 
than constructional engineering), January, I960
Number of manual workers employed:
20 - 98 100 o r more
Building trades craftsm en 109 121
Electricians 111 ua
Building labourers 104 117
Lorry drivers 102 125
Source: Employment and Productivity Gazette.
6 . Geographical Differentials
Interregional wage differentials are  also much wider in 
Japan than in Britain. As shown in Tables 4-11 and 4-lS, for 
example, the average earnings of a ll workers in the lowest-wage 
regions (Sanin) were 28 per cent below those in the highest-wage 
region (Southern Kanto) in 1967 in Japan, while the difference in the 
earnings level between the lowest (South Western, though Northern 
Ireland is said to bo the lowest in the United Kingdom as a whole) 
and the highest wage region (South Bast) in Britain is only 14 per 
cent. If wo take the coefficients of variation in interregional wage 
differences (1), the results are  as follows:
(1) Data used here come from the same sources as in Tables 4-12 
and 4-13.
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T able 4 - 11
Groat Britain: Regional analysis 
of median earnings of full-time 
men paid for a full week as 
percentage of the median 
earnings for whole Britain, in 
September, 1968
South East 
East Anglia 
South Weotern 
West Midlands 
East Midlands
107
93
92
104
97
Yorkshire & Humberside 95 
North Western 99
Northern 96
Wales 97
Scotland 95
Great Britain 100
Source: Employment and
Productivity 
Gazette.
Table 4 - 1 2
Japan: Regional analysis of 
monthly earnings of all employees 
(both sexes) as percentage of the 
average for a ll Japan, in July, 
1968
Hokkaid o 100
Tohokiî 87
Southern Kanto 113
Northern Kanto 87
Hokuriku 87
Tokai 95
Keihanshin 111
lanki 87
San-iu 80
San-yo 100
Shikoku 88
Nortïiern Kyushu 97
Southern Kyushu 89
All Japan 100
Source: Yearbook of Labour
S tatistics,
11.3 for a ll workers in all industries and serv ices, 15,3 
for male and 13,9 for female workers in manufacturing 
industry in Japan; 4,9 for male manual, 6 ,0  for male 
nonmanual, 5,0 for female manual, and 5,9 for female 
nonmanual workers in Britain,
Interregional differonttale are partly ascribed to differences 
in the industry mix and occupational composition of labour force. 
Even after allowing for these differences, however, there still 
remain genuine differentials between regions (1). Tables 4-13 and
(1) See Employment and Productivity Gazette (March, 1869),
Vb
4-1$ Ghow earnings dispersion for workers of some trades in the 
conotrnctien industry in both conntriea. As compared v/lth the 
above-mentioned coefficients of variations in interregional wage 
differences for all workers, that for an identical trade I.» remarkably 
greater, especially in Japan; 22,6  for electricians, 19,4 for heavy 
labourer», and 20,9 for lorry drivers in Japan; 7,6 for «electricians, 
6,1 for building labourers, 5,1 for lorry  drivers, and 13,1 for 
e loctric lam ' labourera in Britain, lïndcx’ these cireumstancea vm 
a re  Inclined to doubt the proaonce of a national occupational market
Table 4 -
Great Britain: Bogional mtmlyal# of average weekly earnings as
perccntogo of tho nvorago for Smttli Western by 
occupation in construction industry (other than 
constructional engineering), in January, 1969
Electricians Building
labourers
Lorry
drivers
South East m 120 113
East Anglia 10$ 103 III
South WoBtorn 100 100 100
West Midlands 114 107 116
East Midlands 111 105 110
Yorkshire & Humberside 110 106 111
North Woatora m 115 117
Northern 107 106 114
Wales 9? 108 104
Scotland 115 113 113
Source; Employment and Productivity Gazette,
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Table 4 .  M
Japan; Regional analysis of average daily earnings as percentage
of the average for Southern Eyuahu, by occupation in 
construction industry, in 1967
Electricians Heavy Lorry
labourers drivers
Hokkaido 96 147 189
Toholcii 100 109 110
Southern Kanto 148 155 163
Northern Kanto 188 122 124
Hokuriku 106 127 127
Tokai 128 143 148
Keihanehin 14G 156 158
Kinlsi 168 144 145
San-in 109 97 101
San-yo 116 123 128
Shikoku 113 115 119
Northern Kyushu 114 113 103
Southern Kyushu 100 100 100
Source: Yearbook of Labour S tatistics.
for thermo workers, particularly in Japan, and Muepect that the local 
labour markets are  much better developed than the national labour 
m arket. These queutions will be dealt with in the next chapter.
Regional wage differentials are said to be most persistent 
over time (1). Britain the wage "rate" differentials between 
regions have decreased since before the F irs t World War <2) and 
'differences in formally negotiated wage agroomonts between one 
d istric t and another are now relatively sm all', partly because 'trade 
unions net themselves the elimination of these differences' and partly
(1) L .C . Hunter and D .J . Robertson, op. c i t . ,  p. 117. 
<2) L.G . Beynolds and € .H . Taft, op. cit.
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becauBe the mlnbmmi rates of wages fixed by statutory wage boards 
tended to raise wage payments In speoîaîty low-wage areas* (1) In 
Japan Interregional differentials have also declined in recent years. 
For example, tho difforencos between regions in the starting wages 
of new school-leavers have narrowed remarkably since the middle of 
the 1050's, though there has appeared a sign of their reopening in 
106,9 (8).
Incidentally, some em pirical studies in the United States 
show that the conrmunity wage level tends to rise  with the population 
size of the community, though cities of a given size in the high-wage 
areas are  lilcely to pay more than cities of the same size in the low- 
wago areas (3). This is also true M Japan, as shown in Table 4-lS 
in tho next page, though the population size of the community is not 
the sole determinant of the community wage level. Despite its 
relatively sm all population size, the City of Kobe has tlie highest stage 
level among the seven largest cities in Japan, pai'tly because high- 
wage industries and higlily-paid nonmanual workers employed by 
large firm s are  concentrated in the area* The relatively low wage 
level of Osaka, Nagoya, and Kyoto may be accounted for by a higli 
ratio of sm aller firm s, self-employed and family workers and the 
concentration of light industries, commerce, and services (4). 
Kitakyushu, where heavy industries based on coal produced in the
<1) L .C , Hunter and D* J .  Robertson, op. c it. p. 110.
<2) Ministry of Labour (Japan), GnkttaotsuBha Shonin%m Chosa (1970, 
pp. 80-83*
(3) L .G . Reynold», op. c i t . ,  p. 478, Also a©» M.W, Heder, op. c i t . ,  
pp. 359-60*
(4) Although we do not quote for bre\dty, sta tistical evidences are 
available from Employment Status Survey.
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Qurrcmiidîng area  have developed aud large firm s are  concentrated, 
has been able to recru it at relatively'- low wages necessary manual 
loboui’ from the surrounding ru ra l area and declining coal mdustry.
Table 4 15
Japan: Intercity analysis of average annual earnings of employees
and related factors* in July, 1968
Seven largest Wage Employees Ho* of wor­ Ho* of non-
cities with level ( in ' 000) kers in manual wor­
more than ono (All firm s with kers as p e r­
million In­ Japan 10 00 or more centage of
habitants
(Southern Kanto)
* 100) employees as 
percentage 
of total
employees
labour force
Tokyo 136 3, 407 22*3 37*6
Yokohama
(Tokai)
124 821 34*1 34*8
Nagoya
(Keihanshin)
114 744 27*7 31*7
Kyoto 117 437 19*5 31*0
Osaka 116 1,000 19*1 31*3
Kobe
(Noi'tliern Kyushu)
123 433 33*0 39*1
Kitakyushu 107 358 36*3 30*1
All Japan 100 30,528 23*3 24* 3
Note: " Farm ers as percentage of total occupied population in four 
largest conurbations:
Keihin (Tokyo* Yokohama), 6*0% ; Chukyo (Nagoya), 10*4;
Kitakyuühii-'Fukuoka, 13*3% ; lieihanshin, 6*4%
Source; .Employment Status Survey*
Finally, we quote the rem arks of M*W* Eeder on factors 
affecting inter-city  differentials: '(1) Small urban areas tend to serve 
as way-points in rural-urban migration; (il) Large cities are  the
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places where the most highly specialized, and hence beat paid, work 
is dome; (Hi) Large plamta tend to be located 3m largo cities*; Im 
addition, *im a high wage city the wage cost and, hence, the prices 
of loeaEy miamifactured prodmcte and service will tond to be 
comparatively high, and conversely . • (1)
7. Age Differential»
As shown in Figure 4 - 7 in the following page, the general 
pattern of age differentials in Britain and Japan is quite sim ilar in
many respects: With the advance of age the oarnlnga of a male
worker go up to a peak (for n British worker, in his th irties and for 
a Japanese workers, in his forties) and diminish thereafter, while 
those of a female worker rise  much more slowly until she reaches her 
late twenties and do not vary very much thereafter but finally, 
slightly drop in her six ties. The earnings of British workers, either 
male or female, increase more rapidly, but begin decreasing sooner, 
than those of the Japanese counterpart, as they advance in years.
As far as adult men are concerned, aa shown in Figure 4.«8, the 
earnings of a Japanese worker, either manual or nonmanual, rise  
with the advance of age faster than those of a British worker, (The 
rise  in the earnings of a British manual worker with hia ageing is 
very slow and smaE). As we shall discuss la ter in Chapter 6, 
however, the pattern of age differentials differs very much between 
large and smaE firm s in Japan: The pattern for Japanese workers
(I) M.W. Eodor, op. c i t . ,  pp. 361-3.
F ig u r e  4 - 7  
E arn in gs  by age ( l )
PI
E arn ings  
as  % o f  
t h o s e  o f
B r i t i s h  male  
B r i t i s h  fem a le  
Ja p a n ese  male
—  Ja p a n ese  fem a lew orkers aged 15-17
/p p e:------- ,------------ —  ---------- !----------------------   ,-,--------- s----------
/r-/7 /T-v> a-r-i.7 Jr-Jf -^^7 s»-s^  Kr^  r Age
E arn in gs  
as % o f  
th o s e  o f
workers aged 2 0 -2 4
2j>v
F ig u r e  4 - 8
E arn in gs  by age ( l l )  
(m ale w orkers)  B r i t i s h  nonmanual
  B r i t i s h  manual
—  ■ Jap an ese  nonmanual 
  Jap an ese  manual
<WV
N o t e ; -  1 .  B r i t i s h  d a ta  are  f o r  median w eek ly  e a r n in g s  o f  f u l l - t i m e  
em p loyees  p a id  f o r  a f u l l  week as  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  t h o s e  o f  
em p loyees  aged 15 -17  or  2 1 -2 4 ,  Septem ber , 19 6 8 .
2 .  Jap an ese  d a ta  are  f o r  average  m onthly  e a r n in g s  as  p e r c en ­
ta g e  o f  t h o s e  o f  em p loyees  aged 1 5 -1 7  or  2 0 - 2 4 ,  A p r i l ,  1967
Source:  Employment and P r o d u c t i v i t y  G a z e t te ;  M in is t r y  o f  Labour, 
B a s ic  Survey  o f  Wage S t r u c t u r e .
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ompXoyod at sm all firims or on a casual basis at largo firm s is 
ratlxor sim ilar to tiaat for Britiob workers*
In Japan age differentials narrowed during the Second World 
War# widened from  immediately after the war till the beginning of 
the 1960*» and have again shrunk thereafter (1)* Wage differentials 
between juvenile and adult male workers are  wider in Britain tlian 
in Japan but tliey have also been narrowing in recent years <21.
(Î) F . Nagano# "Nenreibetsw Seibetau Chingln-Kakusa no Soil"# in 
i l .  Ggochi# et a l. <eds. )# Gendai Eodo-^mondai Eoza <1967)# 
pp. 97^8.
(2) L.G , Hunter and D .J . Eobertson# op. cit.# p. 120.
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C m PT E R  5.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOE WAGE AHAI.YSÏS
1. Towards a Unified Theory of the General Wage Level
and Wage Differentials
In classical economic theory the general level of prices was
determined by the quantity of money, ei ther in crude terms of a
fixed velocity of circulation and level of output, or in more refined
terms of equality of the market rate of interest with the rate required
to maintain fuU-eniployment equilibrium of the system. Under the
assumption of full employment t!ie general level of money wages also
moved with changes in the quantity of money. If there was
unemployment, however, the increase in money supply would not
directly determine the price level because it would, as an increase In
effective dmand, simply raise the level of output, but the money
wages would move to whatever level would produce the real wages
consistent with fuil«employment equilibrium. In the Keynesian
system the money wages WSI*© 3,ssurn©d. s.s infXBXLLl© d.o"wm'icLrd.s ( l )  j so
that the labour supply curve was perfectly elastic at the prevailing money 
wage up to the level of full employment and thereafter had a positive 
slope. As is empirically proved, in a high«employment economy
<1) The downward inflexibility of money wages is often ascribed to 
trade unionism, statutory minimum wage system, or management 
inertia. M,W, Eeder proposed SM (social minimum) as a cause of 
this ("The theory of occupational wage differentials," in ^ American 
Economic Review, vol. 44, 1856, pp. 833.52, As a matter "bflact 
its'iîreïîïence been emphasised in the preceding chapters. But 
E.H, Phelps Brown pointed out that it had existed long before trade 
unionism grew in strength (See footnote ( i) , p. 3 In Chapter 1),
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there lo a determinate rolatlonohip between the quantity of money maû 
the price level (and the general level of money wage^), though the 
relationship between the rates of change in tho two is not so straight­
forward (1).
While the m onetarist takes the quantity of money as an 
Qiitononioua variable, other people have thrown doubt on it and aaaeiTed 
that the money wages are  autonomously determined by collective 
bargaining, the monetary authorities automatically adjusting the money 
siîpply to it accordingly so ao to prevent unemployment. Neither of 
the arguments has yet received a unanimous acceptance nor has 
boon established by em pirical fact. In this connection H.G, Johnson 
rightly pointed out that *in a modern economy, therefore, the money 
supply and the wage level are  jointly determined by the balancing of 
full employment against other policy objectives such as internal price 
stability, or the maintenance of the balance of payments without 
devaluation o r intensification of import and exchange controls.® (2)
As regards the determination of relative prices and rea l 
wages there was a dichotomy between the 'real® and 'monetary® 
hypotheses in classical economic theory. The la tter was only
(1) For example, there is a good positiva coiTolation between the 
indexes of consumer prices and money supply during 1956-69 In the 
United Kingdom (coefficient of correlation, r  0.9928) and Japan 
<r w 0.9840) but not between tho rates of change in the two in the 
U.K. (r  - 0.0391) and Japan ( r   ^ 0.6396).
(2) Harry O, Johnson, "The Determination of the General Level of 
Wage Ratos" in tho Theory of Wage Determination (1967), edited 
by John T. Dunlop, pp. 31-30.
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concerned with the determination o f  the absolute price level. In 
the former, relative prices, including the real wages of various 
types of labour, were determined by productivity, factor scarcity, 
and tastes, and were independent of the quantity of money (and 
therefore the absolute price level). However, part of the quantity 
of money supplied is not immediately exchanged for goods and services 
but held for a period of time for various purposes, which creates 
demand for money itself. This in turn implies that the quanti^ of 
money is not independent of relative prices and real wages: the 
quantity of money influences the determination of relative aa well 
as absolute prices <l). In wage theory it follows that the real as well 
as money wages are codetermined.
In their world-wide analysis of the determination of the 
general wage level (2), Turner and Jackson have showed that the rate 
of increase in money wages is positively comiectcd with <i) that in real 
wages and (it) the degree of inter-industry linkage of wage increases, and 
is negatively related to (lii) the spread of wage increases between 
industries and (iv) the irregularity of earnings* growth. This 
implies that the movements in the level of money wages are not 
independent of those in the relative wage structure. There was a
dichotomy between the theories of the general level of money wages
(1) For the analysis of this matter, see, for example, M. Fleming, 
Introduction to Economic Analysis (1869), pp. 336-75,
(2) H.A. Turner and D.A.S. Jackson, "On the Determination of the 
General Wage Level - a World Analysis", The Economic Journal 
(December, 1970), pp. 827 - 845.
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and wage differentials and real wages. Wo need to bridge this 
gap in wage theory.
The wage structure Is determined as a result of the inter­
action of conflicting forces, those which widen or maintain wage 
differentials and those which contract them. The questions arising 
from here are what these forces are, and whether there are any 
common factors between the forces contracting or expanding the 
wage differentials and those changing the general level of money wages.
2. Origins of Occupational Wage Differentials
We have seen in Chapter 4 that there is a wide wage 
dispersion among the workers in both Britfeln and Japan. The causes 
of wage dispersion are numerous, complicated and dyimmic. A 
considerable part of it can probably be ascribed to differences in 
the regularity of employment between workers: for example, some
workers work overtime and others, short-time. But much of it is 
connected with the way in which the wages are determined. In 
economic theory, if labour is perfectly homogeneous and the labour 
market is perfectly competitive (where there is not cither monopoly 
or monopsony of labour, or any obstacle or cost to labour mobility 
and market information), the wage per unit of labour should be tiie 
same for all workers. Just as the same price is supposed to be paid 
for each unit of a homogeneous commodity. If labour is not 
homogenous, i .e . different workers possess different kinds or 
degrees of skill, as is the case, wage dispersion will arise from this.
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Although the wage rate may vary between different grades of skill or 
occupations, the same wage rate will s till be paid to labour with the 
same grade of skill. The occupational wage differentials a rise  from 
differences between occupations in supply and demand conditions in the 
(occupational) labour market and, in the long run, will be such that 
they Just cover differences in the costs of acquiring the required kind 
of skill through education, training, and on-the-Job experience 
(including the potential wages forgone during the period of learning).
For, if the current wage level for a given occupation more than covers 
the cost of maintaining the prevailing minimum level of living (which 
may o r may not be equivalent to the wage level for the unskilled worker» 
and which may vary from one society to another o r from  one stage of 
economic development to another in tîie same society) plus the cost of 
sk ill acquisition for the occupation, more workers will be induced to 
enter the occupation, which will result in pulling down the wages to an 
equilibrium level. Besides differences in the cost of acquiring skills, 
there are  other causes of occupational, wage differentials, which are 
mainly related to the nature of work: the environmental conditions of
the workplace (physical and psychological ploaoantneos or unpleasantness), 
regularity and security of employment, etc. In tiie long run wage 
differentials thus determined wiU be the ones sufficient to equalise 
differences between occupations in these "non-pecuniary advantages or 
disadvantages" as well as the cost of acquiring the required skill. This 
theory of occupational wage differentials was, needless to say, f irs t 
developed by Adam Smith.
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So far \vQ limo assumed perfect competition In the labour 
m arket. A» wo have seen in the preceding cliapter, however, the 
existing wage dispersion between occupations seem s to be much wider 
than that theory would suggest. While the system  of "equalising 
differentials" works fairly well \vithin a given occupation, as B. Wootton 
rightly pointed out, tliere is no definite inverse relationship between 
the pecuniary and non-peciwiiary advantages of different occupations; 
on the contrary, non-peciniiary advantages such as the pleasantness of 
the work, its social prestige in the commxmîty, regularity and se c u r l^  
of employment, e tc ., a re  very often greatest in those ocoupationB which 
carry  the highest monetary rewards (1). Since most kinds of sk ill can 
bo acquired through education or training (in other words, those jobs 
which require sk ill only based on special natural talents are  relatively 
few) and intelligence Is almost normally distributed among the population 
<2), occupational wage differentials would be narrow er than those which 
exist if there were perfect competition in the labour m arket.
Occupational mobility, particularly upward mobility towards 
higher.paid (and socially highly ranked) occupatiouB, Is lim ited. One
of the causes of imperfect mobility is tho prevalence of various 
restrictions on entry into certain occupations; employers* selective 
hiring policies in respect of workers* personal (non-economic) 
characteristics, restric tive practices by trade unions o r professional 
associations (sometime combined with legal regulations) concerning the
(1) B. Wootton, The Social Foundatimis of Wage Policy (1964), pp. 54-60.
(2) A. Barnett, The Human Species (1968), pp. 104-7.
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number of apprentices o r trainees and the standard of skill required 
for particular occupations, and so on. While economists have dismissed 
these or other obstacles to factor mobility as negligible in the long run 
and concentrated on tho analysis of the demand and supply sides of the 
market based on either the competitive or monopolistic model, 
sociologists have noted the ubiquity and importance of social discrim ina-' 
tiens in employment and income distribution and attempted to theorise 
about tho mi Their views on this matter^ though not yet fully developed, 
may bo useful in throwing light on the structure and mechanism of the 
labour market; In economic theory it is taken for granted that 
everybody is given equal opportimîtîes for access to any occupation 
(the "equal opportunity model"). Historically this view is peculiar to 
industrial society; In traditional society it is a rule that tho occupation 
is W iorited from a father to his son or from a m aster to his Journeymen 
(the "stability o r inheritance model") (1). With the progress of 
industrialisation this principle of manpower allocation has been gradually 
replaced by the form er principle. Bven in most advanced industrial 
countries, however, a revised version of the *i nheritance* principle 
s till partly survives: as a result opx^ortunities for a ll occupations are
not evenly distributed among different social c lasses.
Another cause blocking upward occupational mobility la lack of 
aehiovoxnent aspirations on the part of workers in the lower echelons.
But a more important cause is lack of market information. In thls^onnection,
'■""'’'"T‘‘o # l h e ' 'e x p l a n a t ib h " o M h d s e ..................................................................
(I) L. Taylor, O ccupatlonal Soclolo|ÿ (1968), pp. 62-83.
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L. Tctylor pointed omt(I):
i
"In urbanised societies in general the number of occupations
has increased to such an extent that individual partioipaiits in the 
labour force imve little opportunity for perceiving the total range of  
occupations, assessing their ability and aptitude, and selecting 
accordingly* In fact, due to Informal factors and limited recruitment 
mechanisms, most individuals are reported to enter those occupations 
which are similar to those of their parents, or an occupational category 
that is immediately adjacent to that of the parental generation. "
The character of the occupational labour market differs con- 
0â4orably from one occupation to another. In Table 5-1, Column (A) 
ahov/s the proportion of thoee workers in a given occupation who moved 
from one job to another within the aamo occupation o r otherwise during 
1907-8 In Japan, According to thie, adminW tr  at We officials, managers, 
professional men, and teelinicians are among the least mobile 
occupational groups, while labourers and workers engaged in transport 
and communication and services are among tUo most mobile. That is 
to eay, about 2 per cent of managers, professional men, e tc ., changed 
jobs during the period, while the proportion was 0 or 7 per cent for 
labourers and transport workers, etc. The occupational m arkets for 
professional, c lerical, and production workers (including craftsmen) 
are  of a closed type in the sense that they mainty take in previously 
unoccupied persons, such as new school-leavers and univeraitj’^ graduates, 
rather then admit Job-changers from other occupations (as shown in 
(1) L. Taylor, op. cit.
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C^olunm (C) and (I» in Table 5 « 1, about four fiftlisof the newly hired 
persons during the period were prevlotnsly unoccupied and the remaining 
one fifth, Job-cliangewfrom other occupations), and Job-changers 
previously engaged in those occupations aeek Jobs in the same occupation 
rather than move to other occupations. (In Column (B), about 60 per 
cent of job-changers in those occupations moved within the same 
occupation, as compared with 34-37 per cent for labouroi's and sales 
workers). In short, the mobility of professional, c lerical and 
production workers tends to be limited within the same occupation.
On the other hand, the occupational markets for labourers, sales and 
service workers are  of an open type: Job-changera frona 
occupations are admitted into these m arkets.
Table 5 - 1  
Occupational Mobility in Japan, during 1967-08
J ob - change ï‘s J ob -changers
as percentage who moved
of total labour within the 
force in the 
occupation
Composition of newly 
hi red persons by 
origin:
same occupa- Previously Job- 
tion as per- unoccupied changera
Management &
administration 
Professional & 
tocîmlcal
Clerical & kindred
Sales workers 
Transport & 
communication 
worker©
Production process 
workers & c ra fts ­
men
Labourers
Service workers
(A)
2 .8
2.5
4.1
4.1
7.2
4.6
6.1
5.0
%
centage of 
the whole 
(B)
%
41
58
57
37
60
63
34
50
<C>
20
85
84
66
44
78
58
69
from other 
occuîjations
(b)
% % 
74
15
16 
84
56
22
42
31
Source: Employment Status Survey (1968).
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Siîch ail occupational market structure contributes to îlio 
maîntomnco of occupational ivago differentials apparently wider than 
those which would simply equalise not advantages and disadvantages 
between occupations. A ssisted by imperfect occupational mobility, 
the pay level for some occupations, particularly socially high-ranked 
ones, is partly at least determined according to the social status of 
workers engaged In those occupations (the "status theory of payment") 
ra ther than their economic function or performance (the "functional 
theory of payment") (I). *Btatus* pay must be sufficient to ensure 
that all workers engaged in the occupation concerned are  able to 
maintain their standards of living at a level appropriate for their 
social prestige. With a few exceptions, those workers who hold a 
higher position In an organisation are  paid higher than those who hold 
a lower position. The status structure of an organisation ten^to  be 
reflected in ita internal pay structure. The system  of status pay is 
probably more prevalent and more important In traditional society 
than in modern industrial society and more so in non-manual 
occupations than in manual occupations,
We have found in the preceding chapter that there* is wide 
wage difjpersion even within the same occupation, besides wage 
differentials between occupations. Apart from the absence of perfect 
competition in a given occupational m arket, differences in wages for 
the same kind of labour nmy a rise  from the very nature of labour as 
well as the nature of tho work: labour as a commodity is not separable
(1) For further analysis on this subject, see B.C. Miller and W,H. Form, 
Industrial Sociology (1951), Chapter 11,
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from the worker who Bells it and those jobs which require the same 
kind of labour may have zuinor differences in advantages and 
disadvantages, though more o r less sim ilar in main characteristics, 
from a worker’s point of view. In case of an orclinat'y commodity, 
the se lle r is not usuali^ concerned about how and where the buyer uses 
it and Its price will not, therefore, vary with the use to which it is 
put. But workers usually have to subject themselves for some period 
of time to the control of the employer to whom they se ll their labour, 
so that they are  much concerned about the eharactoristics of the job, 
as well as v/ages, which he offers tliern. Just as two jobs requiring 
the same kind of skill do not always carry  the sam e conditions of work, 
workers with the same grade of sk ill have different personal 
characteristics such as age, race, sex, educational ca reer, social 
class background, etc, Tho employer often discrim inates against 
particular workers according to these personal characteristics (1).
In a given occupational market the employer seeks workers with the 
appropriate kind of skill and tho worker seeks a job of the kind suitable 
for his skill. In addition, tho form er has a preference for worker» 
with certain personal attributes (which, together with skill require­
ments, constitute his hiring standards) and tho la tte r, for jobs with 
given characte ristics. These factors, as well as the absence of 
perfect competition, are  the prim ary origins of wage dispersion within 
an occupation. What makes the m atter more complicated is  that
(1) As regards discrim inations based on race, se x , e tc . in the United 
States, se e  L .G , Eeyaolds, op, c it . pp. 483-0. A lso  see  
W.W, Daniel, Racial Discrim ination In England (1988), P a n t  3.
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the Mrîiig poîîcioa differ from one employer to another and that tho 
sca le  of preference for Jobs differs from one worker to another.
But thin may be triv ia l,
3, Analysis of Interindustry, Interregional, and Inter «firm
Wage Differentials, etc.
In traditional wage theory wage differentials were only 
associated with skill differentials : Different wages would be paid
to different types of labour for which separate m arkets were assumed, 
though more or less related to one another depending on the degree of 
Dubotitutabiiity between types of labour. But this theory docs not 
throw light on other types of wage differentials v/hich wo dealt with 
in the preceding chapter, save that in tho long run such wage 
differentials would merely reflect differences in skill proportions, 
or occupational composition of tho labour force, between industries, 
between regions, o r botooon firm s. Contrary to th is, v/e suggested 
in tho preceding chapter that there wore genuine interindustry, 
interregional, and inter-firm  wage differentials, and pointed out in 
Section 2 of the present chapter that there wore some factors 
producing wage disporsion within tho same occupation: Jobs which 
required the same kind of labour might differ from one another In 
work intensity, unpleasantness, o tc ,, and consequently remunerations 
for them might vary. In addition, some Jobs which have the same 
title may have different content between industries or between firms 
within a given industry. Although we unfortunately have no detailed 
and oxtoBsivo infoinnation about these points, it does not seem  that
9 5
these factors alone are  sufficiently important to explain the wide 
wage differontlala which do exist (IK We ahull content ourselves 
with showing other esamples concerning near-genuine inter-industry, 
interregional and inter-firm , wage differentials.
%n Japan there is an extensive survey of the starting salaries 
and wages of new school-leavers who have not yet had any experience 
on the job nor received any particular form of vocational training 
or apprenticeship (so that they can be regarded as identical imsldlled 
labour) (2). According to the survey, these sa laries and wages 
differ considerably between industries (in the same locality), between 
firm s (within the same industry in the same locality), and between 
regions. For example, in Tokyo, the starting monthly earnings of a 
boy having recently left junior high school ranged from  16,591 yen, 
median in the lowest-wage industry (construction: the earnings of 
tho worker at the lower quartilo was 16,174 yen and those at the 
upper quartilo, 17,048 yen) to 34,203 yen, median in the hlghest-wage 
industry (transport and communication: the earnings of the worker 
at the lower quartilo was 21, 835 yen and those at the upper quartilo, 
24,605 yen) in June, 1968; or from 17,542 yen, median at a firm  
with 30-09 employees to 10, 014 yen, median at a  firm  with 500 
employees or m ore, in manufacturing Industry in the same month.
As regards geographical differentials, the starting monthly earnings
(I) A recent American study found that some intra-occupational wage 
differentials were partly explicable in term# of differences in 
labour force ’quality’ but tiiat other factors remained extremely 
important especially for manual workers (Sec A.Eeesand 3 .F . 
Schulta, Worker# and Wages in an Urban la b o r  Market (1970).
(3) Ministry’’ of Labour, Shinki-gakusotsmha Shonhikyu C!io»a.
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of a boy of tho said category ranged from 10, 500 yen in Wakayama-ken 
to 21,682 yen in Saitama-ken in May, 1069.
What are  the causes of those typos of wage differentials?
In order to answer this question we put forward o> bypotiiesis that 
the markets for factors of production, capital and labour, are 
"fragmented" or "structured" due to their limited mobility between 
firm s, between industrlee and between Xoealitios, and ignorance on 
the part of the supplier of thoao factors. Tho present state of both 
product and factox* m arkets is far from a porfeotly competitive 
model. Many of the existing product m arkets ai'o dominated by big 
manufacturing firm s and capital market, by big financial te titu tiona 
as lenders of money and big enterprises as borrowers* Tho labour 
m arket seems not to suffer so much from monopoly or
monopsony (though some people might argue that monopoly by trade 
unions, monopsony by big firm s o r b ilateral monopoly by both Ib 
more im portant/ CD) as from inadquacy of labour mobility and 
linaitod availability of market hh'ormaticxi, because of the peculiarities 
of labour, differing much from capital (which is perfectly 
homogeneous, though its available amount and direction of flow can 
bo controlled by big financial institutions, monetary authorities or 
government policy): numerous workers supply a sm all amount of 
labour to the m arket respectively; labour is very heterogencou# so
(1) F or example, S.H . SHchter, "Do the V/age-ï»’îxing Arrangemonb 
in the American Labor Market Have an inflationary B ias?" in 
American Bconomic Review Vol. 44 (1954) pp. 322 - 48.
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that the Interests of workers are not always one and the same; 
labour is perishable so that resoiirceleoo \vorI-:ers who have to support 
themselves and their family cannot withhold the selling of their labour 
for a long time; workers may have the feeling of attachment to a 
particular employer or oommimify, while the employer may be 
unwilling to replace Ms loyal employees with outsiders only for lower 
wages, so that the transfer of workers from one employer or 
community to another will entail extra psychological ao well as 
oconomic cost (Even the economic cost of their transfer from one 
locality to another will foe far groator than that of goods or capital*
If they have to change residences and accompany thoir family) (1); 
and Û0 on.
First* we think that the labour market is fragmented at 
the firm  or plant level. Each firm  or plant has a oomijartmentaliaed 
labour market for its own needs (v/Mch will hereafter be called 
"internal m arket", m  contrasted with "external market" standing 
for local o r national labour market). Tho ii# rn a l labour market 
consista of one employer and his employees; the form er exclusively 
and continuously buys labour services from the la tte r and the la tte r 
exclusively and continuously se ll their labour services to the form er, 
for a period of tim e. Tho reason why the internal market develop» 
is that it is  beneficial to both sides. For the employer continuous 
and stable labour supply Is essential to continuous and efficient 
production* and the stability of his workforce saves him additional
(1) ÏI. W, Richardson used the term  "social distance coats" for that 
earnings differential which ia necessary to ’bribe the migrant to 
give up hi# home environment*. (B^gloml Ecoaoiali?# (I960), 
p, 396).
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cost of recruitm ent and training. Particularly in the case of labour 
of the type which is acurco in the external market and for which tho 
employer iias.'. incurred a high cost of ti'aining, the necessity of 
retaining such a type of workers is great. For tho worker the 
security of employment and the stability of income are  indispensible 
to the maintenance of a  norm al family life* and continuous and stable 
employment saves him the risks of unemployment and the cost of job 
hunt. For these reasons the employer trie s  to retain workers by 
various means; high wages are  one of them; more important are  
fringe benefits related to length of service* such as private pension 
schemes* redundancy payments* longer paid holiday* etc. U). The 
seniority principle concerning promotions «md layoffs has also been 
supported by both employers and workers, (2),
The internal market ia more or le s s  related to the external 
market. The employer who needs more workers has to recruit them  
from the external tnarket. Workers who quit an exnployer and want 
to take up a new Job have to go to the external m arket. The employer 
has little  control over the external market* except for those ca ses in 
which one or two big em ployers domhmte a sm all loca l labour market* 
but he has alm ost perfect control over the entry of workers into his 
firm  through se lective  hiring policy. He does not usually open tho door 
to outsider» (from the external market) for a ll  Jobs at his firm  but, more
(1) 88 percent o f the Japanese firm s with 30 em ployees and more (88 per 
cent for firm s witii 1000 em ployees and m ore) iiad som e kinds of 
retirem ent or severence allowance (either lum p-sum  payment or 
pension) solvemes hi WQÛ (Source: Miniehy of Labour).
(3) L.Ct. Reynolds, op. c it . pp. 198-207.
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often than not, lim its their entry to particular kinds of jobs such as 
unskilled labour at the bottom of the company’s  Job hierarchy and 
som e kinds of professions or technical trades, and reserve good jobs 
for insiders (em ployees already in his employment), if  suitable workers 
are available from among them* On the other hand, he has no 
effective control over voluntary resignations. Trade unions may try  
to restrict the em ployer’s discretion in hiring and firing workers.
The large firm  is  likely to have a better developed or highly 
isolated internal market. It is  known that turnover rates are lower 
at large firm s than at sm all firm s (Table 5 - 2 ) .  The internal market 
of large firm s is  of a more closed type than that of sm all firm s.
Table 5 - 2
Japan: Turnover Rates by Size of Establishment in Manufacturing (%)
Year 500 em ployees 100-499 30- 99 5-29
or more employees employees employees
A B A B A B A B
1966 20.1 21,6 29 .4  30.2 34.1 33.9 34.9 31.7
1906 18.5 19.3 28.2  28.0 33.5 32.6 34.8 30.3
1967 25.1 21.1 32.6 30.5 39.1 35.6 32.0 30 .0
1966 24.7  21.7 33.1 29.9 34.5 32.7 30.8 38.7
1969 24.5 22 .0 32 .0  28.9 32.1 31.3 30.2 28.2
A; A ccession rates. Bi Separation rates
Source: Ministry of Labour (Japan)
Japanese firm s do not, as a rule, hire workers other than new school- 
leavers and university graduates to f ill c lerica l or administrative jobs, 
or key manual Jobs from which workers will be promoted to a higher 
supervisory or skilled Jobs la ter . Only the types of labour for which 
they open opportunities to Job-changer from the external market are
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unskilled jobs on a casual basis (1). On the other hand, the internal 
m arket of sm all firm s is relkitively easy of access from the external 
m arket, o r of an open type (2). The structure of internal labour 
market will be discussed further in the next chapter in connection with 
the internal wage structure.
Inter-firm  wage differentials prim arily a rise  from the 
development of internal labour market and differences between firm s in 
profitability or labour productivity. Tlie reason why some firm s 
competing with other rival firm s in both product and labour markets 
pay higher wages than the la tte r is not explicable by a competitive 
market model. Large firnio usually pay higher wages than sm all firms, 
although tiiey have to sell their products at the same price as other 
firm s in the same industry. Higher wages ax*e aecribed to higher 
labour productivity per worker, smaller profits and dividends as a 
share of the commodity price, o r a combination of them. Since smaller 
than normal profits are  disincentive to further investment. It is 
difficult in the long run to maintain a higher wage level than the average. 
Wo infer, therefore, that the main source of high wages is high labour 
productivity. But this simply means the ability of efficient firm s to 
pay high wages and not the necessity of their doing so, for they can
increase their undistributed profits or dividends to shareholders
(1) S . Funabashi, Hodoahijo to Chlnginkeitat (Labour Market and Forms 
of Wage Payment,)'(lQ‘S6),'pp'.' 'isô'-lsè.
(2) Only one third of 200, 000 workers who quit establishments with 500 
employees or more were hired again at other establishments of the 
same size and the remaining two thirds went to smaller establish- 
ment8, while 12 percent of 000,000 workers who left establishments 
with 5-99 employees entered larger establishments and 68 percent 
found a job with other establishments of the same s iz e . (Source; 
Ministry of Labour (Japan) ).
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Instead. There must foe som e tangible or intangible advantages 
which justify it. What first comb» to our mind is  that, since there
i ,
are substantial differences in efficiency or degree of sk ill among the 
individual woïicers of the sam e ocjcnpation, prosperous firm s may 
try to skim  the best cream  of the labour force available in the external 
market or retain beat worker# by offering them better pay and conditions 
of work. This may, in turn, contribute to raising or maintaining 
labour productivity at a high lev e l. Or they may try to secure more 
labour from  other firm s in a tight labour market, though it is  a s e lf -  
defeating tactics except for a short tim e. Managers of large firm s 
may try to establish a reputation as good em ployers in the local 
community because they are often, or hope to be, looked upon by local 
people as respectable partners. It (Iso  makes it ea sier  for them to 
recruit labour in the local market. They may try to acquire the 
•good-will* of their em ployees (1), which will conduce to the stability  
of labour-management relations. Where som e kinds of sk illed labour 
are extrem ely scarce  and em ployers have to secure such labour by 
costly  internal training, it w ill certainly be sensib le to retain these  
types of labour even by paying high wages. These are supposed 
m otives of a large firm  for paying higher tlian the average wages.
Since the em ployees of large firm s are generally more unionised, than 
those of amaH firm s, particularly in Japan, trade unions may play a 
role in producing in ter-firm  wage differentials.
The reasons why average labour productivity is  usually higher 
at large firm s than at sm all firm s are various. Economies of sca le
(1) M.W. Eeder, op. cit. p. 332. Also see E .A . L ester, op. c it . 
pp. 310-12.
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aro probably tho most important factor for this (1). Modern 
teoliology requires investxnente in largo lumps so that capital 
accumulation tends to concentrate in large firm s, ra ther than to be 
scattered over multiple sm all firm s. As a result, differences in 
labour-capital ratios and labour productivity tend to widen between 
large and sm all firm s. In order to make large-scale Investments 
firm s have to ra ise  money in capital market, obtain loans from baidcs, 
or plough back undistributed profits. In this respect large firm s 
have several advantages. Besides, there are  considerable differences 
in the rate of technical progress and innovation and managerial talent 
between firm s. We may well say that capital, managerial and 
scientific talents are  unevenly distributed among the firm s - more 
concontxated in large firm s. But, of course, this is a  general story .
In some industries economies of scale are not substantial but the size 
of an optimum plant is relatively email, so that sm all firm s can 
compete well with large firm s without depending on cheaper labour.
Geographical wage differentials again arise  from the 
fragmentation of national factor markets and the uneven distribution of 
labour, capital, managerial and scientific talents among the regions, 
besides differences in industry-mix and skill composition of the local 
labour force. Distance (the meaning of distance as used in this 
context is not lim ited to geographical distance but it is a concept 
Including distance measured in terms of time taken for Journey after 
allowing for the degree of development of transport and communication
<i) M.A, Utton, op. c it. pp. 18 - 21.
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facilities and psychological distance arising from differences in 
social and cultural sotting, availability of housing and amenities, 
etc. between local communities) is probably tho most formidable 
obstacle to the mobility of products and factors of production, especially 
labour, and the flow of market information. <1) At early  stages of 
industrialisation m arkets for many products and factors of production 
were localised because of poor transport and communication facilities
(2). As industrialisation has progressed, the traffic of goods and 
people has increased and local m arkets Imve been linked with ono 
another. IDven today the m arkets for some commodities (including 
services) still remain mainly local due to their nature. And the 
labour markets are  s till prim arily organised on a local basis for 
many occupations. This is illustrated by comparison between in tra- 
regional migration and oat-migration rates of labour. The ratios of 
migration within the region (per 1000 residents) were between 88 
(London and South Eastern) and G8 (Wales), while those of outmigrants 
to other regions were between 27 (Southern England) and 5 (West 
Central Scotland) during 1800-61 in Great Britain (3). Although these 
ratios are  not a direct indicator of labour migration, they show that 
there is far more migration within the region tlian between regions.
This is confirmed by Japanese data as well. In Japan, die workers 
who moved to other addresses within the region were 7 percent of 
total working population, those who migrated to other regions were 2 
percent, and 01 percent stayed at the same address, during 1967-68.
(1) It is suggested that distance bears upon migration (T .Ii. Hollings­
worth, Migraticm (1970), pp. 63 and 164).
(2) See W .H.B. Court, op. c it. pp. 66-72.
(3) T .H . HoUingsowrth, op. cit. p. 32, Table 3.1.
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As far m  Job-chaagers arc  concerned, the proportion of out-migration 
to other roginm  was conaidorabîy highoi' {13 per cent) and yot the far 
g reater majority COO poreonî) îm nû  jobs within the region {IK Thna 
moot Job-aookora firs t look at the local market In the aroa where they 
Itvo. If there are no suitable jobs avallaMo there, thon they think 
about looking for jobs in othor areno. Some worker# are  In tho dark 
about tho situation of other local markets m  do not find it worthwhile 
to move to other aroaa to get a job boeau»# the cost of doing so i# 
unlikely to be made for by mpeeted future Income® from It, »o that 
they will stay unemployed. Oeographtcal mobility differ# very much 
between vuiTeua types of labour. Young single people mû white-collar, 
partlculai%  professional, wox^ker# are more mobile than older, 
m arried people end manual workers. ’MigrâtorIneae rises  to a
peak in the oarlytweatrea and falls thereafter ra ther slowly.* (2)
It i$ said that thoro la a high positive correlation between intelligence 
m d migration (Z% which seem s to have important implications in 
relation to the distribution of managerial amd scientific talent® between 
regions.
Tho distribution of $tock:9 of capital and labour Is uneven
among tho different regions, dm  to their inter-roglonnl migration and
differoBcos la  tho rates of th e ir’ latra-regional nooumidation. L .0 . 
Eeyncilds and C .lï. Taft pointed out m  cau*#s of interregional wage
(1) aouroor Employment Statu# Survey (Japan).
(2) T.B. HolMiigaowrth, op. cit. p. 63. The workers who changed 
addreemea during l98t-63 a® percentage of the total labour force of 
tho Bomo ago group were 15 percent for the group aged 16 #24, 13 
percent for 3S#$4, $ percent for 35##, and i  percent for 55 end 
over in Japen {Sourcei Employment H^tatu* BurvcyK F or occupational 
analyele of migration, #ee the «aid hook of flolllngaowrth {pp. 5i*54),
m  ibid. pp. 158-0.
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dilfevoritiahi Hho rale of population growth relative to tho rote of
M m tv M  e%po#iou; tlio ohauging ooono&uio forkmos of agriculture 
relative #  Industry; the geographical distribution of no%^  birttm 
reW ivo to the clistxibutlon of m w  joW; mnû tlm roeponsivonoaa of 
labour ami capital migration to wago differentials. ’ (I) Generally 
iipeskîtig, both capital %W labour tenc5 to agglomerate in urban,
Indiïistrial areas where there la great demand for thorn. iU) In 
olaegiieal economic theory W ei'-regloiml imhalanco# in tho dWtrlbntlon 
of capital and labour would automatically ho reotlficd through adiuataieats 
by tW market mouhnniom. In ê^miniç eoonomlo», however, the 
ra te  of migration boweon regions différa between oapite.l and labour 
and tho t&ioB of population growth and eapttal aeeuxBulatloii vdtMn the 
region vary hQtvmm regions. Capital fimû^  ^ for now invemtniont 
are  highly .mohtlo, while fixed capital stock is tied to a given location 
(which may bo ono of tbo roasona why Industry established in tho 
eengoutod industrial area la olow to movo to other plncon deopito 
labour shortages and external dtscconomioo arising from  the exoeaaive 
agglomeration of Industry and population, and invests more capital 
there Im tead). In advanced tndiwtrial eountidos tho capital market 
Is highly developed by big financial laotltutioao with a nation-wide 
network of branch offices They can easily obtain saving» from all 
over the country and transfer thorn to any region where there are 
toontmoBt oppovtxxnitim.
(I) L .G , Reynold» and C.M. Taft, op. olt. p. 359.
<2> There e re  eontroveretal theoretical lemme aboi*t
ec«moiKiie# and regional growth (See II.W. Bichardlon, op. ott. 
pp. 348—01.
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On the otiioi* hand, labour is less mobile than eapttal (excopt 
fixed capital etooh) for the reaaona which we have mentionotU The 
rate of population growth la said to bo lower' in urban area than in 
ru ra l area , though rural-urban différences in birth rates decline 
with the pi’ogresa of Industrialisation (Î)# Besides, in a country 
with a Ini'ge agricultural population, there So relatively large 
underemployed labour force, or latent labour surplus in tho rural 
a rea . (Even in mature m dustrialised economies there may arise  
labour surplus in regions with declining industries). Eoughî^*' 
speaking, labour supply pressures are positively related to the size 
of agriculture relative to industry in the region. (2).
Besides quantitative differencea, there are  qualitative 
differences in the distribution of the labour force between regions. 
Prosperous industrial regions more easily find highly qualified
(1) Before the middle of the 1950’s fertility  in agricultural prefecture#
(e .g . 32.9 p er 1000 population for Kagoshima, 42.4 for Aomori, 
in 1085) was higher than that In urban prefectures (e .g . 37.6 for 
Tokyo) but has fallen thereafter (e .g . 13.4 for Kagoshima, 20.3 for 
Aomori, and 15.6 for Tokyo in 1986). Incidentally, fertility  In 
imemployment-stricken Northern Ireland (23.1 per 1000 population 
in 1968) Is higher than other part of the country (18.3 for Scotland,
10.9 for England and Wales) (Source: Ministry of Welfare (Japan)
and Boglstrar General (U.K. ) ).
(3) Ratio of Job Applicants to Unfilled Vacancies registered witlx Public 
Employment Security Offices (monthly average) in 1037;
Hokkaido 1.1 <20.0) Hokuriku 1.2(28.0) San-in 1.6(36.9)
Tohoku 2 .9 (37 .7 ) Tokai 0.4(16.1) San-yo0.9(22.6)
Southern Kanto 0.7 ( 7.9) Keihansidn 0.8( Shikoku 2.0(31.2)
Northern Kanto 0.6 (35.7> Kinki 0.7(24.8)
Northern Kyushu 3.1 (23.9) Southern Kyushu 4.2(41.6)
I»’igure» lu ( ) represent farming population as percentage of
total occupied by reion in 1968.
Source; Ministry of Labour (Japan) and Employment Status Survey.
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manxîowor such as professional, technical and skilled workers ( # .  
Thei’O seems to be a vicious circle in the allocation of capital and 
high-quality labour: in ru ra l or depressed areas there are  fewer
investment and employment opportunities; capital flees to prosperous 
industrial areas for better opportunities; a low rate of investment 
depresses the level of demand for labour and the rate of productivity 
gxov/th, which may result in higher imemplo^mient and low wages; 
most mobile types of labour like professionals, scientists, engineers, 
etc*, also leave for prosperous areas, which makes the region more 
unattractive for industry. On the other hand, the oi^posite talces 
place in prosperous industrial centres whore ’growth* industries 
concentrate and afford ample opportunities for investment and 
employment. These centres absorb capital from other areas a# 
weH as within the region where they are situated. A high rate of 
Investment creates more labour demand or raises productivity, 
depending on whether investments are  labour-saving or demand- 
expanding. A eontînuod high level of labour demand thus created 
eventually brings about labour shortages and general-wage advance» 
in tho region concerned. Or Increased labour productivity may 
result In wago increases, price roduetions or higher px o^fits, any of 
which may be a cause of greater demand for consumer’s or producer’s 
goods and for labour. Labour shortages induce furthex' labour-saving 
investments and productivity continues to grow. Modes'll technology
(1) The proportion of managers, administrative, professional, and 
tecimical workers in total labour force in the region in 19G8 was 
12.0 and 9.8 percents for Tokyo and Osaka and their conurbations 
respective]^, as compared with 7.2 percent for Tohoku region and 
7.4 percent for Shikoku (Source; Employment Status Survey).
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requires highly quelUied ## well a# sem i-skilled lehour. Abundant 
job opportunitiee end high wage# attract auch labour, which give# 
the receiving region further advantages In the couipoalUon of the 
labour force. The agglomeration of scientific talent may promote 
technical progrem  in industrie# in the region (I ). And «o on.
To sum up, in ru ra l o r le»» developed area» where ’growth* 
industrie# a re  absent a low rate of capital accumulation (and a low 
level of labour demand) and high labour supply pressure# bring about 
low labour productivity, low wage# and probably relatively high 
unemployment, while in prosperous industrial centre# where ’growth’ 
Industries a re  located, a high rate of investment (and a high level of 
labour demand) and practical absence of labour surplus result in 
high labour productivité', high wages and labour shortages. Since 
the pace at which capital and labour migrate between region# differs, 
inter-regional wage< differentials p e rs is t. As long as the effects 
of economies of scale and agglomeration in the existing industrial 
centres last, these area# continues to attract new industries, absorb 
capital and labour from other area# and grow* (2), But shortages of
land, water and labour, traffic congestion, etc. resulting from an
(1) 3ee 11*W* Richardson, op. c it. pp. 316 - 20*
(2) Among the benefits fcam, economies of scale and agglomeration are  
high specialisation among the Industries, the existence of related 
industries, better social overhead capital formations, easy access
to a vast amount of information, capital and labour (especially, highly 
qualified labour), and so on. We have pointed out in the preceding 
chapter (p. 78 ) that the community wage level is positively related 
to its population size. There is an evidence that the labour market 
itself is more effective]^ operated in the regions with a  large 
population (The rate of Intra-regional migration (per 1000 residents) 
i# generally higher in such regions (e .g . 92 for Southern Eanto with 
a population of 17.7 million, 79 for Keihanshln with 10.S million 
inhabitants, m  compared with 68 for Tohoku with 6.6 million and 6.9 
for Southern Kyushu with 3.3 million (Source; Employment Statu# 
Survey). See T .H . HoDingaworth, op. cit. p. 32).
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excessive congglomeratlcm of industry and population will be serious 
disincentives to new firm s and labour which a re  thinking of moving 
into those a reas .
The inter-industry differences in the wage level are  partly 
ascribed to differences in the composition of the work force by 
occupation, sex, age, geographical location of the industry, etc. 
Beyond this there seem to be genuine Inter-industry differentials 
among sim ilar types of labour. For example, if we take the starting 
wages of now school-leavers, they are higher in the generally high- 
wage industries like chemicals and metal manufacture than in the 
generally low-wage industries like textiles and clothing in Japan <1). 
Besides differences in the compogltion of the work force within the 
industry, other factors may be important. According to R.A.
L ester, ’an industry tends to rank high in term s of hiring rates for 
male common labor when it has most of the following characteristics: 
value added by manufacturing per wage-earner hour is a large 
figure, labor coats are  a low percentage of total costs, profit margins 
are high, and tho industry tends to be dominated by a few large 
f irm s .’ (2). L .G . Reynolds also pointed out as conditions for a 
high industry wage level; a low ratio of labour costs to total coats, 
a rapid rate of increase in man-hour output, a high ratio of profits 
to sa les, and a high degree of output concentration in a few companies
(1) The median monthly earnings of boys having recently completed 
junior high school ranged from a high of 20, 345 yen in chemical 
and allied Industries to a low of 18,185 yen in textile and clothing 
industries in Tc^tyo in June, 1968. (Source: Tyokyo-to Labour
Bureau).
(2) H.A. L ester, op. c it. p. 808.
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and "cooperative" pricing arrangements (1). M.W. Rcder maintained 
that *iilgh wage industrie» tend to be those cîiaracteriaed by large, 
well-financed corporations using a great deal of machinery p er worker 
and operating a number of plants which are located mostly in large 
cities . . .  * (2). J . T . Dunlop and M. Eothbaum assorted that ’the 
teelmology of production and the nature of product m arket competition 
largely explain the ranking in the interindustry wage s tru c tu re .’ <3).
On the other hand, after comparing the wage structure between five 
Vv^cstern countries, L .G . Reynolds and C.H. Taft concluded that low- 
wage industries a te  ’1. old Industries which have passed their 
expansion peak and have a low rate of technical progress; o r 2. 
smalL scale and highly competitive industries with little control over 
prices and output rates; o r 3. industries which employ relatively 
light and low-skillod labour, including a considerable proportion of 
women w orkers.’ <4).
Yie may draw a conclusion from the rem arks of tliese authors; 
the industry wage level is related to labour productivity, ratio of 
labour costs to total costs, profit margins, Indus tr ia l concentration, 
and the size of the ^ i c a l  firm  in the industry. In this connection.
<1) L.G . Reynolds, op. cit, p . 481.
(2) M.W. Reder, op. cit. p. 315.
(3) J .T .  Dunlop and M. Eothbaum, "International Comparison of Wage
Structure, " International Labour Review (April, 1055).
(4) L.G . Reynoî3ranE^% % ri% Kr^7% % ï^ution of Wage Structure 
(1956), p . 357. “ ™  '
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there have been many atteixipt» by statistical methods to find factors
affecting the Industrial wage structure. The î*esu.lts of these studies 
have so far been conflicting. Some found that there was a good 
positive correlation between wagee and labour productivity (1), while 
others negatived it (2). As far as Japanese industries are  concerned, 
however, it has been siiown that there is a strong positive correlation 
between the industry wage level and labour productivity measured in 
term s of value added <3). If we look at tho relation between the rates 
of wage increase and productivity growth (output per employee) by 
industry, there is no definite relation between them for British 
industries but some negative correlation for Japanese industries (4). 
The rank correlation coefficient between the industry wage level and 
labour productivity measured in term s of value added has so far been 
higher for Japan than for some Western countries. But, if a negative 
correlation between industry wage increases and productivity growth 
continues to exist, the correlation between the industry wage level
(1) P , 1Î. Douglas, Heal Wasos in the United States 189Q-1926 (1990). 
pp. 98, 104, 562, 504. J .T .  Dunlop, Wage Determination under 
Trade Unions (1950), Chap. 3. J . W. Gar^ariho,"'*^ The ihïërihduetry  
Wage S tructure," Quarterly Journal of Economics (May, 1950);
R* Perlm an, "Value Froducti^^^ Wage
Structure, " Labor H elation# Hevi¥w,^l(0ct r  195 '
(2) For example, S. Fabricant, Employment in Manufacturing 1899- 
1935 (1942), pp. 100-105; F . Meyers and H. Bowlby7 "Thé Inter-
Wage Structure and Productivity, " Industrial and Labour 
Relations Review (Oct. 1963); H.M. Levinson, "Postwar Movement 
of P rices and Wages in Manufacturing Industries, " Study Paper,
No. 21, p. 3.
(3) S. Yamada, "Sangyobetsu Chingin-kozo, " Gendai-rodo-mondai Koza, 
Vol. 2 (Chingin-seisaka)(1907), pp. 135-6; the rank correlation 
coefficient between annual value added per employee and annual 
earnings per employee was 0.801 for Japan (45 industries in 1964), 
0,75 for West Germany <33 industries in 1902) and 0.63 for the 
United States (57 industries in 1964); 0.84 in 1954 and 0.87 in 1959 
for Japan.
(4) The coefficients of correlation between percentage increases in wages 
and output per employee over 1964-69 (for Japan, 1964-68) in 21 
industries are  0.0016 (negative) for the United Kingdom and 0.2037 
(negative) for Japan (See Appendix XV).
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and productivity may become weaker, as in W estern countries.
The relationship between wage» and other factors Is also 
rather inconclusive. There is some evidence of a positive correlation 
between Industry wage movements and degree of output concentration 
or trade union density (1) but, here too, contradictory results have
been obtained (2). Profits are  said to be a significant variable 
accounting for industry wage movements (3). We showed in tlie 
preceding chapter that tiie average employment size of the establisiunent 
was generally la rger in high-wage Industries than in iow-wage 
industries and yet that the wage level of establishments of any size 
tended to be higher in high-wage industries than that of establishments 
of the corresponding size in low-wage industries. This suggests 
that, although the size of firm s in a given industry bears on the wage 
level of the industry, particular conditions of individual industries 
also influence the wage level. What a re , tiien, the particu lar conditions 
characterising an individual industry? Wo tentatively suppose tiiat 
they are the rate of eixango in demand for the industry’s output and the 
nature of technology used in the indw try (and th e r  ate of technical 
progress there).
(1) For example, A.M. Boas and W. Goldner, "Forces affecting the 
Interindustry Wage Structure, " Quarterly Journal of Economics 
(May, 1850); J.W. Garbarino,ibid.; H.M. Levinson, ibid.
(2) For example, H.M. Levhmon, ibid. (no correlation between union 
density and wage increases); J.T. Dunlop, ibid. ; O. Eckstein and 
T. A. Wilson, "The Dotormination of Money XYugm in  American 
Industry, " Quarterly Journal of Economics (August, 1862), pp. 
379-414.
(3) O. Eckstein and T.A. Wilson, ibid.
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Before setting about further discussion about this m atter, we 
review the structure of labour market in relation to interindustry wage 
differentials. Apart from differentials based on differences In the 
composition of the work force by occupation, sex, e tc ., interindustry 
wage differentials presuppose imporfeet labour mobility between 
industries. But this does not mean the existence of "industrial" 
labour m arkets. It is doubtful that the labour m arket is  organised on 
an industry basis and fragmented industry by industry in term s of 
labour mobility. In fact, migration of labour between industries is 
more frequent than that within the industry <!)., Of course, it is 
certainly true that «orne industr)^ which employs many workei's of a 
special type mainly required for its needs virtually monopolises a 
market for such labour, but it is "occupational" ra ther than "industrial". 
Imperfect Inter-industry mobility of labour results from  the 
fragmentation of the local market at the firm  or plant level as well 
as occupational level. In this sense the conept of industry is 
essentially related to product markets and not to labour m arkets.
Individual nrm o in the same industry use more or less 
sim ilar types of technology and arc  subject to the sam e product 
m arket. If we tem porarily dism iss differences in skill proportions 
between industries, interindustry wage differentials priniarily arise
(1) \¥orkors who changed jobs within the industry as percentage of a ll 
workers who were engaged in the industry at tho beginning of the 
period and changed |ob;a during the period <1867/8) In Japan;
Mining 17; Construction 34; Manufacturing 40; D istributive 
trades 35; Finance, insurance and property 16; Transport and 
communication 31; Services 32. Thus the g reater majority of 
job-changers found employment in other industries. (Source: 
Employment Status Survey).
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from cllfferoncos in labont productivity oik! demand proaéure»* A 
Ivigîi rate of teohuic»al progress produces a high rate of productivity 
g$#wth, which would reoult In a  fall In tho price of :tho product eoncemed 
and an increase in employment under perfect comptition, given a 
fixed demand curve* Under imperfect competition* if demand for 
the product is increasing* it is quite possible for the firm  in the 
industry to allocate improvements in labour productivity to wage o r 
profit increase o r both* while maintaining the present volume of 
employment m  well aa the present price of the product.. On the 
other hand* when demand fo r the product is stable o r décidas Wg, 
improvements in labour productivity would result in a fall in 
employment if tho firm  tr ie s  to maintain the present price and wage 
level* or in a fall in the price of the product if it tr ie s  to maintain 
the present level of output and employment* Although there is no 
obvious reason why a high ra te  of technical p ro g e a s  and a high 
rate of demand expansion concur In some industries*, tld» has 
actually happened in a technologically advanced industries* such as 
chemicals and engineering* while other industries like textiles 
and leather goods have suffered,» slow rate of technical progress 
and stagnant demand <1). Many types of modern technology require 
investments in large lumps which weH-financed* large firm s only 
can afford to take the risk  of carrying out. Given the siae of the 
national economy* as we have aeen in Chapter 2* tho type of 
technology determines the structure of product m arket. The 
industries based on those types of technology will inevitably be
(1) See Appendix II.
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oMgopoiistio* ,h a  In IIki table bolow, tbe Q lt^ o p o l iB t io  m arket
0ir«cturo la oioarly related to tlm Industry wage iovol ra ther than 
indaatry wage inoreaRoa# la. oWgep#WtW Inclai^trios wave non^forraus
T&hW & - a
Ouput: Output Ouput Wholesale Employ* Wftgesî
group rate of per _, . ctoncen- price; meat: rate
iiiaroaoe. om%)loyeo;Î tmticmr rate of ra te  of of
rate of level. Increase increase In*
inct'onae 1900 crease
% . % % % %
Petroleum &
coal pToûmiii 8?.8 BO.3 'V 4" «  b. 0 00 30.3(3
Métal goods 10.4 «h iD. i 3 3.7 10.9 43.4(8
Cheniicata G. 4 1B.2 « 5 .0 -6 ,8 39.0(4
Machinery 6.1 3.9 *f‘4' t« 4# 3 3.1 36.4(6
Food 5.7 «0.7 •'Î* 3.8 15.8 35.1(9)
Iron % Stool .$ .0 4 .0 *10.1 « 7.0 33. Wl)
TImbo)'' -5 .3 «10.4 c 24.2 5,8 38.4Ü0
Pulp & paper ao .B » 7.9 "K 5.5 *EL5 30.9(5)
Brioh, pottery «10* 9 Ml. 7 -I" 7.5 0.8 37.6(7:
Nonferrou3 Biotaîs #16.3 4.3 -f'f 7.9 MB.7 33.6(3;
To%tilo8 1-a i.i :iQ,4 « 1.8 M.2.0 36.5(11,
îlotQ;., 1. The rates of increaoo arc  percentage increases over 1960-65.
!L The W u etry  rates of încroaeo In owpnt* otitpnt per employee* 
wholeoalo prlec-Sy and. employment are those relative to the 
overall ratoa of Increase for the whole manufaetnrlng 
îndnatr-y (which were t l . 6%, 3 9 . 3 . 1 %  34.6% 
roopeetivetyl.
8. The sigfi.0 and in output eoncontratlon repreeent a
•very tiîgh% *high% or *low  ^ooneentratîon level reapecUvely- 
4. The parorithealsed figures ropionont the ranking of induitry 
by wag© level In Î969.
Source; Ministry of îïitorciaîîonaî Trade and Industry^ Bank of dapan* 
MWotry of Labour, and F a ir  Trade Commlaelon.
motale, a g reater labour productivity growth roaiiitod in a fall in
product prfecïÿ and relatively atagnant o r reduced employment but not
in higher wage Inereaaw , although In machinery, whtc,h l« an fairly
lahour^itttenslve Industry, isomewhat g rea ter wage ami employment
116
increases ensued from slow productivity growth and a high level 
of demand. Slow productivity growth in less oligopolistic industries 
was accompanied by Increases in prices, employment and wages. If 
we look at the m atter from the demand side, the effect of a high level 
of demand for petroleum and coal products, being offset by large 
improvements In productivity, was only felt in the fairly stable 
employment level of these industries; a  high level of demand for 
metal goods and processed food, combined with slow productivity 
growth, brought about increases in employment, wages and prices; 
slower demand increases were accompanied by slower productivity 
growth except for iron and steel but their combined effects on prices, 
employment and wages differ, depending on their ra te  of increase 
relative to the other. Two things to add are; the ra te  of productivity 
growth is higher in oligopolistic industries; and the rate of wage 
increase is higher in the lowest-wage than In the highest «wage 
industries. We may tentatively conclude from these observations 
that (i) a high wage level and a high rate of productivity growth are  
associated with oligopolistic industries; (ii) with exceptions, a  high 
rate of productivity growth is associated with slower than the average 
increases in prices, employment and wages; (ill) 6hen the rate of 
demand expansion exceeds that of productivity growth, increases in 
p rices, employment and wages result; (Iv) with exceptions, a low 
rate  of demand expansion is associated with a low rate  of 
productivity growth; <v) a high rate of wage increase is generally
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related to a low wage level and vice veraa. (11 The last point may
foe hotter aoeouritod for by labour shortages than otherwise: employers 
in low-wage industries were obliged to raise wages m  m  to retain 
workers. An these industries had a low rata of productivity growth 
and a lov/ level of industrial concentration, their industry wage level 
was depressed when labour was abundant. .Labour shortages forced 
it up and consequently the prices of their products, because of a low 
rate of their productivity growth though in the caee of metal goods and 
food a high level of demand for them, coupled wdth labour shartagee, 
brought about increases in both wages and employment#
The table below shows movements in output, labour productivity, 
p rices, employment, and wages, the level of industrial concentration, 
and the ranking of industry by wage level, in British industries. We 
find some sim ilarities to the Japanese case: <i) a high rate of output 
expansion is associated with a high rate of productivity growth and vice 
versa; <iî) although not so c lear as in Japanese Industries, a high 
wage level and a rate of productivity growth a re  associated with 
oligopolistic industries; (ill) when the rate of output expansion 
exceeds that of productivity growth, increases in employment - but not 
always in prices and wages, unlike the Japanese case - resu lt, o r
(1) The coefficients of correlation are 9*6789 for Industry wage levels 
and ra tes of productivity growth ( r .p .g .l ;  0.0405 (negative) for 
r .p .g .  and ratc& of wholesale price Increase; 0.5Ü92 (negative) for 
r .p .g .  and rates of change in employment (excluding demand-stagnant 
Industries like pu% and paper, non-ferrous m etals, textiles, e tc .); 
0.5353 (negative) for r .p .g .  and rates of wage Increase; 0.7973 for 
r .p .g .  and ra tes  of output expansion; 0.0048 (negative) for Industry 
wage levels and rates of wage increase.
Industry Output;
Table
Ouput
5 - 4
Output Wholesale Employ-
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Wages;
rate per em ­ concen­ price: ment; rate  of
of in­ ployee; tration: rate of rate increase
Chemicals
crease
%
35.0
rate
of in­
crease
%
33.6
level,
1058
%
increase
%
6.3
of in­
crease
%
17
% 
40.0 (5)
Gas, E lec­
tricity , and 
water N.A. 32.4 "h4* 24.1 N.A. 28.1 (15)
Engineering 
& electrical
goods 32.4 27.1 15.2 4.2 35.7 (8)
Textiles N.A, 29.9 8,8 N.A. 39.0 (13)
Other manu­
facturing 26.0 14.4 N.A. N.A, 10.1 37.3 (7)
Food, tobacco 
& drink 16.0 17.1 f 14.1 - 0.9 39.8 (12)
Vehicles N.A, 14.6 1.0 N.A. 36.8 (I)
Paper, printing 
& publishing 12,0 10.2 10.9 2,4 38,4 (2)
Transport & 
communica­
tion 12.3 19.5 N.A. 21.3 - 6.0 44.6 (6)
Brick,
pottery, etc . 10.7 15,4 + N.A. - 4,1 36.4 (9)
Construction 6.0 16.5 - 20.6 - 8,3 88.5 (11)
Metal goods 
n .e .a . 4.6 4.2 4* 17.0 0.4 37,0 (10)
Metal manu­
facture N.A. 8.1 11,7 N.A. 36.9 (3)
Miscellaneous 
services 2,0 5.2 93,9 - 2.2 37.6 (18)
Clothing & 
footwear - 1.5 7.7 10.1 -  8.5 34.0 (17)
Timber, etc. - 2,7 -  1.5 - 18.4 - 1.2 33.0 (14)
Leather & 
fur -  8.7 1,4 N.A. -10.0 29.5 (16)
Shipbuilding Ml, 6 - 2.1 4* N.A. - 9.7 48.1 (4)
Hote;- 1, The rates of increase are percentage increases over 1864-6Ô.
2. The signs ++, +, and - in output concentration represent a 
*very high’, 'high*, or Uow* concentration level respectively.
3, The parenthesised figures represent the ranking of industry 
by wage level in 1989,
Source; National Institute Economic Review, No. 85 (1971) and 
Employment and Productivity O asette,
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when a fall in production is accompanied by slow productivity growth, 
employment also declines. On the other hand, a higher rate of wage 
increase was related to a higher industry wage level; the ra tes of
increase in industry wage levels and wholesale prices were almost
independent of those of productivity growth (1). This would suggest that 
the mechanisms of wage and price determination are  quite different 
between Britain and Japan. In short, the Japanese m arket structure 
is  nearer to a competitive model than the B ritish counterpart, in many 
ways. We shall enlarge upon this m atter in the next section.
Although different students have drawn conflicting conclusions 
about the causes of inter-industry wage differentials, the coverage of 
their studies was mainly limited to advanced industrial economies or 
different time periods of these economics, which were characterised 
by the development of mass trade unionism, a relatively sm all 
proportion of agricultural population, and tendency towards full 
employment. In a less developed country with a largo proportion of 
agricultural population (which is a main source t f  persistent 
underemployment) and a sm all proportion of employee population in 
the modern sector, the impact of trade unionism on the national 
economy as a whole would he negligible, so that we may fruitfully 
explore basic economic forces producing wage differentials. B.A, 
Turner and B .A .S . Jackson suggest that, although the wage level of
manufacturing industry and that of other non-agricultural sectors went
(1) The coefficients of correlation are  0.9083 for ra tes of change In 
output levels and productivity; 0.3526 for Industry wage levels and 
rates of productivity growth; 0.5886 for industry wage levels and 
rates of wage increase; 0.0010 (negative) for ra tes of productivity 
growth and wage increase.
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up together, Üiore v/aa no such relation between manufacturing and 
agricultural wage m ovom eu ts, and that the inter-induetry dispereal 
in rates of wage increase was much greater in less developed countries 
<i). M  the next section we shall attempt to analyse wage dispersion 
in  Japan as an example of the w age structures of develO|>ing countries 
and its narrowing procoso which took place in the last ten years or so, 
in the light of the experiences of Britain and other mature industrial 
co u n tr ie s .
4. Dynamic Process of Narrowing Wage Differentials
in the preceding section we have discussed the underlying 
causes of wage differentials* We shall nov/ attempt to explain, in 
the present section, actual movements in wages in the light of the 
hypotfoosea put forward. The most prominent and prevailing feature 
ol wage movements in recent years is the secular r ise  in wages 
accompanied by wage levelling, which many labour economists have 
pointed out so fa r. For example, L.O . Reynolds and C.H. Taft, 
comparing the wage stinictures of five Western countries including 
Britain, pointed out thiat^most types of differentials in most countrioB 
have declined in i^ercentage term e since 1930.. The shrlnleago Imr^ - 
been particularly marked in the case of occupational and interindustry 
differeixtiale, less striking in the case of geographical and male-female 
differentials.* (2). The pluonomeaon of shrinking wage differentials 
Is not particularly limited to advanced industrial countries. *In
(1) Op. c it. pp. 827*45.
(2) L.G . Reynolds and C .II. Taft, The Evolution of Wage Structure (1955) 
pp. 852—3.
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vccont years there has been a general tendcmcy towards narrowing down 
of inter-industry relative wage differentials, in moat of the countries 
Irreapoctive of their levels of industrialisation. • (1) And we mentioned 
in the preceding chapter that in Japan most types of differentials had 
also nai’rowed in the 1960%,.
We have two major questions to answer: why wage dlaperalon 
Is wider in Japan than In Britain, o r more fundamentally, why gome 
countries such as the United States, Canada, and India have wider wage 
differentials than others, (2> and what forces have operated In the 
narrowing of wage dîfferontlaÎB. Generally speaking In Icgg developed 
countsdes which are  in process of industrialisation there are wider wage 
differentials than in mature industrial countries (3). Among the 
developed o r lego developed group, however, the range of wage 
differentials differs considerably from one country to another. Even 
within a given country the range of wage dispersion varies from  one 
region to another: it is usually narrower in urbanised, industrial
(1) T .S . i%pola and V .P . BharadwaJ, "Dyiwmics of Industrial Wage 
Structure; Inter-country Analysis, " A ne iüconomic Journal Vol.
UiXK  No. 317 <1970), pp. 89-90. -------------------------------
(2) According to L.G* Reynolds and Ç .Iï. Taft, •differentials a re  widest 
in Canada and the United States, narrowest in Franco. Britain and 
Sweden are in an intermediate position but ra ther closer to the French 
level. • (ibid). V.N* Kothari ohowcd that occupatioiîal wage 
differentials were far wider in India than in the United States o r 
elsewhere (*'D isparities iu Earnings Among Different Countries,”
. (Sept ember .  1970). pp. $05-7).
(3) T .3 . Fapoia and V .F . BharadwaJ, ibid. According to an ILO% 
survey on occupational wages, wage differentials a re  wider in Japan 
than in otiier E ast Asian countries; wider in these countries than in 
W estern countries; wider in the United States than in European 
countries; wider in Britain than in West Germany aid Italy
(E. Magota, ”Chingin-icanri no Kokusal-hlkaku”, in Gendai Eodo- 
mondai Eoxa (1966), Vol. 3, pp. 244-6).
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areas than in ru ra l, half-industrSaliaed areas <1),
In less developed countries which a re  at an early  stage of 
industrialisation there is large labour surplus (msually in the form of 
underemployment ra ther than unemployment <2) ) in both urban and ru ra l 
a reas, while capital funds are  short and skilled labour of the types which 
modern technology requires, scarce . Modern industries tend to 
concentrate* usually In the urban area , for the amount of capital these 
countries can afford is very limited* As such industries grow* demand 
for skilled labour increases. Since it is difficult to expand the supply 
of such labour rapidly in the short run, shortages develop and with 
these, wider wage differentials between it and other types of labour* 
Growing modern industries require investment in large lumps because 
of indivisibilities and absorb a large part of what scarce  capital the 
country can afford, while in traditional industrial sector as well as 
agriculture capital formation is very slow* Consequently differences 
in labour productivity between sectors Increase and so do in ter-sectoral 
wage differentials* Moreover, industry in developing countries 
usually has a wider choice in production techniques, either labour- 
intensive or labour-saving, than the counterpart of industrialised 
countries because the la tte r is often compelled by labour shortages or 
international competition to adopt the most advanced type of technology*
(1) For example, the mean coefficients of variation in interindustry wage 
differentials within the region are  much sm aller in urban areas (15 
for Kanagawa, 17 for Osaka, 20 for Aichi) than in ru ra l areas (32 for 
Tamagata, 30 for Aomori, 39 for Shimane, 40 for Saga and 36 for 
Kagoshima) in Japan (Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics). Wage 
differential: by skill o r by size of establishment are  la rger in the 
South and Border States than in the Pacific and Great Lakes regions 
(R*A* L ester, "Pay Differentials by Size of Establishment",
Industrial Relations, vol* 7 (1967-68), pp* 57-67, Also see L.G . 
Reynolds, op. c i t . ,  p. 467).
(2) For the expEination of this m atter, see p. 205 jn Chapter 8).
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Where there is large labour reserve, sm all firm s using labour-intensive 
methods are viable by depending on choap labour and can compete with 
large firm s (which use more labour-saving methods and employ more 
expensive types of labour), so that the form er iiave not so much 
incentive to substitute cheap labour with scarce and costly capital as 
sm all firm s in advanced industrial economies where labour is relatively 
dear. Differences in labour productivity between sm all and large 
firm s may widen If the la tte r continue to absorb a large part of the 
capital funds available in the country conco#ned. As a result, large 
firm s enjoy further surplus profits and pay high wages to their 
employees, while sm all firm s are content with modest profits and to 
pay low wages to their employees, who are easily available from 
labour reserve* This is one of the main causes of a "dual structure" 
of developing economies* In these economies, however, rural-urban 
wage differentials a re  probably more critical* Technologically 
advanced industries usually grow in urban areas and absorb labour 
surplus there. As the urban economy develops, the income levels of 
inhabitants in general as well as employees working in those industries 
r ise  (1). If labour moved swiftly from  ru ra l to urban areas where 
demand for it is  greater, rural-urban differences in income level would 
contract rather than widen* F arm ers a re  one of the least mobile
(1) For theoretical analysis on thto m atter, see H. W. Richardson, 
op. c it. pp. 176 - 85.
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occupational groups (1). Besides poor transport and communication 
facilities, social and cultural b arrie rs  such as localism , tribalism , 
differences in styles of living, etc. are  more important obstacles to 
labour mobility in less developed countries than in advanced Industrial 
countries. In brief, the labour market is more fragmented and less 
developed in underdeveloped countries so tîiat, once new industries 
take off in urban areas , wage differentials between these industries and 
traditional secto rs, between skilled and unskilled workers o r between 
urban and ru ra l areas also s ta rt widening. The continued emergence 
of new industries brings about further widening of wage differentials, 
unless labour mobility and the supply of skilled labour increase 
rapidly.
Incidentally, as mentioned ea rlie r, distance affects labour 
mobility. Given a level of transport and communication facilities, 
the range of inter-regional wage differentials tends to be wider in a 
country with a large area  on which population is scattered, like the 
United States and Canada, then in a sm all, densely populated country. 
The came analogj»  ^ is true about regions within a country.
Apart from the effects of statutory minimum wages and 
trade unionism, factors contributing to the narrowing of wage
differentials are  improved labour mobility, increased supply of scarce
(1) See T .H . Hollingsworth, op, c i t . ,  pp. 53-64. In Japan, although 
the labour force engaged in agriculture decreased rapidly during 
the last decade, the number of farm  households remained fairly 
stable, which means that, despite falling Incomes from forming 
relative to those from other occupations, the majority of the 
Japanese farm  households would not abandon what sm all holdings 
they possessed nor leave for Industrial aireas (though it is to be 
noted timt many farming areas are  close to industrial centres and 
employment in industry and service is accessible to farm  house­
holds without changing addresses there).
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typos of laboiix' and capital, and technical change. Given a savings 
ratio, tîie amount of capital funds available for investment increaees 
with a rising level of national income, A greater amount of capital 
funds makes possible more extensive investments in various Industries 
in different regions, instead of intensive investments In a limited 
number of modern industries as at early stages of economic develop­
ment, T!ie shrinkage of differeneos in labour productivity between 
firm s, between industries o r between regions may resu lt. The supply 
of skilled labour increases as public education becomes more widely 
diffused, A typical example of this is the secular decline in the 
relative position of clerical workers because literacy is no longer a 
privilege for tlie middle o r upper classes in industrialised countries. 
Public education also contributes to the assim ilation of young people 
from  different social classes o r different parts of the country and 
thus the gradual elimination of social and cultural obstacles to labour 
mobility. The dissemination of urban styles of living In ru ra l areas 
makes farm ers aware of need for cash and Job opportunities available 
in urban a re a s , The improvement of trmmport and communication 
media no doubt facilitates the diffusion of market information and the 
migration of labour between regions « Tecîmîcal progress in our time 
has been such that in modern industries the field of white-collar 
occupations like management, professionals, teclmical and clerical 
workers expands, while manual work requiring craftsm anship or 
m ere m uscular strength is replaced by work requiring less manual 
dexterity but more intellectual qualities (which resu lts In blurring the
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traditional, boundary between manual and nonxiiamisl work)<l). Generally 
spealting, this has favourably affected the vmges of female o r manual 
workers relative to those of male o r nonmanual w orkers. Besides, 
government policies such m  the set-up of a nation-wide network of 
public employment services and regional development programmes may 
be oonduei%re to the reduction of Inter-regional wage differentials.
Such policies will, however, bo leas effective where there
are general and persistent labour surplus and an absolute shortage of
: . ' , 
capital (2), than where labour is short and capital, abundant. Although
the diffusion of popular education is one cause of contracting occupational
(skilled«unskilled, manual-aonmamml, e tc .) o r male-female wage
differentials, it does not seem to contribute much to the narrowing of
other types of differentials* The most important factor Inducing the
shrinkage of wage differentials is a general shortage of labour (3). A
general labour shortage hits hardest the lowest reaches of the community*»
wage hierarchy; unakilled labour, low-v/ago industries, sm all firm s
depending on cheap labour, and b o  on. For omployera can cope with
a shortage of skilled labour, within given lim its, by Introducing "dilutee"
(Î) For the analysis of the nature of modern technology and its effects on 
labour, see O. Friedmann, Industrial Society (1955), P art 2,
(2) Since capital investments are  noTihflnitely divisible, labour surplus 
cannot be eliminated completely where capital is  absolutely short.
(3) There is *a certain  inverse connection between the general level of 
employment and that of relative differentials. * (H.A. Turner, 
"Inflation and Wage Differential» in Great Britain, " in The Theoiy 
of Wage Determination (1957) edited by J .T .  Dunlop, pp. 123-35.*” 
%ScTsee*MT\V. Heder, "The Theory of Occupational Wage 
DiiTorentlalsV American Economic Review, Vol. 44 (1955), pp. 
833-52. -------- -------- ----- - ---------
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labour <1), or varying Mrîng atandardrj <2), o r training employées of a 
lower grade. Workers sMft from agrlots.lture to unskilled jobs In 
Industry, from unskilled to sem i-skilled jobs in industry, from unskilled 
to sem i-skilled jobs, o r from low-wage to high-wage industries, or 
from sm all to large firm s. After exhausting the existing labour 
surplus, however* there will be no more workers available for job 
vacancies of the most unattractive type. Then the wages for these 
types of labour a ta rt rising at a pace more than proportional to that 
for other typos, for tîioroiHa no reaBon for omployera, who can s till 
recru it from among the form er ty^pes of labour to fill vacncies for the 
lattex' by lowering hiring standards or otherwise, to ra ise  their wage 
level more than the average, while they are  obliged to put up the wages 
for Use form er types of labour more than the average so as to prevent 
them from  leaving for other more attractive jobs. If demand continues 
to expand, however, a sim ilar process affects all types of lower-wage 
labour 80 that the narrowing of wage differentials may eventually be 
very general, involving not only oceu|,>atioiial but also interindustry, 
in ter-firm  and înter-regîonal differentials. Since this process is the 
pulling up of low wages rather than the pulling dowsi of high wages 
towards the average, downward spread in wage distribution contracts, 
while leaving upper spread more o r leas intact. Wage levelling will 
not proceed so far as for a ll difforontinlo to disappear, but will stop 
when the range of difforontials becomes so narrow that it will not give 
workers any more Incentive to move from one job to anoth.er o r from
.0 .  Hunter and D .J . Robertson, op. cit. p. 406.(1)
(2) M. W. Beder, op., clt
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one region to another.
We have #o far ignored the effect# of trade unionism and 
statutory minimum wages on wage# differentials. This can he Justified 
about countries where trade unionism and statutory minimum wage 
system  are  s till in their infancy. But they cannot be overloc4ted In 
countries with a  well»developed, centralised system  of collective 
bargaining, such as Britain and other Western countries (1). il.A . 
Turner ascribed the narrowing of wage differentials to the growth of 
mast trade unionism rather than to full employment, diffusion of public 
education, or technical change, and asserted  that *. • • . trade unions 
p refer to demand equal wage advances for all the ir members: mass 
trade unionism has, on the whole, chosen to demand Increases which 
are  equal in absolute te rm s. The general preference for such 'fla t- 
rate* Increases has been the f irs t cause of the narrowing. * <2) On the 
other hand, some trade unions o r some groups of workers (e .g . 
skilled labour, tim e-workers versus piece-workers) a re  particularly 
keen to maintain "established relativities" o r "customary differentials" 
so that, if a general wage advance is obtained by trade unions, 
sectional demands for wage increases follow so as to resto re  
"estaW shed relatives". If a  trade union affiliates different types of 
labour, as is the case with large British unions, it tends to prefer
(1) L.G . Reynold* and C.H. Taft mentioned, after comparing the United 
States, Canada, Britain, France, and Sweden, that *it is suggestive 
that the decline In differentials was greatest in those countries where 
wage determination Is most highly centralised, and least in those 
countries where wage decision# are  vet^ decentralised. * (op. cit. 
pp. 882-3).
(2) op. cit.
muniform cash advances among its members because dfecMmlnatory 
wage demands are  often a source of internal friction beüween members. 
And in such a trade union skilled workers are  outnumbered by less 
skilled workers so that its choice of the form of wage demand, more 
often than not, leans to general wage increases for all affiliated m embers. 
If a trade union wants to stick to the principle of "coercive comparison", 
o r advance the interests of a particular group o r groups of workers 
ahead of those of other trades o r unskilled labour in general, it must 
be exclusive or restric tionist in its membership. Typical trade 
unions of such a type are  relatively sm all craft unions which s till 
survive, despite the general tendency towards m erger and general 
unionism (as against craft unionism), in present-day Britain (1).
Although uniform wage increases advanced by m ass trade unionism 
were supposed to have brought about the narrowing differentials for 
British workers, the existing system of established relativities was 
said to have been taken as given by trade unions and government 
agencies, such as arbitration tribunals, conciliation services and 
legal wage boards. In more recent years (2). But, on the whole, we 
do not know for certain whether the halt o r reversa l of the narrowing 
trend after the middle of the 1950's in Britain (3) was due to the 
revived drive for the maintenance of established relativities o r the 
attainment of a system  of equilibrium differentials which would 
naturally come as a result of adjustments by market forces. Only
we can say with some certainty that full employment, diffusion of
(1) B .A . Turner, "Trade Union Organization, " Political Quarterly,
Vol. 25, (1955) pp. 57-70.
(2) II.A . Turner, op. cit. pp. 123-35,
(3) B .C . Hunter and D .J . Robertson, op. cit. p . 131.
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popular education, technical change, development of mass trade 
unionism, and statutory minimum wage system have all worked in 
the same direction to bring about the contraction of downward spread 
of the British wage distribution.
The far wider wage differentials in Japan are essentially 
a reflection of greater disequilibria in the distribution of labour and 
capital (including technology) among the regions, industries and firms 
that have been caused by a rapid and unbalanced sectoral growth of 
the economy. More specifically, in Britain with a small proportion 
of agricultural population the degree of industrialisation is relatively 
homogeneous over the country, though the industry mix differs 
considerably from one region to another (1), where Japan has a 
relatively large agricultural population which is unevenly distributed 
among various regions (2). Roughly speaking, the regional wage 
level is inversely related to the size of agriculture relative to industry 
in the region concerned. Among other things, the difference in 
labour productivity between agriculture and non - agricultural industries 
is remarkably larger in Japan than in Western countries, because the 
average productivity of the Japanese farmer is extremely low, as 
compared with that of manufacturing workers which does not differ
(1) See J, Tumelty, Britain Today (1969). pp. 67-123,
(2) See Footnote 12Ï on page 106,
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very nm ch  from* say* that of their Ik itish counterpart» <D* There 
were 16 million farmers (nearly 40 per cent of total working population) 
in 1000* which diminished by nearly ,0.0 million annually to 10 million 
(about 20 per cent) in 1008) (2)* This implies that a vast amount of 
unskilled labour flowed from agriculture into industry during the last 
decade* Besides* more than one million school-leaver# mainly 
entered industry and about one third of them migrated to urban areas* 
every year during the same period* Production in manufacturing 
increased at the average annual rate of 10 per cent between 1000 and 
1080* The «hare of agriculture* forestry and fishery in net fictional 
product fell from 22*7 per cent to 11.7 p m  cent and the «hare of 
manufacturing industry rose from 22*3 per cent to 28*0 per cent 
during 1000-87 (3)* Above all* the importance of chemical* metal 
and engineering industries increased markedly (4)* Rapid and great 
elmnge# in the Industrial structure originally created wide dilferehcea 
in labour productivity* wages and profit rate» between leading 'growth*
Industrie» like chemical* metal and engineering Industrie» and slow-
(1) The average productivity of British farmer# ### nearly three time# 
a# high as that of Japanese farmer#, while In manufacturing the 
average productivity of Britlah worker# wa# on% 17 per cent higher 
than that of Japanese worker#, in 1967/08. (The average produc­
tivity of Japanese worker# at big manufacturing firm# I» no lower, 
but aometlmc# higher, than the British counterpart. The problem 
of low productivity maln%^  concerna agriculture and email firm# in 
other industrie#. For example, the percentage difference# in 
labour productivity between the United State# and Japan (favourable 
to the former) were HI for wortser# employed at e#tabll»hm«nt# with 
1900 employee# or more and 481 for worker# employed at eatabUeh- 
ment» with 1-0 employee#)* (Source* Bodo-h#W#ho (1909)).
(t) Source; Frlme Minister*# Office* LabomH^o^^
(8) .Source; Economie Planning Ageney7T^#tï<S 'statlatic#.
(4) The aliare of theao Induatrle# In total valiwï'aîtded l>y “Sinufa®
Wrn# from 5S.3 per cent In 1950 to #8.8 per cent in 1987 (Source: 
Ministry of Industry and International Trade).
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growing imlîistrtos* botweeii expanding and ctoelloing lirrns, and 
footweon developing urban areas v/itli many 'growth* industries and 
underdeveloped* rural areas without uny such industries. But 
abundant labour supply made it possible for iow-wago înduitrie» or 
firms within a given Industry to survive without raising wages am 
much as leading Industrie» or firms In an industry did. This v im  
eapeeimlly so when the economic boom got under way In the lSGO*s. 
Underemployed fermer# were willing to snatch at any job opportunities 
available hi industry for low wages. The spread of urban styles of 
living in the rural prea aroused the deaire of rural people for cash 
ineomes. In the beginning they sent out tholr sons and daughters to 
cities for employment in Industry and services but later even bead# 
ol farm household came to leave farming to their wile or old parents 
and go to luduatrtal centres for measomi employment. As a result 
of the continued economic growth* labour shortages or rccruitmemt 
difficulties were first felt by small firm# in low-wage industries In 
the urban area and then spread to larger firms and less developed 
areas. Among other things* small firms had to compete with large 
firms In high-wage Industrie# for new school leaver# who were the 
cheapest but most flexible and m<4»il© type of labour. As job 
vacancies began to outnumber in a great measure those school leaver* 
who were seeking employment In industry and service* (though other 
types of workers still had more or loss difficulty in obtaining Jobs 
until recently)* in the beginning of the I9C0*»* small firm# found it 
increasingly difficult to hire these school leaver# at low wag##. (I)
""T'Aut 1"" 1* 1^, AAitim fw uiwuw# ii*m i i i i#  n UNUWN* wwLimg
(I) #e« p. 213 In Chapter g*
mMore and more ochool leaver* flowed from rural to urban areas and
\
entered higher-wage Industries and services and largo firms (I). Two 
consequences followed from this phenomenon; (I) the rates of increase 
in the starting wages of school leavers began to outpace that in the 
general wage level, which naturally contracted differentials between 
Juveniles and adults; (11) differences in the starting wages of school 
leavers between regions, between industries, between firms, and 
between boys and girls narrowed (2). That did not ond there. These 
rapid and large rises in the starting wages of school leavers, as will 
be discussed In the next chapter, had a profound effect on the whole 
wage structure of Japanese industry.
By the late 1960% a general labour shortage became apparent 
in the Japanese economy. We cannot say much about labour shortages 
in Japan from  unemployment data, for unemployment rates have, for 
special reasons (3), always been very low by Western standards (4). 
There are  however, other indicators. F irs t, as v/e have aecn in the 
preceding chapter, a wage explosion has developed in  the la tte r half
(1) For example, out of 250,000 school-leaver» who completed Junior 
secondary school, 60,000 (about 33 per cent of the whole) migrated 
from their home region to other regions in 1960, The ratios of Jck) 
vacancies filled by school-leavers are much higher at large firms 
than at small firms (Source: Ministry of Labour).
(2) For example, the annual rates of wage increase for boy school- 
leavers in 1060, 1961, and 1902 were 16,2%, 22.6% and 29.0% 
respectively, which were well above those for other workers <4.9%,
0.4%, and 10.2%). (Source: Ministry of Labour).
(S) Seep. 205 Chapter 6.
(4) The unemployment rate in  Japan was 1.9% in 1053 and 1.1% in 1830 
(Source: Ministry of Labour).
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of the I960*». Second, job vftcencie* for worker» other then school 
leaver» mleo began to outnumber job applicant» at Public Employment 
Security Office# (1). Labour shortage» have been particularly acute 
in aemi-skiUed and skilled production trade# <2).
Although the general labour shortage ha# been caused by rapidly 
expansing demand for labour, two other factors have contributed 
towards Intensifying it: <i) an increasing proportion of school leavers 
go to higher education (S) so that the time of their entry into the 
labour force is postponed; (Ü) the sources of labour supply from 
agriculture have been exhausted (4). The effects of labour shortages 
are that they tend to increase not only migration from agriculture to 
industry or from rural to urban areas but also the mobility of the 
existing labour force in industry, between industries and between firms
(1) The ratios of job applicants to vacancies were about 1.5 before 
1066 but below one thereafter, i.e . there were more vacancies 
than applicants (Source: Ministry of labour).
(2) That number of workers of these types which industry needed 
increased from 1.3 million in 1902 to 1.8 million in 1969 and the 
shortage of them was most acute among the smaller firms 
(Source: Ministry of Labour).
(3) The proportions of school leavers who went to high school and to 
technical college or university rose from 61.5 and 18.4 per cent in 
1953 to 74.7 and 23.7 (for universities only, 17.8) percents in 1967 
respectively. These figures are relatively high by European 
standards (for example, the proportions of school leavers who went 
to senior secondary school and to university in Britain were 49.9 
and 9.8 per cents respectively in 1986) (Source* Ministry of 
Education).
(4) Out of about 10 million farmers still remaining on the land in 1968, 
one third did not work full time in farming but among the full-time 
farmers, 60 per cent were female and again more than 60 per 
cent of all farmers were aged 40 and over (Source; Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry).
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wlthîiî a  local m arket (l). The result W, m  we have seen in the 
preceding chapter, the narrowing of all types of wage differentials In 
Japan in recent years. At the same time the rates of wage increase 
have not only increased hut also become more and more uniform 
among various types of workers, industries, firms, and regions <2). 
In these circumstances there have hsen Important developments in 
the Japanese collective bargaining system, which we shall discuss in 
Chapter 7. These phenomena have aroused much concern among 
economists, business managers and government policy-makers in 
relation to price movements, particularly with regard to the question 
of whether the increased linkage between wage movements in different 
sectors is due to the improved operation of the labour market or the 
Increased centralisation of the collective bargaining system.
(I) F or example, the number of job-changers having moved between 
firm s increased from 764,000 In 1964 to 832,000 in 1000 
(Source; Ministry of Labour).
(2) See p. lag in chapter 7.
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Cm PTB R  0
INTERNAL WAGE STRUCTURE AND LABOUB 
COSTS
If QÎÎ wage# are determined In the external m arket, there 
i0 no room for wage administration by management, nor any need of 
examining the Internal wage atrneture of eoinpanie# baeanse it m erely 
rofleet* the sk ill mix of the workforce employed by them. And in ter- 
firm  wage differentials In the samo local rmnrket a re  ascribed to 
differences in skill proportion between firms# In the real world, 
however, they cannot he accounted for golely by difference# in skill 
mîH between In other words, different firm# in  the same
local m arket pay different v/agoo to workers of m  Identical occupation 
and, what la m ore, the relative position of a given occupation in the 
internal wage hierarchy varies from m o  f ir m  to another <!>• This 
fact Implies that an individual firm  hao a considerable degree of 
discretion over its internal wage structure end methods of wage 
payment. It is known that wago drift often arises from wage 
administration by management and wage bargalna at the plant level In 
Britain and other W estern countries with a eentraîîî^cd system  of 
collective bargaining. (0). In Japan, the concept of "wage rate»" is 
not used in praetico nor negotiated in collective bargaW ng (3) so that 
no problem of wage drift arlooo in the sonno that actual enminga per 
hour OP week oxceod nationally agreed wage rates# But a sim ilar 
problem has arisen from stoop iiiorcaaoa la the wages of young workers,
itW" oïï'ïïSBr*K*1SS^
mxil W ornsl Labour M arkets", in Local Labour Market» «nd Wage
Structure m m .  edited by D# B A ^ b m r n n T p jr m M r -----— -
Brown, "Wage Drift", Baonomica, vol. 29(1962), pp.
(3) In Japan, the "base wage" W a matter of nogotiatioa, instssd (Bee 
pA89 in the next elmpter).
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Bîme  the system  of age dlfforontlaî» has been maintained fairly 
rigidl^f by management, or under p ressure of trade unions, in Japan, 
large advances in the wages of young workers tend to induce upward 
drift in the wages of older workers so m  to maintain the eatabltihed 
relativ ities based m  age o r length of service (I).
Labour costs do not only consist of wages directly paid to 
workers but also include fringe Ijonefits, costs of recruitm ent and 
training, e tc . In recant years the la tter tend to r ise  faster than 
wages do partly because of labour shortages and thus cause upward 
drift in labour costs. Independently of wage advances. When we talk 
about rising labour costs, therefore, it is also important to know which 
constituents contributed to the particular increases in labour costs. 
Moreover, trade unions are  not concerned in the determination of all 
constituents of labour costs nor even in a ll components of wages.
1. Internal Labour Markot
The pattern of Internal labour markot structure and the 
company wage level relative to the (external) market v/ago level bear 
on tlie pattern of internal wage structure and methods of wage payment. 
If the internal m arket of a given company is very much isolated from 
the external m arket, as In Japanese large firm s, or if the company 
wage level is conaidorably higher than the market wage IcvcL 
management can have wide choice in the type of internal wage structure
(1) It îCî pointed out that "pure drift" which is not due to national 
negotiations could occur within any internal wage structure at 
British firm s aa well. (Beo S.W. Lerncr, J .E .  Cable, and S. 
Gupta <eds.). Workshop Wage Determination (1669), p. 248.
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arid methods of wage payment. For management need not take so
mueh nocount of the markot wage rates but can determine Individual 
wages at wluchever level they like, as far as the wages so determined 
are  not lower than those determined in the external m arket. Of 
course* the direction of management in the détermination of these 
m atters may be restric ted  to some extent by trade unions o r by their 
own consideration that alterations in customary relativities between 
their employees may engender discontent among the xmfavoumfoiy 
affected groups of workers.
The types of the internal market may differ from one firm  
to another. The main characteristics of the internal labour market 
structure are  determined by the company's policy concerning rec ru it­
ment, promotion and training. Some firm s may only h ire, as a rule, 
unskilled M iour at the lowest grade from the external market and fill 
all vacancies for higher grades by promotion ù*oni within. Other 
firm s may liave an internal labour market w hich# higidy compsrt- 
mentalisocl o r stratified  occupation by occupation but haa many "ports 
of entry" open to the external m arket, so that recruitm ent is direct 
into each occupatioai in the external market and tliero in little 
opportunity for promotion or internal labour redeployment within the 
firm . We have called the firs t type of Internal market "closed-type" 
and the second type "open.-type" in the preceding olmpter* A pure 
form of either open-type or closed-type internal markot io ra re  in 
reality . Most firm s usually recru it only for a limited %'ànge of skills 
from  the external market,promoting or redeploying "insidors" wherever
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possible. Some opportunities for outsiders do, however, remain 
because some types of labour are difficult to obtain by internal 
training or promotion and "promotion from within" has several 
disadvantages as well as advantages (1). One of the disadvantages for 
small or medium firms is that the maintenance of long-term company 
training programmes is often too costly for them. Some of them, 
therefore, find it more convenient to pool their funds and organise 
training courses for their employees on an industry basis. But in 
that case it is very difficult for firms to "lock" trained employees in 
the internal market. Internal training and promotion from within 
are essential to a cloaed.typo internal labour market.
The internal labour market of many Japanese large firms 
is typically of the closed type <2). These firms mainly recuit new 
school leavers and university graduates for key jobs, or Jobs leading 
to higher key grades later, and give them internal training of the 
required type. <3>. These "in-bred" employees have entered the 
firm under a tacit mutual understanding that they commit themselves
to the latter throughout their life-time until they reach an age of
(1) J. Valerie Grant and G.J. Smith, Personnel Administration and 
Industrial Relations (1969), pp. 62-3.
(2) For further information on this matter, for example, see M. Tsuda, 
"Japanese Wage Structure and Its Significance for International 
Comparisons", The Changing Patterns of Industrial Relations (1965), 
pp. 203-14.
(3) New school leavers and university graduates accounted for about
43 per cent of the new mcrults at firms with 500 employees or more, 
while the proportion was 11 per cent at firms with 5-29 employees 
in 1968. More than 90 per cent of the firms with 1000 or more 
employees gave their employees some form of training at their 
expenses and two thir<feconducted company training, while over 40 
per cent of the firms with 30-99 employees provided some form of 
training and only 18 per cent carried out company training during 
1967 (Source; Ministry of labour).
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compulsory retirement <55 at most firms) (!)• As regards the recruit­
ment of workers other than theae school leavers and university 
graduates, many large firms have adopted a restrictive hiring policy 
based on age and try to avoid hiring such workers, particularly for key 
skilled or clerical Jobs (2), Promotion channels are usually established 
separately for middle-school and high-school leavers, and university 
graduates* Promotion is awarded mainly according to age or length 
of service after allowing for merit, past performance, etc* Within 
the internal hierarchy of a given company there are two separate 
substructures - the white-collar and the blue-collar (3)* Promotion 
ladders are separately established for each substructure so that 
vertical mobility la quite possible within it but mobility between the 
two structures is rare* In Japanese large firms, moreover, three 
such substructures are separately formed for clerical and administrative 
jobs, technical grades, and manual grades <4)* The skill acquired by
(1) Almost all finne with 500 employees or more had a compulsory 
retirement system for their employees, while a half of the firms 
with 30-99 employees had not, in 196*7 (Source: M in is try  of Labour). 
<2) A discrim inatory hiring policy based on ago was practised for 
clerical and technical Jobs by more than 50 per cent of the firms 
which hired workers other than school leavorn and university 
graduates, and for sales or production-line jobs by 60 per cent 
during 1968 (Sourco: do, )*
(8) See D*C. Miller and W*R* Form, op. cit*
(4) F or further information on the Japanese promotion systems, for 
example, see S. Kaheko, "Shoshbi-seldo”, Gendal Eodo-mondai
Kossa, vol. 1 (1966), pp. 208-22*
*%Bout 70 per cent of the firms with 500 employees and 27 per cent
of the firm s with 30-09 employees carried  out internal promotions; 
over 80 per cent of the large firms and 38 per cent of the small 
firm s conducted internal redeployments of the workforce during 
1967 (Source: Ministry of Labour).
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employeejs on the job, o r through company training at a particular 
firm , is  not generally recognised as such by other employers so that 
it is  ra ther difficult for older skilled workers to got a comparable 
Job with a comparable pay in the external labour m arket, unless there 
are  acute labour shortages (i)* F o r those unskilled o r sem i-skilled 
Jobs which do not lead directly to higher key grades, workers other 
tiian school leavers are  liired on a casual basis at low wages 
approximately sim ilar to those of workers employed at sm all firm s. 
Most of them are  virtually deprived of opportunities for promotion o r 
ca reer development and consequently their turnover rates are  high, 
as contrasted with the high stability of in-bred employees. Those 
casual workers a re , so to speak, a safety-valve against business 
fluctuations for large firm s which have such an inflexible employment 
policy for in-bred employees, because they can easily laid off o r 
rehired, unlike the in-bred permanent workers for whom employers 
have incurred a high training cost and who are  not easily available in 
the external labour m arket. <2)
On the other hand, the Internal market of Japanese small 
firms Bcf the open type (3). In these firms the stability of employees
(1) Among the newly hired Jbb-changers, the proportion of those who 
were hired for their special sk ill or expertise was only 6 per 
cent in 1968 (Source: M inistry  of Labour.
(S) K. Ymamoto, **Hii>Jiko, Shagaigo no Haicld**, Gendai Eodo-mondal 
Rosa, vol. 1 (1886), pp. 224-40. Also see K.'''Roj^yashi% G%<ïal 
Nihon no Koyo-koato (1967).
(3) 84' ^ r ' cent of 'tike'firms with 30-99 employees hired workers other 
than school leavers, while the proportion wai 44 per cent for the 
firm with 5000 employees or more in 1968 (Source: Ministry of
Labour).
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(as iBcasii-red in  tersns of the avorago longtli of servieo with the present 
employer) is much lower and turnover rates are  higher tlam at largo 
firmja (1). Labour mobility between em ail firm s and of casual workers 
between large and sm all firm s la quite high <2). We may, therefore, 
say that u single external m arket for manual labour is  forinocl within 
the local m arket to caiër for sm all firm s m û  casual employment at 
large firm s. As contrasted with those in-bred permanent employees 
whose employment relatlonship with largo firm»  reflects elements of 
bilateral monopoly, those workers employed at sm all firm s or for 
casual jobs at large firm s am  always exposed to competition among 
thorns elves and from job-changera who flow in from agriculture o r  
other occupations in industry. Such a labour m arket structure is 
reflected In the internal wage structure, wage levels, and trade 
union structure, which wo shall soon cUbcuss.
In Britain opcn-ty^m internal m arkets combined with 
somo internal mobility seent to be more common than in Japan, because 
of her long tradition of craft unionism and the more developed habits 
of occupational labour markets. Nevertheless large firms in new 
industries often find it difficult to obtain workers with the required type 
of skill in the external market, so that they are obliged to breed
<11 The s?/erage age and length of service of employees working in firms
with 1000 employe00  or .more were 32 yeara and 10 years respectively, 
while those ot workers employed at firms with 10-09 employees were
3S yoarf] and 5 years. In 1967 (Source: Ministry of Labour).
<2) See K. KobayashI, op. cit.
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âgomo of thclr own employees by internal training. Since the supply 
of and demand for tiicse mvi types of skill may bo lim ited to particular 
firm s, it l« convenient, in such ». case, for both employers and 
employees to have continuous and stable e^nployment relations.
2* Internal #age S truoturt and Methods of Wage Payment
The development of the Internal labour market allows 
individual firm s to develop an internal Job hierarchy o r a Job evaluation 
system , and an internal wage structure and various forme of wage 
payment based on it, according to their own needs. It Is difficult 
to generalise m  firm s may havo different principles of Job stratification 
o r Job mahmiinn, on the one hand, and some Itrm s have not a consistent 
set of principles for job stratification or evaluation and wage adm inis­
tration based on it so  that the wages of particular workers o r jobs 
are  determined extemporaneously and ireelevantly to those of others 
in the same firm* which results in a chaotic Intom sl wage structure
(1), on the other. Moreover, although it Ib comparatively easy to 
assess differences in the performance of workers within a  given 
occupation. It is extremely difficult to apply a functional theory based 
on productivity and responsibility to determine pay differentials for 
different occupations. As B .C . Miller and W.H. Form  rightly 
pointed out, a  "status'* pay check Is easier to justify than a 
"productivity" pay check (2). This is particularly true for the pay 
of indirect labour such as white-collar workem, for whom there is no
<1) Bee, for example, National Board for Prices and Incomes, Fay aW 
Conditions of Service ctf Bnginseriug Workers, Report No. WtïSsT),
’’ÏSû&ïnitfr''SÎS5™''^ ''™^ ^
(2) op. cit.
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i l im c t  raothod of moaauriiig procluotiviiy* On the otlior hand. It is 
oiiQU poasl’olo to measuro the productivity of production workers eo 
that atten^pts to relate their wages to productivity liavo boon made and 
various methods have been devised for tliis purpose Cl),
But oven in the pay pocket of these w orkers, as shown in 
the left-hand ooiumn of Table 6«1, only a  minor part of their earning# 
ÎB attributable to payment-hy-reaulW system  (FBE), though the 
proportion varies oonsiderably between industries and is generally
higher for women Cin Britain),
T’aM© & - 1 
l%yment l>y Results
Percentage of earnings Percentage of employee#
attributable to PBE: having received pay based 
on I»BR m  a comi>onent 
of their earnings;
.All industries &
Britain Japan Britain Japan
le rv ices 8.9(12.0) 6 .? 34.1 # 0 .5 ) 10.0
Mannfacluring 13.3(21.?) 4.1 39.5 (41.3) 14.0
(Motal manufacture) 19.9 18.3 50.0 00.0*
iYehiclm ) 
(Bricka, pottcryq
21.8 ?.4 40.0 34.4*
etc, ) 18.3 3.3 40.6 20.9*
Mining 
Transport &
11.0 37.3 14,3 43.5
communication 
Skillod 
Semi-skilled 
Umkillod 
Nomnamial
4.0
10.9 (33.0) 
16. Ù <aa.4) 
0.1(11.1) 
0 .4 (0 .3 )
10.0 19.4 36.0
Not#: -■ 1. The parcthc«i#ed figure# a re  for women and the
a.
3.
afitorlokod, lor  1084 in Japan,
British figure# are, except for those otherwise 
apooiflod, for manual mon. paid for m
full week, September, 18##.
Japmiona fi^p tO B  are, OKOopt for thoao otherwlee 
specified, for all employee# irrespective of #ex«# 
miû manual-nonrnnnml, Septombor, 1367.
Source: 'Bmployment and Productivity Oassatto and Yearbook of Labour
Btatialica.
M.th«xte of w .g .  P.ytn.ntc tn BiMWh
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Payment-by -remult# system# are  more widely used in Britain tlian in 
Japan, though they are  more important in Iieavy industries in both 
countries and in mining, and transport and communication, in Japan, 
Particularly  in m etal manufacture, nearly QO per cent of employees in 
the industry received pay based on FBE as a component of their earnings 
and this source alone accounted for nearly 20 per cent of tlieir total 
earnings in both Britain and Japan, PBR is more important for soxni- 
skilled (in the case of females^ skilled) workers but negligible for the 
earnings of nonmanual workers in Britain. Moreover, FBE systems 
covered 44 per cent of Japanese manufacturing workers in 1939 and 
the proportion fell rapidly thereafter to 37 per cent in 1954, 18 per cent 
in 1854 and to the present level <14 per cent) <1), while in Britain ’there 
is no clear evidence of any overall movement to, o r away from , PBR 
since 1851’ <2).
Earnings differentials between workers within a firm  arise  
from  different sources wliich a re  created by management to serve 
different purposes o r needs of their own or employees. Table 6 - 2  
shows the percentage composition of total earnings by form  of payment 
and the percentage of employees who received pay based on a particular 
form of payment as a component of their earnings. Among the various 
components of earnings, basic pay is by far the most important for 
most workers in both Britain and Japan.
(1) T, Tanselye, "Noritsukyu", Oendai Eodo-moudai Koza <1966), p. 173,
(3) National Board for P rices andlncomes. Report No, 65 (1868), p. 0,
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Table 6 - 3
Mako-up of Pay
Great Britain: fuîl-ÜBio mon paid Japan: all omployoea,
lo r full week* Septombor* 1968 Soptomber, 1987
Basic pay 67.4(01.2) 06.5 Basic pay 75.0
Overtime pay IG.l (2.8) 62.0 Overtime pay H.4
PBR 6.9 (0.4) 24.1 PBR 5.1
Shift promlum 2 .3 (0 .2 ) 10.3 Supplementary
Commission 0.3 (2.7) 1.8 payment# tor
or profit living cost 5.3
sharing 2,2 (3,2) 23.5 Buty allowance# 3.0
Holiday pay 0 .4  (0.3) 1.7 Tum-up allowances 1.3
Guarantee pay 0 .3 (0 .0 ) 8.5 Other payment# 0.0
Other payi’xient» 2.1 (0.0) 26.0
(Special yearend and summertime
Figiîro in < } are for nonmamml men. bommos)
Note: ^  I, Snpplo^fuontary payment# for living oast consist of fmmily 
allowances* area  addition»* travelling allowances* 
housing enbsidles* etc.
2. Duty allowance# conaiat of responsibility pajq danger or 
dirty money* irioonvenieneo pay, skill additions* etc.
3. Other payment# in Japanese pay consist of holiday pay* 
guarantee pay* wnlform allowance#, etc.
4. Supplementary payments top living cost, duty allowances 
and tum -up pay a re  Included in other payment# in British 
pa>*
5. Special honimem allowed twice a year a re  equivalent to 3.S
months’ pay in Japan,
Source: Employment and Productivity ûaîsetta and Yearbook of
Labour Statlettcs.
A largo part of earnings dlffarcntials nr#* therefore* ascribed to
differoncos In baa to prq/, though other components tûso Influence
differentials. Baafe pay is calculated on tim e worked and tim e ra tes.
In Britain the period of time Involved in a  month, o r  sometimes a,year*
for sa la ried woikers and a week o r leas for %mgo earners CD* In Japan,
(I) L .C . Hunter and B. J .  Robertson* op. e lt. pp. 54-57.
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the p^Tioû of time involved Is a month for both vJiîte-oolînr and blit#« 
collar omployoe# at largo firm e, while at sm all (Irma it is  largely a 
month for salaried  workers and a day for many wago-oarnors Cl). 
Standard time rale# most Qoncorn both management and workers. They 
may or may not be negotiated through eolleetive bsagaîntog. Onto Me 
the unionised secto r of the economy, they are  determined by market 
forces, management policy, o r statutory wage eoimoils o r other 
government bodies* In Britain salary  scales which are  directly related 
to ago (e .g . bank oœployoos) o r length of service (e .g . school teachers) 
o r to job evaluation or grading eyaîems, whether o r not Indirectly 
roJmtml to ago o r length of servico <o.g. Imperial Chemical Indimtries 
L td ., E lectricity Supply Industry) <2) are established for the pay of 
salaried workers m  m  to allow periodic salary  Incremonta for them, 
while the wages of manual workers are  determined grad© by grade 
(aometimc# within a  range for a given grade) for each occupation 
irroapectlve of age o r length of service, except for juvenile worker»
<whose wages are  uaually related to ago between 10 and 20) o r  "«ervice 
pay" for worker» who have worked over a certain  period of time for 
the present employer (e .g . mimleipal bnamen) (3). In Japan, the 
tim e mt# (monthly foaale pay) in predemlnmntly delernnined for the man
(1) More than gO per cent of the firm# with 1006 employee# or more pay 
both white-collar ao<l manual worker# o n  a monthly basis and 40 per 
cent have a  provision for deduction# in came of workers* failure to 
turn up, while #7 per cent of the firm» with 80-80 employee:) pay 
both type* of worker» on a monthly bail* and 48 p er cent do m  only 
for white-collar worker# Im 1807 (Source: Ministry of labour).
(2) National Board for Price# and Income», Report# Noe. 85 (1867), 5
mm}* 105 (1808), %m (I800), 10a ( i0im), « w .
(S) National Board for Price* and income* Report* No». 63 (1868), etc.
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vathor than for tho job. m other words, the basic pay oi both now- 
mamial and manual emplojoeo (other than oaoual worhors) ia largely 
dotorininod according to poraoaal charaotorieticB of the individual 
f/orkor oiwh oa age, length of servToo, educational career, ability, 
skill, diligence, past porformmioo, exporioneo, etc. <1) Among other 
things, age o r length of oervioo Ib often a doeWlve factor at many 
firmo. (2) Most Japan©Bo firma imvo a periodic incremental oyston^ 
which allows employees, either white-collar or manual, to be progrosaed 
through the salary  acalce or wage schedules, though tho award of 
periodic increments in not nlwaya automatic. (8) The main |utifica- 
tlon for this system  is, from tho m anager's point of view, that 'increased 
experience in tho Job should lead to improved perform ance' (4) o r from 
the older w orker's point of view, that the man with family respoiu»!- 
hilltioe ahould reçoive more than au unmarried, young man so a# to 
moot tho growing noodo of his family (S). Tho view of the la tte r I# 
particularly significant where 8W c social security system  1» inadequate
(1) For further analysis of this m atter, seo K. Koike, Chlngin C136S).
Î2} The establishment which determined wages by Job evaluation syatem», 
or by tho appraisal of omployoe job-performing ability, or by types
of job wore 2,5 , 2 .4 , and 3.8 per cents rospoctlvcfy and other 
establishments more or less took m oom t of ago, length of serv ice, 
educational career, etc. in their wage determination, (September,
1967) (Source: Ministry of Labour).
id) About 04 per cent of all Japanese firms had some form of periodic 
incremental system; more than 05 per cent of tho firm# with 1000 
employees or more and 85 per cent of the firms with 50-99 employees 
had an employee assessment system; more than 50 per cent of the 
largo firms and 89 per cont of the small firms bad salary scales and 
wage schedules, m  at 3optombcr, 1007 (Source: Ministry of Labour),
(4) J .  Valerie Grant and O .J . Smith, op. c it. p . 240.
(5) T. iRumo, "Nenliojoretsukytt Shokumukyoi, " Gendal Eodo-mondal iCojg» 
(1908) pp. 100 - 102.
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and the employer 1» eager to practise paternaltatlc management. In 
this connection, other forme of payment* even payment by résulta, 
a re  more or lea» related to the principles of the dc#%'minatlon of 
basic pay, i .e .  largely determined according to ago o r length of 
service and the weight of supplementary payments for living coat are  
conaideraWy greater in the Japanese pay system . <U
As a result of these pay system s, as we have seen to 
Chapter 4, the pay structures of B ritish oalarled and Japanese (either 
nonmanual o r manual) workers a re  characterised by age differentials, 
while the %agem of British manual workers Is almost independent of 
their age except for juveniles. ?he tendency for pay to rise  with 
age to even more distinct for the pay of employees at Japanese 
large firm s (Figure 6 .. 1). The pay of these employeeo continues 
to progress with age and length of service up to a retirem ent age 
(usually 55), while that of nonmanual employee» at Bmall firm s reaches 
a peak in their 40*s and the range of age differentials for the la tter 
is much narrow er. It seems that this apparently reflects the 
difference to the internal labour market structure between large and 
sm all firm s, which we referred  to ea rlie r (2). But there are  other 
reasons for this • The structure of a large organisation and its
promotion ladders are  more complicated than those of a sm all 
organisation. There need to be more stepe in the salary scales 
to iiiaintain appropriate status-pay differentials for different s tra ta  
in the hierarchy of the form er organisation.
(1) S. Fimahaehi, op. c it. pp. 139-384.
(2) There la an objection to this view. See K. Koike, op. c it. p. 222.
Figure 6 - 1
Japan: Average m onth ly  e a r n in g s  o f  male -workers 
in  m a n u fa ctu r in g  in d u s t r y  by age group ,  
as on in d e x ,  group aged 2 0 - 2 4  = 1 0 0 .  
A p r i l ,  1 9 6 7
ISO
Establ^ shm ents w ith  1000  
em p loyees  or  more
Nonmanual
  Manual
E s t a b l i s h m e n ts  w ith  1 0 -9 9  
em p loyees
  Nonmanual
  Manual
fLo -
ro
Age
S ou rce:  M in is t r y  o f  Labour.
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Although the range of pay differential® between Qccupattona, 
between grades or between workers and their ranking in the internal wage 
hierarchy may be determined by market forces* collective bargaining 
or management policy, o r a combination of tîiem, there is the social 
demand that the wages so determined should be "fair" for all workers 
and, once the range of differentials betisreen them and their ranking are  
established, these wage relationships tend to be maintained for a long 
time by custom. <1) The age-related pay system  is a potential source 
of wage-cost increases. Although this system  may decrease turnover 
rates and increase employees* attachment to a particular employer, the 
average wages of the present employees automatically increase with 
the passing of time unless the employer continues to take in young 
recru its , so that the wage bill of those firm s which have suspended 
recruitm ent and sustain the present employees keeps rising over a 
period of time as far as the pay system  and the existing age differentials 
a re  maintained. What is m ore, steep increases In the wages of young 
workers are  likely to push up the whole wage structure so as to 
maintain the established age differentials. These dem erits of the 
age-related pay system , coupled with the shortage cf young workers 
and the ir preference for a more rationalised pay system , have induced 
employers to strive for the introduction of a pay system  based on job 
analysis and job evaluation in recent years in Japan it).
Methods of wage payment can also have an impact on wage
U) B .H . Phelps Brown and J * Wiseman, A Course in Applied Economics 
{ m m  pp.
(2) K. Tftkahashi, mihon no Chingin Kanrl <106$), pp. 119-39.
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Method® a t wage payaieat can almo have an Impact mi wage 
drift. If tho wages of one type of worker® rise fester than those of 
another where the established differentials arising from some ëouros, 
for escamplo differentials between piece-workers and time-workers or 
between skilled and nnskiUed worker», are strictly maintained by 
trade unions, otistoms, or management wage policy, wage drift will 
result Ci). Conventional payment by résulté systems have been a 
major aoureo of primary wage drift. But a factor of primary 
importance is the extent to wîîtcti management relie# on these systems. 
They are said to be more widely used in Western countries, 
eapeolfvUy Scandinavian countries, but as mentioned earlier, they are 
less important in Japan than in Britain.
3. Labour Costs
Salaries and wages a re  not all costs which the employer 
Incurs to employ workers, though they are , of course, the most 
important component of labour costs, lab o u r costs are  a more 
relevant concept than sa laries and wages when we thini» of cost-push 
inflation. The proportion of wages and sa laries in total labour costs 
for British manufacturing workers is much larger than that of other 
European countries (2). The proportion does not only differ from one 
c ountry to another but also varies between industries, between firm s 
and between different time periods in a given country. White-collar 
workers usually receive more fringe benefits than wag#-earner# and 
Cl> ÊUK. Phelps Brown, op. cit.
<2> The proportion is 91% for Britain, B3% for % eat Germany, 1Z% for 
Prance, 71% for Italy, 80% for HetUerland# and Belgium, in 1968 
(Sources Employment and Productivity Qaaette).
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consequently industries and services with a high proportion of 
salaried  employees such as insurance and hanking, gas, electricity 
and water, tend to have a high ratio of labour costs other than 
wages and sa la ries , though mining ia an exception <11. Large firm» 
provide more private social welfare payments, subsidised serv ices, 
payments in kind for the ir employees than sm all firm s do (21.
There is a tendency for fringe benefits, statutory national insurance 
c o n trib u tifs , cost of recruitm ent and training, e tc . to increase in 
percentage term s as well m  in absolute term s - more than 
proportionately to increase» in wages and sa laries  - in recent years 
in both Britain and Japan. Apart from  statutory national insurance 
contributions and the like which a re  largely determined outside the 
direct control of management, the increases in those costs may arise
(1) The proportion of wages and salaries in total labour costs was 
75.7% for insurance and banking, 87.7% for gas, electricity 
and water, 82.8% for mining quarrying in 1968 in Britain: 8G%
for insurance and finance, 80% for gas, electricity and water, 
and 76% for mining, in 1008 la  Japan (Source: Employment
and Productivity Gaasette and Yearbook of labour sta tistics).
(2) Tho proportion of private iiocial welfare paymoatB plus 
subsidised services in total labour costs was 2.6% at firm s 
with 25-249 employ cos, 3.5% at firm s with 250-909 employees 
and 4.4% at firsns with lOOO o r more employees in British 
munuf&ctuiing indm try: 8.6% for firm s with Icsü than 500
employees and 8.0% for firm s with 5000 employees or more 
in iapanose industry (Source: Bmploynient and Productivity
Oaaette and Nlkkelren).
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Table 0 - 3
Analysis of Labour Costa 
- as percentage of total labour costs
Britain; manufacturing, Japan: a ll industries
and services
10# 1804 106# 1805
Total labour costs 108.0 108.0 100,0 100.0
Total wages & sa laries 91.3 81.8 86.1 86.3
Statutory national insur­
ance contributions 4.4 3.8 5.1 4.7
Selective employment
tax (net) -1.5 m
Provision for redundancy 0.4 — -
Retirement o r severance
payments (private) - 2.7 2.6
Private social welfare
payments 3.2 3.1 3.9 4.5
Traitïing 0.8 0.3 0.3
Subsidised services 0.8
Payments in kind 0,1 1.5 0.9 0.8
Recruitment 0.6 0.3
Other labou r cost» 0.5 0.6 0.5
Source: Employment and Productivity Clasette and Yearbook of Labour
Statistics.
from the employer*» efforts to a ttract o r retain labour (D* Managers 
a re  prim arily responsible for and have the initiative in the determination 
of various fringe benefits and the cost of training and recruitm ent, 
though trade union» may be concerned with some of them, for example, 
holiday with pay, pension schemes* severance payments, etc.
(1) Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers* Associations 
1005-1988, Report (100#), points out that arrangem ents for dealing 
with fringe benefits were not the subject for collective bargaining 
generally (p. 21 ).
1
mA ppm niim tely on» quarter of total labour cost# aro not 
part of the direct romuueraüon for labour sorviço# actually supplied 
by t*:i0  employee (pay other than holiday and guarantee pay, siîpplements 
for coot of living, travelling allowanoee, e tc .) Iti Japan, a# compared 
with tt little over one tenth in Britain, so tW  it would also fee necesaary 
to review those labour coats other than wages and sa laries  from tiie 
point of view of cost control. (1)
(1) In this connection, U.hU Levinson emphasised that *slnce the end
of World War II, collective bargaining has placed increasing emphasis 
on privately negotiated fringe benefits, with the result that these 
benefits have been rising relatively much more rapidly than hourly 
earnings. The omission of fringe benefits can fee particularly 
misleading . . . .  * (Determining Forces In Collective Wage 
Bargaining (100$>,
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CHAPTER 7
WAGE DETERMINATION UNDER COLLECTIVE 
BAHQAINING
The raison d*#r# ot m\ îiioome» policy lie», m  we have
disoiisaed in CImpter 1, in that trade union# puah up tho money wage level
above that whioh would otherwlae be determined by demand and supply
oomlltlcm» In tho labour market, bo that it I» mee##ary to persuade
trade unions to restrain the ahwe of their power for the purpose of
suppresaiag coot*push inflation. The main question for this chapter
is whether or not suoh ia the case for British and Japanese trade unions.
Although some people emphasise the prtsenco of union monopoly (1),
tlmr# I» ill reality no single trade union or federation of trade unions
that has perfect control over the total supply of the nation*® labour force
In Britain, Japan or elsewhere; in other words, the national labour
force la only partially organised In any country . Of eourae, the
degree of unionisation varies h&twmn countries and wlttdn a country
union raeratoorship la wuevenly diatributed amo*%g industries, occupation»,
regions or firms. The labour market may be separated into the
organised and unorganised sector for the pgepose of analysis. In tho
unionised sector wages are supposed to be determined through collective
bargaining and in the unorganised sector, by market forces or
Individual bargaining. Furthermore, some countries or some industrie*
within a country have a highfe^  centralised system of collective
bargaining, while In other countries or other industries within the
(11 Mason, "Labour Monopoly and Ail That", Amiual Proceeding#,
I .E .B . (1W5) pp. Ift#-a08.
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country the power of trade unions Ifs decontraîtood. First, we sliaîl 
look Into tlie trade union structure® of Britain md Japan, Then the 
eollootWo bargaining syetoras (together with statutory minimum wage 
syntom) of both countries and tho way In ?/hioh wage® are fixed mder 
these système will fee examined, Lastfy, the actual impact® of trade 
unionism on wage® in both organised and unorganigad «cctor# (through 
spill-over effects (1) ) will be dlscwased*
Î. The Struetures of Trade Unions
There are great variations In trade union density - union 
memher#hlp m  percentage of employee# or labour force In general - 
between countries, And these variations do not seem  to be particularly 
ascribed to differences hi the degree of Inditsitrlullaatlon of the 
coiuîtriea concerned. Since tho number of employees increases, in 
either absolute or relative terras, with progreaa In industrialisation 
and trade unions are employées* organlsatians, trade-union snembershlp, 
either m  percentage of total labour force or in absolute term#, may 
be expected to Increase up to a certain point with rise# In the 
proportion of employees in total labour force. But union density I# 
not particularly related to the degree of Industrialisation or the ratio 
of employee# to total working population. J .T . Dunlop pointed out as 
bearing on the development of trade unionism the following four factors; 
technology; market structure# and the character of competition; 
community Inatltutlon# of control; and Idea# and belief#, in other word#,
the value synteai of the community (3). As shown later, there are aom#
(1) F . Machlup, 0p. cit.
(2) J.T* Dunlop, "The Development of Labor Organisation; A Theoretical 
Framework”, R.A. Lester and J . Shiater (ed#.>, Inalght# Into Labor
tmum ( 1948 k  p p .  163 - 9 3 .
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features common to Industrial countries In the distribution of trade- 
union mmnbersîiîp among industries, that can be acribed to the nature 
of the industry concerned (type» of technology, market struoturea, 
e te .)  but the type of trade untonlsra which is moot' prevalent in a
Table
Country Y ear
Japan I0i13
U.K. 1963
USA xm2
W. Germany ÎÔ64 
Canada 1933
AuatraMa 1903
India 18C2
1
Trade-union Union deneltyi 
membership (as percentage <aa percentage
(in tinoufanda) of o.mployoes) of total labour
force)
D, 357 3C 20
3,017 42 40
10,583 30 33
7,384 30 36
1,446 30 n
2,004 30 44
1,706 43 1
Source: Eorau-gyoacl Kenkyuja, 2ienkcku Rcdokumlal lohrnn, p. 166
country scorns to bo a product of historical development rather than 
of the degree of industrialisation.
Trade-union membership in the IM icd Kingdom expanded
rapidly from thcdloeo of tho last century till 1630 when there wore over 
eight million trade unioniats, shrutik thereafter to half that number in 
1633, expanded again till the end of the 1940*# and remained fairly 
stable during the last two decadea (I). relative stability of 
union memberahîp Is also apparent during the same period in the 
United State# where the number of union members attained a peak in 
1930, declined thereafter till 11133, but recovered by the middle of tha
(I) Source; M. Felling, A Btiitory of Brltleh Trade Unjoniam (1986),
pp. 361 - 4 CStatiatical
Fi g u r e  7 - 1
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Membership
P o s t -w a r  t r e n d s  i n  t r a d e - u n i o n  membership  
i n  t h e  U n i t e d  Kingdom and Japan
( i n  m i l l i o n )
U.K
Union membership 
Union d e n s i t y
J apan:
Union membership 
Union d e n s i t y
of
employees  
i n  t rad e  
union: ;
S ource:  M i n i s t r y  o f  Labour Ga z e t t e , Employment and P r o d u c t i v i t y  
G a z e t t e ;  and Labour Union B a s i c  Survey  (Japan)
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1950*3 (î). In tîapftn trade vmm qiif»,ntlt»t!vely negligible in
the pre»wnr period beeanse of represeivo leglalatfon <3) bnt there
wne a remai^afele development tmder the perm iselve legislation of the
peat-w ar period. Union membership mnehroomed within a few year»
Immodintely following the and of the war, mimbering over six million
in 1040, and wnlon density registered a reeord high of 59 per cent in
1949, m  shown in Figure 7«1. Faced with such difficult condtttona at
home and abroad am builnea» depression and large-scale purges of
communists and sympathetic leaders from the unions following an
aggravated confrontation between the Soviet Union and tho lînlted
States, however, the Japanese trade unionitm suffered a temporary
setback In the ensuring y ea rs . Again, while union memherahlp has
risen  rapidly, union density fell until I960 mû tim  rexiialned «table
thereafter* Today, Japan haa the largest union rnembcrehip next
to that of the United Statee In the free world and union dentlty In
Japan Im higher than In the United States and sim ila r to European
countries save Britain and Scandinavia* Taking Into account #
sm aller proportion of employees In total working population, however,
Japan’s union memberahip a« percentage of total working population
ia still low by European standards, as shown In the right-hand column
of Table t  - 1* Although wo do not consider that union density itself 
(#  E*Ct. Reynolds, op. e l . ,  p . $0*
W  Union membership in pre-w ar Japan was only 4810,000 In 10S6, m  
all-tim e high before Hie war and the pre-w ar highest pei*ccntage of 
employees In trade unions was 7 .0  In 1931 <T. Shtrat, Nihon no 
Rodokumial 11997), p* &), though this figure le not particwïariy low, 
5â' compaîeS with O.0Sa In 10$0 in the USA IL .G . Reynolds# ibid).
F or fuller discussion of the subject, see E . Okochi, ^^Traditionalism 
of Industrial Eolations in Japan", and T. Ishli, "The Changing Role 
of Labour Legislation in Japan", In The Changing Patterns of 
Industrial Eelatloos 11965), pp. 136 - 141, 334 - 233. Also see M. 
Sumiya, Nihon Eodo-undo-sht <1966), S. Shlota, Nihon Hodo-undo 
no Eoklshl (1964). "
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directly determines union strength or pushfulnoss In w£^ ge bargains 
because, for example, in countries with a low union density lUce the 
United States the problem of union monopoly is also sometimes urgent 
o r taken seriously, a low union density Implies that the direct 
influence of collective bargaining on the determination of incomes In 
general may foe more limited, or to put it in another way, a substantial 
part of national income is  likely to determined outside the framework 
of the collective bargaining system ,
Union membership Is unevenly distributed among the 
industries. American labour economists point out that there Is strong 
correlation between industry union density (which II. M. Levinson 
referred  to as union strength) and output concentration in manufacturing 
industries (1). This is more or less true in Britain and Japan.
Industries witii a high level of industrial concentration such as 
metal menufacturo, engineering and chemical* imve a high union 
density, wiiile light Industries have a relatively low^  union density.
Outside manufacturing industry, there are some variations: mining, 
trranspo rt and communication are  well organised and agriculture, 
distributive trades and miscellaneous services are  poorly organised 
in a ll the three countries, wliile white-collar workei’s employed in 
government, education, and finance and insurance (particularly in Japan) 
are  well organised in Britain and Japan but not so In the United States W#
(1) J .W . Garbarino, op. c it. H.M. Levinson, "Unionism, Concentration, 
and Wage Changes: Toward a Unified Theory", in Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, vol. 20, No. 3 (January, 1067).
(2) B .C . Hoborts1(oS7)7Industrial Eolations; Contemporary Problems 
and Perspective» (1902), p . 72. T . Sfalral, op. c it. pp. 8-13.
L.G . Reynolds, dp. cit. pp. 47-9. Also see Appendix
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What îs more, big labour organisations exist among these well- 
organised industries and serv ices. One thing to note ia that there
Table 7 - 2
Top ten biggest labour organisation* in Britain and Japan
in me?
Britain Membership <*000)
Transport and General Workers* Union 1,461
A^nalgamated Union of Engineering and 
Foundry Workers 1,044
National Unton of General and Municipal Workers 782
National Union of Mine workers 380
National Association of Local Government Officers 367
E lectrical, Electronic I ’elecommuncation Union i52
Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers 321
National Union of Teachers 270
National Union of Public Employees 266
Society of Graphical axid Allied Trades 220
Japan . . .
All Japan, P iefcctural and Municipal Workers* Union 819
Japan Teachers* Union 660
Japan Federation of Textile Workers Unions 605.
All Japan Federation of E lectrical Maeîiiue and 
Tool Indwtry Workers Unions 402
National Hallway Workers* Union 277
General Federation pf Private Hallway Workers*
Unions of Japan 266
Japan Postal Workers* Union 245
National Telecommunication Workers* Union 227
National Federation of Motal Industry Workers* union 220
National Trade Union of Metal and Engineering V/orkors 204
Source: Trades Union Congress Report J(1968) and Yearbook of
Imbour S tatistics.
a re  a considerable number of big independent trade unions (which
Imve autonomy and a large membership of, asy, over 160,000} in
Britain and the United States* while there are few independent trade
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niîtono of comparable aW  lt\ Japanoae private Induatx'y, for mo§t 
Japanese ivaûo imlom are  orgnnlsod on a fiimi o r  plant baals. Many 
of tW Japanese labour organisation» mentioned în the table above 
a re , therefore, laclustrial fed'oratiens of autonomous trade unlona.
rvlany of the highly orgaalmed induitrie» and aarvlces
oooupy a key position in the national economy In the eetuie that they 
are  suppliera of energ^ -^ o r haato m aterials like eoalmlmlng, iron and 
atool, electricity  and gas, o r service* eaeentlal to everyday life of 
the nation like transport and communication, m  that stoppages of 
work In these lnd«atrie$ and services are  |>articnïarîy detrim ental to 
other liiénatrios and tho public in general. Exploiting this situation, 
trade unions in those industries and aorvlees tend to proas their  
demands agoinsi not only employers but also the public. Em ployers, 
too, taking advantage of their monopolistic position, %end to 
aaerlflee public interestii ra ther than vm iut strong union preaaures 
m tlem  there lu government Intervention, These trade union# had, 
o r have, a great Influence on aollcetlve bargaining In other Induitrltw, 
which we shall discuss la te r.
The public sector, including public corporation» (1), 
nationalised Industries ( #  e te ., employs an Increasingly larg» part
# ,  If*p(hIIIf'fiq*Ti#*i
(1) The eompoaltion of employ#»* in the public sector in 1967 In Japan 
ids natloml govtrnmtht, #00,000:' local govomintut, 3,021,000; 
public corporation* (Japan National Railways, Japan Telegraph mud 
Telephone eorporatlon etc.. Including Foatal Service, national and 
local public emerprfeem, 1,376,000 (Source: Statistical Abatract 
of Japan),
<3) The Brltlelt public sector con#l#t# of government service» (1,346,000 
in 106#) and m tiw olieed W uatries (1,001,099 in 1066) (Employment 
and Productivity CSeaette; Select Committee on Hatlcnelieed 
induetrie* (1066), MWaterial Control of the Nationalised Induatrles, 
Vol. 0,"p 7 ' "   '"" '' " ....
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of the nation*^ labour force (14.3 por cent ol total omplcyco# In 
1966} in tho U .K .,, and 18.1 per c o n t^  1960 in Japan) and ,W hîglüy 
orgmiiëod by big unions in both cotmtrioa (1). Vshflom rc*txToti.on« 
are  put on collective notion of employees in thié eocttor in Japan; 
atrikcn o r other Imdnetrisl action are  totally banned by legislation 
for all employees In oithez; government service* o r publie eoxTora- 
ttonss boside#, both national and local government employees are 
refhsod the right of collective bargaitiing (Instead, an a cmmmmu-tim  
for this, the National Foraonnel Authority and local government 
personnel committee# are established to inveatlgnto rm$m in 
private eeotor and maho reoommendmtlona on the wages of pnhllc 
employee#) (3). Therefore* It may be appropriate to exclude in 
Japan the onion# of these omplc^'ees (nearly 30 per cent of total 
imion membership) from the trade unions in tho generally accepted 
«emit.
Despite several common features of the industrial 
paîtcï'i’î of union density* the strneiuro of trade union organiaatlon 
différa very much from one country to another. It m tm  that the 
structure of trade union organisation is a more important factor 
afiecting union strength than the m ere sl&e of membership o r union
(Î) Union memhemhip in the public «ector w#e: 258,900 In national 
government, 1,600* 000 in local government* 1* 005* 000 in public 
corporations, e tc ., 177,000 In local public onterprisea In 1985 in 
Japan; In Britain, union membemhip warn, for example, 460,000 
in national government service* 724,009 in local government 
aex'vice* 806,000 la coalmining, 310* 009 In railways in 100# (Source; 
Employment and Productivity Gmeette: Labour Union Baeic Survey 
(Japan),
(2> K. Eamiehtro, "Chingti* niokeru Ohurol Korol JinJIn", Oendai
Redo-mondai Koasia vol. 2 (1987), p p .  290-314,
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dorjülty Ü ). la  B rita in^  *every concolvablo  type ùf  o rg a n isa tio n  okIsIjs 
miû no one i fpo omx ho saM to prectornîmte. The tjpea oî British 
nnîoB organîiatioîj a re  customarily olgggified into throe moin groups? 
occnpntional (or oraft) nnlona; Industrial (or oommon oomplo^mmix} 
unions; and general unions* The last type ot oi'gnnisatlon Is said to 
be moat ebaraeteriatio of B ritish trade nnioniam today* According to 
A. F landers, 52 main trade* anions affiliated to the Trades tjrdon 
Congroàs are rmghjiy classified into BS craft o r oeecpational UEiiona,
BI industrial o r oomlmon employment nniom, S tmions wltii characterletlc*
/
of both types, and B general cnlone (3). In reality , however, *pure 
forma are  hard to find*, though these elagsification# have a certain  
h istorical validity (4>* Many trade unions which started  as sm all, 
single-craft unions In the last century have turned into la rger, multi» 
craft unions by amalgamations and the admission of less ekilled worker# 
(51* On the other hand, am all craft miom  have #tlll survived.
Besides, in Britain, w h iteco llar unions have developed separately 
from manual imions, though some manual unloyjm have eiitended their 
organisation Into white-collar employment. W hite-collar unionism 
is gonorally much stronger In public than In private employmcjit where,
particularly In private manufacturing tnduBtry, employers have been
(1) E. M. I#vW on painted m% m  fnctar# affecting untim power the degree 
of Internml atrenglh, the militancy of union membership, coheslvenese 
of the union# end employer# involved, #nd the eggre##iv#n##e of union 
ieaderehip (op. oil. pp. B64 - 7G>.
<») A. Flanders, Trade ïMon# (l»ea), pp. m*
<3> ibid., pp. — ~ ~
(4) E.A. Turner, ‘^ Trede Onion Organisation**, Political Quarterly, vol.
35 <16551. pp. 5?*7Ü.
(#> B. Felling, opo c it. Chapter 6 (pp.
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very reluctant to gr;ai4 union roeognttlon for v/hito-collar w orkers•
Another factor which hm# m#d# the British trade tmion
eiriictiire ex tm n ej^  complem W **multi ^ unionimmd* ; in most indeetrie# 
or firms there a re  two o r more trade union# of similar o r different 
BO that *8#veral unions witMn the factory or office have to 
work together. * <l) This situation hag, in turn, contributed to 
strengthening the position of work groups m é  shop stewards speaking 
far thcin on the shop floor and increasing their independence from 
trade union branches. On the one hand, shop stewards who deal with 
multl^union Issues Inside the factory ere  hardly mado reponslhle to 
a particular union authority outside, for they are  often obliged to act 
for the common Interesto of workers In the same workplace, Indepetu 
dontly of; individual union policies, rather than promote the in terests 
of particular unione tvhich each affiliate pnrt of these workers and 
adopt conflicting policies towards them: If the oliop atewards listen
to one union onlj^, those workers in the same workplace who are  
alflHatod to other unions w ill not follow  ^ them. Of course. If a ll 
unionii which affiliate oomo workers at a given workplace coordinate 
their policies beforehand, no such problem will a rise . On the other, 
full-tim e union officials find themselves incapable of tackling plant- 
level issues because it is not easy to keep In touch with sm all groups
(I) Royal Commission on Trade üniona and Employers* Associations
1000.1068, llepoHimmh H.M.S.O., p. so. This *'0onovan 
Report" also pointed out that *about four out of every five trade 
unlonlato In Britain work in a multi-union estab lig toen t and perhap* 
one in six of tliem belongs to a grade of worker In which two o r more 
unions aro competing for mombor«3. • <p. 2D).
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of member# eeatltred over mmny laetoriee mnû the»* &*#*## often 
involve members of other trade union# within the faotoiy. In this 
oonneotlon, one empirical study, pointing out low participation by 
workpeople in branch affaire and change# in the attMWe# of them 
toward# trade union# in recent year# (e .g . 'concurrent relatively high 
involvement In unlonlam at workplace'), mentioned that 'almost 
complete divorce between the untoniem of the branch and the workplace 
which i# manifest likely to develop on a much wider scale, a# also 
may associated views of the function# of trade union# of a distinctively 
limited and instrumental kind. (1), Thus, the authority of trade union# 
has been undermined at workplace level because they have often failed 
to tap the feeling# of their rank and file.
Another aspect of the British trade union structure Is the 
long-run trend toward# greater ccmcentration of union membership 
into big unions: Since the First World War the number of British 
trade unions has steadily declined through mergers or amalgamations (2). 
However, while the average membership sise  of trade union# ha# 
increased, more than fifty per cent of Britain's 565 trade unions (in 
1009) are still sm all, having a membership below 1000. This compares 
with nine big unions with over a quarter of a million member# each, 
which account for more than fifty per cent of all trade unionists In the
(1) J.IÎ. Ooldthorpe et a l..  The Affluent Workers; Industrial Attitudes 
and Behaviour (1070), p. 179.
(2) The number of trade unions declined from 1,394 In 1020 to 791 in 
1045, and further to 555 in 1967 (Source: II. Felling, op. c it .) .
The average siae of unions increased from about 6,000 in 1020 to 
19,900 per union In 1969.
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country. The "big three" (Transport and Oenerat Workers' Union, 
Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers, and 
General and Municipal Workers' Union) affiliate over three million, 
or one third of Britain's total union membership (I). Nearly one 
third of all British trade unions are affiliated to the Trades Union 
Congress and its General Council. Although the remaining two 
thirds of trade unions are outside the T .U .C ., nearly ninety per 
cent of British trade unionists, are affiliated to this central body so  
that it 'can fairly claim to speak in the name of the movement as a 
whole. • (2), However* the T.U .C . has no formal power to bind any 
member union to its decisions* The limits of its power are easily 
seen by the fact that 'a trade union in affiliating to the TUC does not 
yield up any part of its autonomy. * (3). Thus, the British trade 
union structure has two major weaknesses in terms of internal control, 
namely, lack of control by the central body over affiliated member 
unions and shift of power from union leaders to individual work 
groups or shop stewards speaking for them at the factory level.
The most prominent feature of the Japanese trade union 
structure la that almost all trade unions with few exceptions (the most 
Important exception is All Japan Seamen's Union with an affiliated 
membership of about 143,000) are organised on a company or plant 
basis. The '’enterprise union" (or the confederation of plant unions
(1) Source: T0C Annual Report (10@g).
(2) A. Flanders, op. c it ., p. 24.
(3) ibid. pp. $0-1.
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within tiie #am« «nterprUie) whose membership I# limited to employe## 
of a particular enterprise ha# autonomy m  a bargaining unit and 
negotiate# all aspect# of the term# and conditions of employment I or 
it# tnomber worker» with the employer* It ueuelly efCiliete# 
both white-collar end menuel worker# employed at the »am# enterprise, 
irrespective of their occüpetioiuü, ■ thcmgh casual or part-time worker# 
arc often excluded from it (1). There are nearly 30,000 autonomous 
trad# union# in Japan and, in contrast with the British trend toward# 
greater concentration in union moia^iership, the number of trade 
unions ha# steadily increased since I960 (2). The average member­
ship s ise  of Japanese trade union# Is consequently very small {379 
in 1069), m  co^mpared adth 10,090 W i960 in Britain, and does not 
particularly have a tendency to tndreaee (3). Nin#ty#Bve per cent 
of Japanese trade union# had a miembershlp below one thousand, or 
alternatively trade unions with a membership of lesfi than om  hundr«d 
eoaetUuted more than sixty per cent of the whole, in 1969. Although 
the minute sise  and multiplicity of trade union# are more prominent 
In Japan than in Britain, union membership I* coneantrated in a 
limited number of large union# in Japan ms well <44 per cent of total 
union membership belonged to 274 trade uni«m# having ft, 000 affiliated 
members or more In 1067)* As in other industrial countries, workers 
eiæqiloyed at large firms are generally better organised than those 
employed at sm all firm# In Japan* About four out of every five
<1) H* Tmmmit "Eodokumioi no ioshiki”, in T. Shlrat led*) Nihon no 
Eodokumiai (1007), pp* ft*.0,
<2) The number of trade unions dropped from 54,600 in 1040 to 10,013 
in 1055 and rose again to 20, dll In 1060 (Sourest Ministry of 
labour).
(3) The average sise  of trade unions in 1055 was 347 (Source; The 
same a$ above).
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trade aWoniat* work either at a firm with 500 employee# or 
more, or in the publie eeetor; #4.0 per cent of worker# employed at 
firm# with 500 employee# or more are trade-union member#, while 
the proportion i# only û per cent at firm# with lea# than 100 employee» 
(D. Although about three fiftliii of Japan'# thirty million employee#
(in 10##) work at email firm# (with lea# than 100 employee#), the 
majority of them are «till unorganieed.
Many trade union# are  newly organised at email firms and 
nine in every ten of them fail to eurvive each year C2). The sm all- 
firm  union usually suffer# from  lack of good union leader# and 
Instability of membership - the employment of worker# itself is , 
as mentioned in the preceding chapter, unstable * and Is financially 
vulnerable. Probably the unionisation of small-firm employees will 
not progress very much m ^ws general-union-type orgasiisations are 
more widely adopted.
Snterpiidso wnlatu? more often thmi not combine to form 
nation-wide industrial fedorations (commonly oalled'tansan"), which 
differ in many way# from  industrial federations Ui Britain and (inter*) 
national unions in tho United States, There a re  more than one hundred 
•tan^an* for vartou# industrie» (#). Not all unions In a given industry 
aro affiliated to a tamam for thia industry hut largo -enterprise and
CD These figure# are  from Labour Union Basic. Survey.
(2) Source; Labour Union Basic Survey.
0 ) T . Shiral, op. c it. p. 26. Big 'tansan* with a meiubership of
100,000 or more numbered some 23.
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«malUcnterprjiie union# often set «p two separate tanaan: for b^ample, 
in Chemical and allied Industrie#, large-firm union# are affiliated to the 
Japanese Federation of Synthetic Chemlatry Worker# Unions and small* 
firm unions, to either the Federation of Chemical Induatry Workers 
Unions or the National Federation of Chemical Industry Workers Unions. 
For the terms and condition# of pay and employment are extremely 
different between large and small firms so that a united front may be 
meaningless for the former. From another point of view trade unions 
contribute little to reducing the existing inter-firm differences in wages 
and other conditions of work in Japan, as they have done in Britain and 
the United States. Although the tansan is intended to be industry-wide, 
it does not cover all enterprise unions in the same industry (1) and there 
are often separate tansan within the same industry, which are affiliated 
to different national centres; for example. In coalmining, there are 
three tansan affiliated to different central bodies (Sohyo, Domel), namely, 
Japan Coal Miners' Union, National Coal Mining Workers Union, and 
National Council of Coal Employees' Unions (independent). Since each 
enterprise union has perfect autonomy in Jagmn, the main functions of 
a tansan are to promote the exchange of information between members 
unions and to coordinate targets in wage claims set by member unions 
and so forth (2).
There are four main central bodies * superstructures of
Industrial federations of enterprise unions « in Japan. They are the
(1) Nearly 2Ô, 000 <37 per cent of the whole) trade unions, or 2.5 million 
unionists (34 per cent of the whole) were independent of any federation 
in 1905 (Source; Labour Union Basic Survey).
(2) H. Tauaumi, op. cit. pp. 70-72.
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General Council of Trade Union# of Japan (Sohyo), the Japanese
Confederation of Labour (Domei), the National Federation of Industrial
Organisations (Sliinsanbetsu), and the Federation of Independent Unions
(Chur it surer en )« Sohyo, Domei, Churitsuroren and Shinsanbetsu had
an affiliated membership of^  4.2 million <39 per cent of the country's
total union membership), 1.8 million (17 per cent), 1.3 million <12 per
cent), and 0.07 million (0*7 per cent) respectively In 1968. The
remaining 3* G million trade unionists and Bomo GO tansan were
affiliated to none of these central bodies * Sohyo, by far the largest
organisation of that type in Japan, has lost ground in recent years*
partly because many of its member unions belong to that sector where
employment has ceased to expand, such aa coalmining* railways,
government (about two thirds of its affiliated members work In the
public sector)* But it is still the most powerful and influential labour
organisation in Japan, having several important Industrial federations
(including seven of the top ten big tansan listed in Table 7-1). The
other three central bodies* Domoi, Shinaanbetsu, and Churitsuroren*
draw their members mainly from  the private sector, especially some
♦growth* industrie», and have all gained membership in recent years (1)*
These central bodies are no more than loose combinations of tansan,
or industrial federations, and none of them has formal power over the
latter or their substructures ( i .e . enterprise unions). The main
differences between the central bodies are more political than economic,
Sohyo and Churitsuroren support the Japan Socialist Party (a left-wing
(I) A Hat of major tansan affiliated to these central bodies la available 
in Appendix XIX,
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oppoaUiosi), Domei, the Democratic Socialist Party  (a moderate 
opposition) and BhWambetsu, the Japan Communiât Party  <!)•
I4ke the trades councils* substructure of the TUC, the 
Jspsnese nstlonsl centres, Sohyo end Domet, have local organisations 
at the prefectural and district levels. These local organisations were 
originally set up to strengthen relations between local trade unions* 
teespeotlve of their affiliation to national centres* within a particular 
region or district so as to promote mutual support In strikes* 
propaganda work and organising* hut as rivalry between the two 
natimal centres has developed* each of them has tried to bring those 
independent local organisations into closer alignment with Its policy 
line through personnel and financial help. As a result* each national 
centre has come to have its own local agents at both prefectural and 
district levels.
The existing trade union structure in Britain and Japan is 
a  historical product, for once union# of one type a re  created, they 
atragglo to survive, despite changes in the labour m arket environment* 
by adapting thomuelves to new aircumstanceo and union structure will 
evolve* if slowly, with these changea In the environment. ÎI.A . Turner 
points out that 'the direction of a union's growth is influenced by the 
employment structure of the occupations among which It commences to
organise. ' (2) So far as the objective trade unions Is to Improve
U) N. MorL^’^’ie ito  to Kwmtat"*"Gendai RWo^ Koia," vol. ' 4
(1987)* pp. 244-7.
( 2 )  O p .  c i t .
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or maintain the xmgou and eonditloi^ of work for their members. It 
i# necessnry for them to control the supply of labour aervloea to » 
particular market. If the labour maiket I» oocupatlonallj,'  ^ fragmented, 
the occupational (or craft) union# serve the purpose best. If 
internal labour markets are highly developed and dhfiferencea in 
labour productivity botwen firms In the same industry are so great 
that hlgh-produettvUy firms can continue to enjoy high profits without 
being exposed to severe competition, or the product market concerned 
is monofîolîstic, the enterprise union may effectively function. If 
the typo of labour Is easily available and firms are so competitive 
with ©no another in the product market that a wage cut at one firm 
compels otiîor to follow suit, the industrial union may be moat 
equitable. If a certain product must compete with substitutes, the 
industrial unions may be obliged to go beyond the boundary of the 
industry to organise workers producing these substitutes. Consequently, 
those industrial union# turn into general unions. Thus, as the labour 
market otruoturo changed, a considerable number of British trade 
union# which originally started a$ craft unions have subsequent^ 
turned into snultl-craft or general unions. In Japan, several germinal 
forms of craft union were found at early stages of industrialisation (I).
Afi the compartmontali^atlon of the labour market by large firms 
progressed, however, occupational labour markets became less
i.mportai5it, and this form of union organisation virtually disappeared*
Before we start to discuss collective bargaining systems, 
we must look briefly at employers' aeaoclationa in Britain and Japan.
(1) K. Koike, op. eit. pp. 370*83.
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There are  1,350 omployera* aasoolatians (Mated by the Department 
of Bmployment and Productivity) in Britain. Many of these are 
local atîsoQiatîona subordinate to the industry-wide federation» of 
which they are member*. TOe most important central organisation 
for employer* i* the Confederation of British Industry (CBÏ), ahlch 
admit» to men^berahip employer#' association», trade association#, 
iWividual companies in pwductive industry and transport and the 
public corporations administering the nationalised industries. 
According to a CBÏ cetiim te, the IÛ8 employers' ansociatlonn in its 
membarshlp represent companies whose employees amount to moro 
ih&n three (Quarter* of all employees in the private iector of industry 
and transport (I). Like the TÜC, the €BI ha# no formal binding 
power over its member ausociatlon». The Japanese counterpart 
of the CBÎ i# Mikkoiren (Nihon Eeictuha-dantai Henmeîï the 
Confederation of Japanese Employers' Associations), v/hich deals 
with labour issues as well as mangcment problem* in general but dot* 
not interfere in the autonomy of Individual companies or local or 
industry-wide associations in its membership in handling industrial 
relations or other matters. This central body is composed of 47 
ind#try«wldc, 8 rogiotml, and 45 prefectural associations (1960), and 
the member companie* affiliated to these association» number about
170,000 in all, though a conaiderable numb* r of them are affiliated 
to both industry-wide and local aaaociation# *o that the actual number 
of member companies may be much smaller than this figure. Like 
the €331, Nikkeiren has no formal binding power over its affiliated 
(1) Donovan Report (op. c it.), pp. 7-8.
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associatloîia or subordinoto .meimbor comp&nW#. Japanese employer», 
îik© those In other countries, res is t outside Interference in their 
Internal aw aits and another, particularly Japanese reason, is that 
Nikkeiren and affiliated aasociations have adopted a 'trade-union 
containment' policy which is designed to lim it the bargaining unit to 
each enterprise union. Although {paal-indwstry-wlde collaettve 
bargaining has emerged In such indwatrtea as private railways, 
synthetic fibres, im n and steel, e tc ., and effective industry-wide 
bargaining has been practised in singla-firm  industries like Japan 
National Railways, most em ployers' associations do not have the 
power to conduct collective bargaining for their member companies 
in Japan (1).
2. Collective Bargaining Systems
The most Important activity of a trade union Is collective
bargaining. In which it seeks a collective agreem ent with an employer
o r group of employers * a  body of rules Intended to regulate the
term s of employment between Individual employees and employora <2).
All the other activities it undertakes are  regarded aa a by-product
and auxiliary to this m ajor activity. Of course, collective Imrgaining
is  not exclusively an activity of trade unions but Is also conducted
between informal groups of worker# and an employer. The arrang#<0
ment# in which collective bargaining takes place in accordance with
(I) I. Ishida, "Kei#i#im*d»nW no Soshlki to Kino", qendai Eodo- 
mondai Kota vol. 4 (1067), pp. 308-21. 
i%) A. Flanders, "Collective Bargainings a theoretical mnaiyaia", 
B ritish Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 6, no. I (1068) pp.
ï T ' i ë r " " ' ’  .............................
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proscribed procedural rules may be called a  "form al system" of 
collective Imrgaining, m  against a  "informal system " lo r ad hoc* 
impromptu collective bargaining. The informal system  may he 
dominant v/here labour organisation#* and thus a  form al collective 
bargaining ayutem* are underdeveloped. But in induatrial countriea* 
like Britain or the United State#* where trade union# and a form al 
syatem of collective bargaining arc  well developed* the informal 
system  remain# important. Tht# I# related to the emergence of hi# 
trade union# organising a large number of workers of different type*. 
*ît was previously suggested that the more comprehensive the alliance 
- the more inclusive of one's competitor# and strategically situated 
colfebomtors - the greater la one's bargaining power. • il) This is 
a basic incentive for a labour organisation to expand. 'But a# more 
individuals and group# are  brought within tiic combination* the more 
likely that m em bors' aspirations will be divergent and competitive 
ra ther than common, ' and 'The less homogeneous the mendsers of the 
alliance, the greater the disagreement that is likely to em erge. * <2) 
This is also the case on the cjBployera* side: an association of 
employers is a p luralistic, ra ther than unitary* system  (3). Faction 
fights or other group conflicts emerge from the multiplicity of diverse 
interest» of separate work groups and the functional and hierarchical
conflicts of in terest within mamgemient so that the determination of
(1) N.W. Cham'berlain, "Determinants of Collective Bargaining 
Structure", in A.R.. Weber <ad .). The Structure of Collective 
Bargaining <106l>* pp. % - 10,
(3) TbW.
(3) A. Fox, Induetrlal Socloloi^ and Industrial Relation#* Royal 
Comml»aîon oh"¥r«SS’"W!SïonS'ïn31fmp 
Research Paper# $ (1966). F art 1, pp. 2 14.
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priorities or 'Intornal bargaining* wîtbiîi tUo bargaining unit becomes 
m ore Important than external bargaining between the trade union and 
management. The location of power - whether it ta concentrated at 
the local, regional o r national level - and its degree of concentration 
within the trade union structure i# an important factor determining 
the pattern  of collective bargaining. If the power locu» U In the 
induitrial federatiom  of trade union# rather than in their affiliated 
unions, industry-wide bargaining obtain#. If power is highly 
concentrated, the scope of informal bargaining by subordinate group# 
■will be more limited.
The BrltiaU #y#tem of collective bargaining ha# long been 
characterised by It# national or Industry-wide collective agreement# 
between national leader# of trade union# and employers' associations. 
There is «aid to be about five hundred separate Industry-wide 
negotiating arrangements in Britain for manual workers alone, although 
industry-wide agreements for te-collar woikers are relatively 
rare (11, where there are such arrangements, the white-collar 
unions almost invariably negotiate separately from the manual 
workers' unions. Maintenance workers' unions also negotiate 
separately from the unions of process or production workers.
Bubstantivo industry-wide agreem ents, aa distinguished 
from procedural agreement#, usually lay down the length of the 
normal working week, regdktlon# for overtim e, week-end and shift 
working, and for statutory and annual holidays. Industry-wide
(1) "Donovan Report" (pp. c it. ), p. 13.
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ogtomimnist also regulate pay* but their pruvWiou* show a great 
dual QÎ variety; 'Bom# fix only two time rate#* one lo r #kill#d 
worker# mû another lor uuaklUed* leaving individual firm# to deal
with interm ediate and other grades* Other# p tm crlho  a lis t of 
éUÎQrmit rate# lo r a  catalogue of dilloreut grades* with In addition 
à  sorié# of spoctal additional payment# lo r apeeiul duties o r condition# 
of work* Somo agrooment# inake no provision lo r payment by 
rcoulta; other# do so* but in different degrees of detail. Some 
dw erlbo thoir rate# ao minimum rates* other m  standard rate#. * SD
Industry-wide bargaining preeuppoae# the ealaienoe of 
industry-wide organisation# capable of impoalng their deciaion# on 
the ir member#. In other word#* auch organlaation# must cover a 
aubatantial number of either employer# o r employees in the industry 
concerned and have power to make declaion# which bind the la tte r.
In thi# case* since affiliation to these organlsatiom  I# voluntary* 
the source of their power o r authority depends entirely on the 
willingness of the ir members to obey their decisions. la  many 
Britiah industries the majority of important companies a re  federated 
into one or more employers* association# and the *non-federated* 
firm s a re  usually sm all (21. The readiness of employer* to 
federate does not* however* mean their wtUlngne## to hold closely 
to common regulation imposed by their association#, Not only do 
firm» neglect tim decisions of their aamoclutlom but nmny of them also
m  Ibid*
m  Ibid. p. 21,
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allow (hoir factory o r workshop manager» to settle m attors in tboir 
own factorIcB o r woiWhopa. T'hus the authority of an employei’»' 
RBKoeiation inoraaaingîy attenuate# «» it goes down the organisational 
hierarchy, and the locus of power has shifted towards the factory or 
workshop level.
The other aide in industry-wide bargaining is an Industrial 
union or a group of trade union# allied m  an industry-wide basts.
But, am referred  to ea rlie r, there a re  not a muffioient number of 
Industrial unions to meet the needs of numerous industries. Although 
one way of organising two o r more trade unions which exist within the 
sam e industry, is an industrial federation, there a re  not a sufficient 
number of organisations of thim type, e ith e r . <l) In order to make up 
for this situation and smooth the way for orderly industry-wide negotiation#, 
many Joint Industrial Councils, in which representatives from  different 
trade unions In the industry concerned Jointly negotiate with employer#' 
representatives, have been set up after recommendation# fey the 
Whitley Committee, In those Industries and service# where both err^loyera 
and workpeople a re  adequately organised. (3) There were about 200 
such council# in 1065 and they covered many important field# of employment 
like public adm inistration, public utilities, transport o tM r than railways, 
and a wide range of manufacturing industries (3), though some important 
industries such a# e»|^neerlng, shipbuilding, and Iron and steel, have
had their own ad hoc negotiating machinery a t the national kvel (4). In
(I) There 'were'% 7"federa#on#^ the end of
1909 (Sources Emplc^ment and Productivity Oasettc).
(W Ministry of Labour, Industrial Relations Handbook (1901), pp. 23-5.
(S) A. F landers, op. cit7
(4) M inislry Of Laiiour, ib id ., pp. 27, 84-§, 43-5.
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thoae üisiuâtrica and a or vie os whùx'o *nq adaquaio machlBery oxWW 
fa r tlio affactive régulation of ihe rom uïïoratto  ol worker#*. Wages 
Councils have been established to fix orlnlmwm romuneratlon which is 
legally emforceable on a ll workers in the trade eoacerned (1). There 
were 84 wages eoimello at the end of IB69 and, talking Into eccouat 
Agricultural workers covered by a alm ilar oyatem, the pay and other 
eonditioiui of work of about four million workers wore onbject to 
Gtatutory regulation In I960. (2)
According to the TUC't eatim ete, five million employee# 
are  not covered by any agreements on pay and another million are 
covered mainly by company agrcemente. Of the rem ainder, there are  
four million in ¥/agea Council industries, aovOn million in those 
Industries In which Industry ^ wWc agreoaienta are  closely followed at 
company and local level, and six million in those industrie* with 
Induatry-wido agreement# where bargaining wîibin companlts has an 
Important Influeneo on actual earning». (3) On the whole, the pay of 
three quarter# of Britain*# 94 million oniployeeu was to a g reater o r 
lease r extent influenced %  industry-wide agreement# or minimum 
remuneration tim û  by Wages Councils. Th# degree to which Induntry- 
wld# agreement# determine actual earning# level# is , howOvar, much 
sm aller than might he expected from this figure and indeed tha Influtnca
of such agreement# ha# been diminishing, because they mainly concern
(I) Minis try ,of Labour, op. c it., pp. 155-67,
<2> Employment and Fraduettvity Oaxette.
(3) "Bonovan Report" (op. clt#), p. S t.
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'bàsio leaving otiiar components of earning# or labour coats
10 determination through workshop bargaining, management discretion 
o r  statutory régulation. Bvcn these 'basic ra te s ' are  often minima, 
which a re  exceeded fey Actual ra tes determined at company o r factory 
level to many private todustriea.
Th« effective regulation of pay levels hy Industry-wide 
agreem ents la now largely confined to the public secto r (I). Although 
before the Second World War tha divergence between agi'oed rates and 
actual earning#, o r '^*wage drift", was very modest and industry-wide 
agreement# were generally assumed to be able to provide alm ost all 
necessary joint regulation, leavtog m ly  minor l«#uc# to bo settled by 
Individual manager#, actual oarntog# levels have risen  fa r more rapidly 
than nationally negotiated wage rate» after the war in Brltato (2). That 
means that the extent to which industry-wide agreement# determine 
actual pay has declined. Moreover, the three m ajor sources of wage 
drift, namely, piecework o r incentive earning#, company o r  factory 
additions to basic ra te s , and overtime eam ings, (8> are  not so much 
regulated by industry-wide agreements a# derived from  workshop 
hargalnlng, customs and practice, o r  managers ’ discretion at company 
o r factory level. On the whole, authority In collective bargaining has 
been transferred  from the industry to  company o r  factory level, but 
this process of decentralisation of authority is not yet complete. As 
A resu lt, there Is some overlap in the coverage of subject# by Industry­
wide and workshop foargaintog. to countries which have a contrAitsed
12) ib id ., p . 14.
(3) E .ll . Phelps Brown, op. cit.
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system  of colîeotivo bai?gaining, aa informal oyatem inevitably develop# 
At eompany or factory level becaaao the formal oyatom embodied tu 
official inatitationa m  national bargaining oaimot cover all »ubjeot$ 
which may vary botweou companies or factories bat leaves minor laauos 
to the informal system . In e«ch a case, the jurisdiction of tho two 
syotems over subjects to deal with must be demarcated beforehand. 
Otherwise they may enter into conflict with, rather than oaxnplamaut, 
each other. This has happened In Britain, In addition, apontaneoua 
workplace bargaining in Britain in fragmented and autonomow, which 
has x^QSultôd in eompotitlve aoetional wage adj«3tn?»onts and di*orderly 
pay structura». Thus tiio B ritish informal system  undermino* the 
regulative effect of indwotryvc-wide agreements. Consequently wagô 
drift a rises from this dual structure of collcetivo bargaining in Britain.
As we can expect from her trado union structure, the 
Japanese system  of collective bargaining I» generally more decentralised 
than In v/estorn countries. Wc have already mentioned that civil 
servants, cither national or local, are denied the fundamental rights 
of workers to act collectively except the right to organise, and that 
employees of public corporations. Postal Service, and local public 
Oîiterprisés are  deprived of the right to strike, though these employe «« 
have other right* of workers. Even the la tte r'#  right to bargain 
collectively is largely nominal m  the ffmneial managomont of these 
Oï'ganîsutlüna Is under governmental control and the dîacration of 
Bmploym% in settling wage bargains la lim ited. Comaquantly wages 
disputes there arc  eventually settled througîi conclltatîoii o r arbitration
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by the Public Corporation and National Enterprlao Labour Relation# 
Comnilaalon In moat oaae# <D« In auch private Indtiatrle» aa tranaport* 
electricity, gaa and water and the health aervice the uae of the right to 
strike la strictly reatricied by legislation and consequently industrial 
disputes In these industries and services are often referred to central 
or local Labour Relations Commissions for conciliation or arbitration 
rather than settled through voluntary coUectivt bargaining (2)« Even 
In other private industries and services the extent to which trade 
unions and employers depend on conoillatlons or arbitrations by the 
third party for the settlement of industrial disputes is great in Japan: 
out of 3* 051 industrial disputes which took place in 1005* 1* 805 <58 per 
cent) were settled at either central or local Litoour Relations Commission#
(3). This figure is remarkably large* as compared with less than 
one per cent attributed to arbitration and mediation and tS per cent to 
voluntary negotiation# a# methods of settlement of wage disputes In 
103# in Britain (4). Taking everything into consideration* those 
employees whose pay la determined through voluntary negotiation* are 
28 per cent of the whole and those through statutory regulation 
(including 15 per cent covered by statutory minimum wages as well a#
14 per cent la the public sector), 20 per cent, while the remaining 
employees (45 per cent) negotiate individually with employers for their
(1) K, Eamishiro* "Dantai-kosho to aogi", in T, Shirai (ed .>* c it ., 
pp. 217-24.
(2) See The Labour ReWions Adjustment Act (1948), articles 37-3,
(3) C#ntr#U''5KcuFR@KEo Zenkokuteki 
llod<yo|i*choset JItal no Kenkjm, vol. II (1988), pp. 555.
(4) "^mp1^m!enraS^ .
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«Bd condition» of work <!)# the pay of Bcarly half of the
jApameao omployoee* m  compared with one quarter in Britain, are 
outalde tho collective bargaining ayatem or statutory regulation.
The Japanese system of collective bargaining Is characterised 
by enterprise-wide bargaining. Enterprise - wide bargaining Is not
peculiar to the Japanese system. For example, company or plant 
bargaining is  quite common in the United States (2). What is peculiar 
to the Japanese system is that, with few exceptions, every enterprise 
union and management have perfect autonomy in collective bargaining.
Of course, in the United States, this form of bargaining does exist but 
'multi-employer bargaining' or that single-company bargaining In 
which national union representatives take part seem s to be commoner (3). 
Further, the authority of local or industry-wide organisations over 
either workers or employers, or their further si^ rstruotures. Is 
very much weaker in Japan than In Britain and the United States.
The reason# for the prevalence of enterprise-wide bargaining are 
muc the same as those for the development of enterprise unions; 
absence of occupational labour markets, lack of labour mobility 
between large firms, development of internal labour markets, great 
Inter-firm differences in productivity and wages, and so on. In the 
highly fragmented labour market# there is not so much in common 
between unions, nor incentive for closer trade union unity. Under 
the Japanese employment system, the worker does not consider so
(1) K. Eamishiro, op. cit. p. 220.
(a) L.G. Reynolds, op. cit. pp. 180-74.
C3) ibid.
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iTiiich a# h!» B ritish  or American ooisntorpart that other workers of 
the yamo type in the external labour market are  competUora.
Moreover, Japaneoe employers have p rtfe rred  antorprîae bargaining, 
or endeavoured to eonfine Wrgalning unit# to enterprise unions, beeaaaa 
they fear tlmt industry-wida bargaining may undermine their paternallatic 
xnanagenient and the viability of the less efficient firm s which depend 
on clwaper labour. Enterprlae bargaining may give imiona of 
proopcrou# firm# some advantage#: tiwae unloius can push tW ir firm  
to pay higher wage# than the average in the industry (in this ca*#, 
faced with threats of stoppages, the firm  may not re s is t tiw ir demand# 
so much}. On the other iaand, cn tei^rise  union# may have many 
disadvantage# particularly In developing effective union leadership.
This springs from the fact that in most coUoctlvo agreement# tliero Is 
a provision that official# of a given enterprise union m m t  be employees 
of the firm  from which the union draws its m em bers, and that tlte 
majority of full-tim e officials of the enterprise unlot%, who are  released 
from  the job for « certain  period of office In the union, a re  reinstated 
by management la ter (1). Because of this, u limited membership and 
a lack of union funds, it is difficult for the union to obtain good 
leadership and expert negotiators o r speelallats in union affairs and to 
conduct pxx)longed strikes o r other industrial setlon <2), which may 
adversely affect the bargaining strength of the union; and so forth.
(1) T. Shlral, "Union Waders", Gendal Hodo-mondsl Koss, vol. 4, 
CÎÔS7), pp. 223-30. 
m  N. Nsilo, "Kumlal Zalsel", ibid., pp. 233 - 41.
msince 19S5 there h#* occurred m great change In the
Japanese system  ol collective bargaining, though en terprise  bargaining
I» «till moat Important* This la a tendency towards Induatry-wtde
bargaining among m ajor iuduatrlal federations of trade onions in Japan*
ïn the «prîng of that year, eight m ajor Indnatrial federation* alfiltated
to Sohyo atarted a  united front for wage Increaae# and took concerted
action in wage claim# to employer»* This united front of Industrial
federation# has been organised ©very spring (therefore called "spring
offensive") and drawn in more and more industrial federation# not only
from within 8ohyo but also from  among those affiliated to  other central
bodies such m  Churitsuroren. A# a resu lt, trade unions which
cover more than 80 per cent of a ll trade unionists in Japan hav# coma
to take part in a spring offensive and present wage demands
sim ultaneous^ and In a more or less concerted manner (1). This
pattern of aynohronised wage negotiations by #mltlple en terprlss
unions - which may be cnl,)ed "wage rounds"  ^ is  s till fa r from
industry-vtdde bargaining, for m ajor unions In each industrial federation
do try  to coordinate and standardise wage targets and timing of
the submission of the ir wage claim# or Industrial action but a re  in
no way liable to follow the prearranged pattern by a ll means (2).
The porcm % # o fth ^ o  W o S
lucrca»e« during the period between A pril and June was 88 per cent 
for firms with 1000 employees or more* and more than 70 per cent 
for «m ailer firm », while tlio proportion was lower for non-tinlmi firms 
($8% for firms with 1000 employees or more end 47% for sm aller firms), 
in 1 0 # . This i», however, not all due to spring offonsive# for 
Japanese firms traditionally give workers periodic wage increases In 
spriugtimo every year unâ a lte r the starling pay for school-leavers 
during the same period (Source : Ministry of l^ our)*
(9) In aome tuduatriea like shipping, coalmining, private railways, e tc .. 
Industry-wide agreements have been concluded between industrial 
ttuiou or Icdoraiiorw of eutorprlsc vMom and industry-wide employers' 
associations (See W . Fu|ita, "Hihonteki Roshi-kosho no Tokushltsu", 
ib id ., pp. HD m 31.
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Novorthelos», tho sIko of \mgo oûvamQ obtained hm  a tendency 
to w a rd s  un lforxn îty  a m o n g  th em  <11.
One Interesting thing is # s t  a phenomenon (called "point 
struggles") sim ilar to "pattern bargaining" In the United States has 
taken place In the Japanese setting. In the synthetic, chemical 
industry, for example, one leading firm Is singled out by the industrial 
federation, or tansan, as the Initial target In a particular year; 
after negotiations are completed, the amount of wage Increase 
settled there becomes a pattern for bargaining at other firms In the 
industry (2). Such a phenomsnon is also observed between large 
firms of different industries; one leading industry is singled out by 
a national centre like Sohyo as the initial target in a particular year 
and the amount of wage increase settled there becomes a pattern for 
bargaining at large firms of other industries. Iron and steel, private 
railways, chemicals, etc, have been "wage leaders" in this sense 
in recent years, The number of large firms which determine wage 
increases for their employees after taking into account wage settlements 
at other large firms within the industry or outside has been increasing 
and today, moat large firms refer to wage sattlemcnt at other firms
before determining their own (8), It seem s, therefore, that w age____
<11 Ministry of Labour, Modo Bakusho <19701, p. 109, It shows that the
mean coefficient of variation in the sise  of wage advance among 
large firms steadily declined from 48.3 in I9&S i o 14.0 In 1969.
(2Ï W. Fojita, op. cit. p, 119.
<# âtore than 10 per cent of firms with 800 employees or more first 
referred to wage settlement, wage level, etc. of other firms in 
same industry but 00 per cent of them also took into account those 
of firms of other industries secondarily (Source; Ministry of 
Labour, Survey on wage increases, etc. )
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movements betwaen toduitrio# ## woU m  beWoen firm# within the 
Bsmo industry have booomo înoroaaingly interdependent in Japan.
Under the British system. Industry-wide negotiations 
centre on wage rates, and other forms of wage payment like payment
by results may,or may not, be dealt with secondarily. In Japan, 
it is the average wage of Oiiiployees working in the particular firm  
(commonly called "base wage") rather than wage for paHlcular grades 
or types of workers, that Is brought into focus In union-management 
negotiations. ID Whan union# in a particular industry organise a 
common front in wage bargaining in a spring offensive, they usually 
coordinate their wage demands and place with each employer claims 
for m  amount of advance in the bus# wage that is equal for all 
participating unions. After the amount of advance in the base wage 
is fixed at Industry level, each union participating in the comm<m 
front may separately hold further negotiations with management for 
additions (commonly called "plus alpha") to this industry-level outcome. 
An  overall advance in the hm o  wage doe» not mean, however, that 
all employees working In tho firm concerned receive an equal wage 
Increase In cither absolute or percentage terms, that additional 
negotiations are required to settle another issue of how this overall 
advance in the base wage should be shared among the employees or in 
other words, how smuch the wages of particular workers should be
<l) Out of about 3,800 Industrial disputes having occurred In 1968, 59 
per cent were mmaiul}' concerned with wage advances, 96 per cent, 
with biannual bonuses, and 3 per cent, with retirement allowances 
or other (Hnga bcnclita (Source; Sîiiilstry of Labour).
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©gatest those of other workor/s in the aamo firm . A little 
mcr 0 th&n one cjucirtor of a ll omWrprlae wwIoïib which struck v/age 
bargains left tho nm tter to .mm%agament% dlscrettona nearly half 
of them decided only tlm principle# of distribution of wage advances; 
and tho r emaining quarter laid, dov/n detailed provisions for the method 
of sharing wage advances among the individual w orkers. (15 The 
commonest mothoda of doing m  a re  oqnaUaniount wage advances 
(nearly t>0 p e r  cent of the unions which struck agreements eoneerning 
the distribution of wage advanoeal, o r equal^-pe r cent ago wage advances 
<35 per eontl, for a ll workers <*5, In those negotiation management 
endeavour» to increase that imrt of wages which 1$ directly related 
to m erit ..rating or other r^iethcdfs of employee assessm ent, while 
the union tries  to avoid internal conflicts botween different groupa of 
affiliated members which compete with one another for a la rger shar#. 
tiniform wage advnnees for nil workers, though commonost mo far, 
have sometim es engendered discontent amongst higher/..paid worker# 
tn Japan, as ha# been tho case In Britain.
la s tly , we must toko a cursory look to the statutory 
minimum wage eyatem In Japan. At the and of 196Û there were about 
3 million worker# whose wage# ware subject to regulation hy thl# 
eyatom. They were mainly concentrated in low ..wage indaatriea 
and serv ices although even among the hlghoat'^wage Induatrlea like 
petroleum and coal products, chemicals, printing and publtahlng,
< 1 >  M M . t r y  o f  L f t b o u r *  o p «  e i t .  
(2) ibid.
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there were underpaid workers v;ho were covered by statutory wage 
regulation). 30 p er cent of an  workers of this category were in 
manufacturing (3 million in metal manufacture and engineering and 
1.4 million in textiles). (Î) There are two kinds of minimum wage»
 ^ one is determined by a minimum wage council (which is composed of 
representatives of workers and employer» and independent membera 
and established permanently in every prefecture but not separately 
for individual trades, as with British wages councils) and another Is 
based on agreements between employers In particular industries 
(thfe formula will soon be abolished) <2). Besides the difference in 
the organisation of wages councila or minimum wage councils, one 
fundamental difference is that in Britain, a Wages Council may be 
CGtahliahed if 'there is no adequate machinery for tl&e effective 
regulation of the remuneration of any w orkers' (3), in other words, 
if a particu lar trade is not adequately organised, while in Japan a 
minimum wage may be determined for a particular industry, trade 
or area if tho M inister of Labour, or the head of a prefoctural labour 
standards bureau, is of the opinion that It is necessary for the improve­
ment of the working conditions of low-wage workers (4), In Japan, 
even if an industry as a whole is well organised. It does not follow 
that the collective bargaining machinery effectively regulates the 
wages of all workers in tho industry; the wages of workers employed
at SÎ3## firm s and casual workers employed at large (well-organised
(1) Ail figures from Ministry of Labour, Labour Standards Bureau.
(2) The Minimum Wages Act(668), artic les 26-9 and a previous Act 
(1959) a r t ic le s  9 -10.
(3) Ministry of Labour (U .K .), op. cit. p. 155.
(4) The Minimum Wages Act (1958) article 16.
192
and high-wago) firma In the industry are outside the regulation of 
collective agreement» because large -firm  unions aro reluctant to 
admit these workers to their membership and collective agreements 
a re  struck on an enterprise-w ide basis.
3. Impact of Trade Unionism on Wages
The contention that trade unions rais# the wage level above 
that which would otherwise be determined by market forces Is the crux 
of the cost-push inflation argument. There have been much theoretical 
controversy surrounding the relationship between union power and wage 
determination as well as many attempts to test the impact of trade 
unionism on wages empirically since before the Second World War.
F.H. Douglas and other American students In the prewar days, who 
questioned whether unionisation and industrial concentration distorted 
the interindustry wage structure, tested the relationship between 
industry wage increases and unionisation (or productivity growth) by 
statistical methods (1). Immediately after the war# J .T . Dunlop and 
A.M. Boss put forward two conflicting hypotheses concerning wage 
determination under collective bargaining (namely, Dunlop's wage- 
employment maximisation model and Ross's political model), which 
raised so-called "the Dunlop-Hoss controversy" among the students of 
the subject (2). This controversy gave an Impetus to further empirical 
studies on the determinants of the interindustry wage structure.
(1) F.H. Douglas, op* cit. Also see Chapter 5 pp. 114-9 .
(3) F o ra  good summary of this controversy, see H.M. Levinson, op. clt.
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H.M. Levinson aummarlsod the of thoao otxKlîea as foHows:
Cl) greater xxnton strength (ae measured by the proportion of 
produotlon workers covered by collective bargaining agreements) \wm 
associated with relative wage advantages ...* ; (It) * certain 
characteristics of the product market - particularly, the 'degree of 
monopoly* (as measured by the concentration ratio) and the level of 
profits » wci'O also man eclated both with the rate of change in wages 
tmé with union strength. '; (lit) ' i . .  condUlona in the labour market, 
no measured by rate# of change in employment or in physical 
productivity, were Ic&a clearly associated with change» In the inter­
industry wage structure than were .the product market variable». » (I), 
î.n this context the moat Important conclualon he drew from those la 
that *oMon!»m did appear m  m  Important force Influencing the rate 
of change of wages . . ( 2 ) .  O. Bckateln and T.A. Wilson, after 
examining the behaviour of wages In American manufacturing Induetry 
from 1943 to l$0ù, found 'only week evidence that unionization affects 
the long-run level of wage», ' though they did not deny the presnnee of 
a trade union effect on wage», either, for a reason mentioned later (8). 
A.O. Hînee, who inveatfgated the relatlonahtp between the rat# of 
change of money wage rate» and the rate of change of the percentage of 
the labour force unionised, in the United Kingdom during the period# 
1393-1912, 1921-38 and 1949-51, concluded that 'an Index of trade walim
pushfwlne»#, namely the rate of change of unionisation, I» closely
(I) Ibid. (The underlines am originally in itallcB),
(3) ibid.
(3) "The. Determination of Money Wages in American Industry", 
'Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 70 (1903) pp. 37Ô-414.
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Associated with the rate of change of money wages rates' and that 
'moreover, this index cannot be explained by the level and/or the 
rate of change of the demand for labour. ' (1)
We have examined the relationships between the overall 
rate of increase in earnings i and union density ( T, the
percentage of employees in trade unions), between W and the rate 
of change in union density ( A T), and between a  T and the rate of 
unemployment ( A U) during the last decade or so in the United 
Kingdom and Japan. Our conclusions are as follows; A W is 
positively associated with both T <r • 0.3622) and A T (r • 0.4750) in 
the U.K., while ^  'W i» negatively associated with T (r ■» .0.4898) 
and positively with A T (r * 0.3697) in Japan: partly contrary to
a Hines' conclusion, there is a positive correlation between A T and 
A U <r ■ 0.4190) In Britain, while the two variables are negatively 
associated (r • 0.8745) in Japan (2). In the case of Britain, as both 
the unemployment rate and rate of increase in union density increase, 
the rate of wage increase also rises, whereas in the case of Japan, 
as unemployment rate declines and the rate of increase in union density 
rises, the rate of wage increase rises. We may say, therefore, that 
trade unions are likely to have pushed up wages despite adverse labour, 
market conditions in Britain but we cannot say so for Japan. We are 
inclined to think that full employment has been conducive to increases in 
bo%h union density and wages in Japan because the increases In 
trade-union membership have mainly taken place among the employees 
working at smaller firms in recent years and small.flrm unions have
several weaknesses in terms of "pure power, " which will be discussed
0) ' ' ^ Trade^'uBo'ns' "and Wage infliction in the U^
Review of Economic Studies, 81 (1964), pp. 221.51.
(.2) F o r" s tî^  Appendices X and XI.
mat tho end of fais Chapter* We iiave alaa teveatigatod the relationship  
between the laduotry wage lev e l ard union density In fourteen British  
Indu@trl03 and aervioes, slid in twenty Jspansso ioduatriea and servies# 
<î). There la a weak positive correlation hetwesn the industry wage 
lev e l mid union density In B iltaln  In 1968 (r •» 0*2530), while tlie 
correlation hoiween tho two variables is  negative in  Japan in 1007 
(r - 0*4731>. in addition, there I» a lso  a negative corrélation  
between the industry rate of wage Ineroase (over the period 1038-90) 
and industry union density (in 10O7) In Japan, (r  * -0*3180), On the 
whole, the role of trade unions seem s to bo much stronger in Britain  
than In Japan whore union density ic; tiot a good explanatory variable 
for the overall rate of wage Increase and the industry wage level at 
a ll. We may go tîie length of e ay lag that trade unions are Irrelevant 
to wage movements In Japan m  far aa union density Ib eoneox^ned.
There may be two objev-tiona to testing tho effect of trade
unions on wages by union dem lty and Interindustry eomparlaon. One
v/âs made by S,H, SHchtar; a  method of testing the effect of unions
by Interindustry comparison of wage movements and union density (or
other m easures of union power) 'breaks down i n  tboe times when
tmlone exert groat Influence on the wages of nonunion v/orkers* (through
spill-over effeota of wage patterns) (B), In other words, 'because
of tho spillovers, any wagon increases caused by unionisation would
perm eate m m h of the re s t of the wage structure In other Industries
Cl) For ^tatlBtical data used, se e  Appeiiflicea x n  and XIII.
(2) 8 .H . SHohtOf, op. cit.
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And, therefore, would not appear in croia-aectlon compariaon. ' <1) 
Another wa« already made by many atudenta of the aubject in relation 
to the aignifieance of union density aa a meaaure of imion power or 
puahfulneaa. 'This measure of union power may be aeriously 
deficient if (i) the union memberahip Itaelf laeka the militancy neceaaary 
to vote ill favor of a strike or to remain out after a strike ia called,
<ii) a aubatantial minority of employee# are not union member# and are 
not prepared to support any union action, or(iii) the union leadership 
ia itaelf unwilling for aome reason to initiate aggressive action. • (2)
The first point has been develi>ped further by Levinaon, 
Eckatein and Wilaon, and others. In the United States contracta 
have been negotiated between unions and employers in a series of 
"wage rounds" which range from one to four years. In each wage 
round leading unions in a group of heavy industries (called "the key 
group") first set a wage i>attern in the "key bargains" and other 
unions in the group subsequently tend to follow this pattern settlement 
because of the economic, political and institutional interdependence 
among the firms and the unions in the group (3). As a result wages 
in the key group move almost identically. Wages in other Industries 
outside the gioup are also subject to spiH-over effects of the key-group 
wages (4). Thus wages settled at different places are linked with 
one another. One thing to be noted here is that interdependence of
wage movements between firms in a given industry or between
(1) O* Eckstein and T.A. Wilson, op. cit.
(2) H.M. Levinson, op. cit.
# )  O. Eckstein and T.A. Wilson, op. cit.
(4) ibid.
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Induatrie# Is nal n#ce##Ar% du# to uAle#i pro»#ur## but may aiau 
reaali from iaput-output comwctiona# full mtnpl&ymmui and lacraaaad
W)om= mo'büHy, aW. In Japan a wag# round iwbat we eallad 'Spring 
olîonaive") taka# place every year and, m  wo have m«nti«n#d aa rlta r, 
there is aome ©videnc# that interdepandanea tn wag# detftrminaticMi 
among the large firm* ha* imcreaaed# In the present wrltar'a view, 
îhî» phenomenon in Japan om. better be explained by what Lavlnaon 
caUed "poiltiaal variable*" (like union rivalry , the preatlg# of union 
leader*, e tc .)  than by labour-m arket factor* beoauae labour mobility 
between large firm* i* aiiU very limited there and rivalry b#tw##ti 
national centres wilii different political outlook such m  dohyo and 
Domei i* fierce, particularly where they each affiliate aeparat# union# 
in the same firm  or iu the name induatry and compete for m#mb#rahip.
Although we have pointed out that in te r-firm  dispersion In 
the «isse of wage advance obtained through negotlatlon* ha* tended to 
nhrink in recent year*, this phenomenon ha* Wen limited to large 
firm s and Ims not led to uniformity in the rmte of wage increase among 
them boceuae there have previously oxiatcd wide differences in tho 
wage level between firm* in Japan; timt ia to may, if the siz# of weg# 
advauco obtained through bargaining i$ the same among the firm s, It 
loUowo that those firnia which originally have a higher wag© level award 
sm aller porcontnge wago Increaaoa tium those which have a iowor wage 
level, and aonooqucntly in ter-lirm  differential* decline in percentage
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term* (1). On tho other hand, the npilLover effecto of v/ago oeUle* 
monts for largo firms on the wages of smallor firrno aro otlH faint 
at the moment. About 40 poi^ o é n t  o f  the firms with 30-90 employee*
In marmfaotnrlog IWtwtry and dlotrlbutlvo tv'^ûm ^ took no aeooimt of tho 
wagep of Qthor firms In determining their m m  and only 31 per cent 
of them referred to wage advances at other firms <2). The vm g o  
determination of email firms W, therefore, moro"tadividMali«tlC!.
Again, many sm all f îm s  determined wage rises  lo r  their own employ#*# 
woil before large firm s did* (3) Au a resu lt, in te r «firm wage 
dWperaien le very mnob wider among the em ail firm s that among tho 
largo firm s |4 ). Wage determination at em ail firm s is thus more 
influenced by the conditions of the labour .market, for example, olmnges 
in the starting wage# of ^sohool-loavers* We may eonolude that th* 
sp ill-over effects of %mge advances or tnterdependenco of v^age
<l) For example, «oppose that Biiierprise llniosis .A, B, and C all denmnd 
a nnlform amount of wage advance (say, 19,009 yen) mW Firm # A, B, 
and*C mT^naily have a different wage level <«ay, 40 ,0ÔO y e n  for A,
50* 000 yon for B, and 0 0 ,000 yen for C); then, ih e^a ta  of wage 
inerea»© will he 20% for A, 20% for B, and 10.7% tor C; «no, if w« 
take tlx0  wage level of F irm  A ae a  base, the original d î f f e r e n i im l»  # 
are  100 for A, 120 for B* and 150 for C and those after wage settlem ent 
will be 100 for A, ISO for B, and 140 for C b u t  the ahaointe d i f f e r e n c e  
between the firm s will he the game ( i .e . 10,000 yen) m  W f& e.
(2) Ministry of Lebonr, Eodo Haknsho (1070), p. lif>.
(0) ,4’he large firm# which struck wege bargains before the middle of 
April were only 13 per cent of the whole, while 04. per cent of the 
nonunion sm all firmm and 3 i per cent of unionised em ail firm s did.
In 1009 (Source; Nihon Beisawel Eonbu).
(4> The cocfficlfints of variation (^ (the highest decile, minus the lowcal 
decile) divided by the median multiplied by 100) In wage tncrca®€« 
hi manufacturing are  00.7 for firm s with 30^90 employees ami 
,24.5 for firm s with loOQcmployeca or more (Sourcin Ministry of 
Labour, Ibid., p.
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movement# a re  a till limited to wage determination at large firm# and 
that many firm #, eipeolally em ail one# #ttU determine their own wage 
level without Interference from trade union#. Thta i# true of even 
unionieed em ail firm»: a considerable number of em ail-firm  unlcm# 
do not have any collective agreement# with the ir .employer# hecauae 
of the latter*# refusal for union recognition o r otherwise, so that 
these employer# a re  free from  union Intervention (I).
Lastly, the role of what Levinson called "pure power" 
variable» seem# to be leas important in Japan than in Britain o r the 
United State#, for several reasons. F irs t, Japanese employees 
working In the large firm s have strong loyalty o r attachment to their 
employer which may have deliberately been developed through 
paternalistic management by the la tte r, but at the sam e time they 
also identify themselves with the union at their firm  <2). This 
attitude of the worker# toward# their employer and enterprise union 
(which may be called "dual allegiance") probably a rises  from  their 
view that their company and company union are part of the company 
community to which they belong, as against organisation# outside. 
Under such circumstance# the militancy of union membership 
generally m oderates. Secondly, workers of older generation# may 
feel more attached to their company than to their union and may not
be prepared to support any aggressive union action, which weakens
R)"'"S%ore'lhan 40 per'cent"oflKe' u5oni#t#
(with a membership below 100) were not covered by collective 
agreement# (M inistry of Labour, Trade Union Basic Survey).
(2) See B. Haaama, "Hodoaha no Kigyo-lshtki to Kumiai-lshiki", 
Oendai Rodo.mondai Kosa, vol. 4 (1967), pp. 182-90.
2 0 0
the internal strength of the union. Thirdly, union leadership i s  
weak for the reasons which we mentioned e a rlie r . Financial 
vulnerability and lack of fhnd# due to the sm allness of union s l x e  
makes It difficult to conduct prolonged strikes. In this connection 
A.M . Eos# pointed out, after making international comparison of 
e trikm , that the Japanese pattern of industrial conflict was 
characterised by a high propensity to strike and short duration of 
s trikes, as compared with a moderate propensity to strike and 
moderate duration in the United Kingdom (1). But, if we exclude 
the strike» against mas» redundancy which are  really furious and 
prolonged, more than 60 per cent of strikes were called off within 
four hours in Japan {%) so that the average duration of strikes would 
ver very much shorter. Taking everything Into account, the 
pushfulness of Japanese trade union* may be much weaker than that 
of British unions.
(1) "Changing Patterns of industrial Conflict", In G .G . Somers (ed.)
Proceeding» of the 12th Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relatim# 
Research Association, 1959.
{? ,) Source: Trade Unim Basic Survey.
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CHAPTER 8 
THE IMPACT OF MARKET FORCES ON WAGES
ît ia a central postulate of c lassical ocouomic theory that 
wages are  determined by tho interaction of labour supply and demand 
in the m arket. But doubt has been cast on this postulate by many 
modern labour economists* particularly after the Croat Depression 
of the 1830*s. One most widely supported assertion is that wages 
a re  determined in collective bargaining between trade unions and 
employers. Another,sociological explanation. Is that wages are  
determined by the social status of the worker. We Ixave so far 
discussed the wage-fixing process in Britain and Ja%^n from these 
poinh^ of view. Now wo return  to the supply-demand ^>ostulate 
once again and look at the relationship between actual wage movements 
and changes in the labour market conditions in both countries.
1# Labour Supply
Tho labour supply (measured in term s of the number of 
workers) depends on population size and its activity ra te . Apart 
from emigration and immigration, the population size of a country is 
in tho long run doterniinod by tho rate of population growth. Since 
the beginning of this century, B ritain 's rate of population growth has 
been fairly  stable and much lower than that of Japan, though the
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la tte r km  fallen lu the îast fifteen yoars (1). The activity rale  of a 
givmi population varies with Its ago etruotuie m û  iu affected by 
monoinio tmd social factors auoh m  the per-capita inoome level, 
indiietrial strachiro , attitudes toward* female îabovn* particii>ation, 
the Rtmrage period of éducation for young people, th^ social security 
system , the rotiremont age of older workers, otc. Tho overall 
activity rate has had a deolhiing tendency in the long run, though the 
activity rate for m arried v/onxen hue increased, in most Industrial 
countries due to ageing population structure, prolonged education for 
young people, rising Income level, etc. <3). As a rem it, the ra te  
of increase in the labour force Is expected to decline îix the long rim 
in both Britain and Japan. The British labour force Increased only 
at a rate of 0.5 per cent per annum during 1960-67, as compared to an 
annual rate of growth in Japan of 1.4 per cent over 1960-6R (3),
(#  Average mimml rate of population growth
U.K. Japan
1930-20 Û.Û 1.31
1930-30 0.4 1.63
1930-96 0.3 1.45
1035-40 0.0 0.76
1040-45 0.4 0.22
1845-00 0.9 2.89
1050-53 0.3 1.42
1953.00 0.4 0.91
1960-05 0.8 0*89
1906-09 0.5 1.10
Source: 0N Demographic Yearbook and Statistical Handbook of Japan.
(2) Labour force m  percentage of total population aged 16 yeai's and 
over Î 03 per coxit in IÛ60 and 01 per cent in 1968 in the U .K . ;
: 71 p er cent in  1960 and 06 per cent In 1909 in Jap an . 
Source: Employmexxt imd Productivity Gazette and Yearbook 
of labour Statistic*.
<3) Suuroei Employment and Productivity Gazette end Labour Force 
Survey (Bureau of Statistic», Prim e M inister's Office).
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Widening our auulyalu, we have aS#o to oonuWer the 
effectiveness with which the labour supply is used. Uudemmployment, 
a particularly soriouc problem in countries v/ith ii large agricultural 
population, can bo a nource of labour for groudng industries ♦ There 
may be absolute imderoiiiplay.mont In the oonse that to remove oomo 
workers from a sector of tho economy will not affect production hut 
recuit in an hie reuse in tlie average productivity of tho x’omainhig workers 
in the sector* Thi0 actually happened in post-war Japan: tho farm
labour force dlrbhiiahed from 10 million to less than 10 million, while 
the amiufti production of rlca increased from 12 million to 14 million 
ton.8, during 1955*1900. Helatiyo underemplo$mv3nt in found among 
those wOK^korevhoseps'oductivity io oxtremoly lov/, ae compared with 
that of other worker» in other ooetoro of the economy, and the transfer 
of whom to other soctora may reduce tho px^esont level of production in 
the original aeotor but increase their productivity and thus the average 
labour productivity of the national economy aa a whole. As the 
indit£;trial structure changea, thia type of xmdoromployment occurs 
again and again oven in nclvancod industrial oconomloB because of 
limited labour mobility. It soerne that large-scale absolute under­
employment ban almost boon ellmhiatod In Britain where agricultural 
wos'kero have constituted only a email fragment of htvr total working 
population and the proportion of oelf-ernployed and unpaid family 
workers hm  been sm all (J>. Self-employment ami unpaid family
(I) The pro|.K>rtion of the farm  labour force was 9.4% in 1911, 0A% in
1931, 5.0% in 1950. and 3.5% in 1804 (^tource: L .C . Hunter and D .J.
Robertson, op, clt. p. 161, Table 0,5).
The proportion of self-employed persona and employers in total
working population was 13% in 1931 and 6,8% tn 19OR, Family worker#
were 176,009, o r only 0.7% of the labour force in 1866, (Source:
Anniml Abstract, of Statistic»).
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employment are often refugee of surplus labour In lees developed 
oountrie# where the labour market 1» underdeveloped and the social 
security ayatem, like unemployment benefits, im poor so that many 
of the jobless cannot afford to stay out of work until Job opportunities 
in paid employment prcî3cnt themselves but ore obliged to earn a 
llvollhoood as petty self-employed o r unpaid family w orkers. In the 
family enterprise (in agriculture or other industries) which has not 
employees the principle of average productivity usually applies rather 
than, the capitalistic principle of marginal productivity: Even if the
marginal value productivity of an additional family member falls below 
the current wage level (probably living wages) o r is even equal to zero, 
the family enterprise will employ him or her as long as the average 
value productivity of all family members Is above the current wage 
level and no alternative Job is available. Under such circumstances 
the result is disguised unemployment and, if Jobs are  available in the 
local labour market area and wages for them are above the marginal 
value productivity of some family members, they will take up a job 
outside the family business at low wages which may not be sufficient 
even to support themselves but s till make their family as a whole 
better off. In many Japanese agricultural households male members 
take up other jobs and female members run their farm  because the 
earnings of male members are not sufficient to support their household, 
although considerably higher than the incomes which they would got 
if they worked on the farm  (i). In brief, low wages in industry and
(1) Those households which lived exclusively on farming were 21 per 
cent of Japan 's 5 .4  million farm  households in 1907 (Source:
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry).
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low incomes from agriculture complement one another. From  
another point of view industry In the ru ra l area can attract labour 
from agriculture even at below-subsistence wages*
The underemployed are  seldom registered as unemployed 
in the official s ta tis tic s . For example* the number of jobless people
has been larger in the United States than in India whose labour-force 
eise is more than double that of the United States and whose per-capita 
income is almost at subsistence level (1). Despite the repeated 
assertion that there was abundant labour surplus in Japan, her 
iineniployrnent rate has been much the same an tliat of Britain which 
has experienced labour shortages since the Second World War* This 
can be accounted for by the fact that self-employment and unpaid 
family work in agriculture, hiduetry, and services Itave given shelter 
to the potentially unemployed in Japan* The proportion of working 
population in agricultural employment was as high as nearly 40 per cent 
in 1955 <18 per cent in I960) and self-employed persons and unpaid 
family workers amounted to 25 per cent and 31 per cent respectively 
in 1955 (19.5 per cent and 16.5 per cent in 1969) (2). Moreover, the 
number of aelf-cmployed persons has remained almost constant since 
the beginning of the 1960's, though their distribution has greatly shifted 
from agriculture to other industries and services (3). The
(1) Source; ÏT..O, Year Book of Labour Statistics.
(2) Source: Labour Force Survey,
(3) The number of self-employed persons was 9.919,000 in 1863 and 
9,930,000 in 1969 (Source: Labour Force Surey).
Figure 8 - 1  
Unemployment'level and rtte in Britain and Japan
Unemployment
level
(in thousands)
 Unemployment level
 Unemployment rate
Unemployment
rate
Japan
C9V
Unemployment
rate
The United Kingdom
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
/9C
Source: See Appendice X and XI
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probability of underemployoieiii among tho golf.employed and faml3y 
workers in developing countries is suppot^ted by the fact that the 
average incomes of these workers are  well below those of employees 
in developing countries* while the opposite is true of advanced 
industrial countries <!)* Again we liave other evidences that many 
of the self-employed and family workers are underemployed iu Japan 
<2>* The shift of manpower from agriculture and unpaid family 
labour iu other industries and services to paid employment iu growing 
industries during the last decade or so in Japan was tremendous (3)* 
Taking into account this interindustry transfer of labour and greater 
increases in tlie labour force by way of the entry or re .en try  of new 
school-leavers and housewives* Japanese industry and service have 
been fa r more amply supplied with manpower tiian British counterparts 
since the Second World War* Even now a large labour reserve 
remains in the form of relative underemployment* though there is
little absolute underemployment o r unemployment* in Japan {4>*
(ir The ratio  of ' the^f^'rage" wages' ' and'saîarïës" of employees to tiie " 
average incomes of total occupied population is between 0.7 and 0* 8 
in Western European countries* as compared with over 1* 0 in 
developing countries and 0*9 in Japan (Source: N. Maruo, "Seisansei* 
Chingin* Eijun”* Oendai Bodo-mondai Koaa* vol* 2 (1967)* p, 226),
(2) Other indirect Indicators are' (i)'biat"''22'pe of all solf-employed
and 30 per cent of the family workers* as compared with only 5 per 
cent of all employees* worked less than 200 days during the year 1908; 
and (il) timt the lower.quartîlo annual incomes for the self-employed 
were 220*000 yen* while those for the employee», were 308*000 yen
in 1968* that is to say* there were more low-lncom e-earners among 
the self-employed than among the employees (Source: Employment 
Status Survey).
(3) S, Tankanashi* ’’Eodoshijo no Henbo to Eoyo-seisaku*’* Gendai Bodo^ 
mondai Koga* vol. 1 (1066)* pp. 14-20.
(4) The number of those workers who wished to change jobs* or to get 
additional work* or those people who wished to take up a Job was 2.5 
million* 1.8 million* and 4,1 million in 1958; and 1.9 million* 0.9 
million* and 5.7 million in 1968 respectively. Above all, those 
who wished to participate in the labour force increased in recent 
years (Source: Employment Status Survey).
208
2, Labour Demand
The level of demand for labour may rise  with economic
growth but at a slower pace allowing for improvements in labour 
productivity* which are often induced by labour shortages (and rises 
in the wage level) resulting from economic expansion. As we hm e  
seen in Chapter 2* Japan’s rate of economic growth was more than 
four times as high as that of Britain in real term e during the last 
two decades. In both countries tho most important source of growth 
of national product is attributable to improvements in labour 
productivity. To put it in another way* tho increase of labour demand
Talbe 8 - 1
Average Annual Bates of Increase in the labour
force and labour productivity as factors contri­
buting to economic growth
U.K. Japn.
1061 - G7 1960 « 65 1965 - 68
Hate of economic growth
( r e a l G N P )  2.5% 10.0% 12.4%
Hate of increase in labour force 0.4 1.3 1.9
Rate of labour productivity growth 2.0 8.6 10.5
Source: Rodo Hakusho (1971), p. 171.
was very much slower than output expansion. Incidentally* the 
average national productivity of labour can be raised to a considerable 
extent through the transfer of labour from low-productivity to high- 
productivity sectors of the national economy. The average 
productivity of Japanese workers rose at an annual rate of 1,4 per 
cent between 1960-68 simply owing to inter-industry labour mobility.
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while productivité increment# due to this factor was negative: during 
1960-67 in Britftin, i .e .  the transfer of labour from  high-productivity 
to low-produettvlty eectom reduced the average national productivity 
of labour at an annual rate of 0.3 per cent* though productivity 
improvemonta within each industry more than offset it, <l).
Total labour demand la an aggregate of labour demanda 
by different sectors of the economy. The intensity of demand 
preaaure# differs from one industry to another: some Induatriea
expand employment, while other# make their workers redundant.
The eharacterlatica of the Brttidh employment structure* aa compared 
with the Japanese counterpart, are  Cl) that the alxe of the agricultural 
labour force ia extremely small in Ijoth absolute and percentage 
term#; (it) the proportions of manufacturing and service industries 
(including the public servies) a re  much larger thaw In Japan.
Table 8 - 3  
Induatrial Composition of Labour Force* 18#
U.K. Japan
Total 100.0 100.0
Agriculture* forestry & fishing 1.8 22.1
Mining and quarrying 2,1 0.6
Manufacturing 38,4 25,8
Construction G.O 7.9
Transport and communication 7.(1 "I fî eGas* electricity* and water 1.8
Distributive trade# 12.3 18.2
Finanee, banking* and services
other than public service» 24.0 16.2
Public services 0.3 3,0
Source; ïSmployment and Productivity Gazette and Employment Statua 
Survey.
m  Bodo HnkuBho (1970>. p. 171.
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Basic trends in the pattern of employment are  sim ilar between tho two 
countries in mainy ways* for example, rapid contractions in agriculture 
and mining, and expansions in metal and engineering Industries# There 
are  also some differences: emplo^aiient in old industries like textiles
and clothing has declined in absolute term s in Britain, but increased, 
though more slowly than other, industries, in Japan; construction 
and distributive trades are among the fastest-expanding industries in 
Japan but fairly stable in Britain, in term s of the size of employment# 
The expansion of employment occurred over all industries and services 
save agriculture and mining and more than absorbed abundant supply 
of labour during the last decade or so in Japan# P artia l labour 
shortages which appeared towards the end of tho 1050’s have developed 
into general ones in more recent years (1).
(I) Today, in Japan, full employxnent and general labour shortage
are apparent in the sense that almost all workers are  in employment 
and that many firm s want to hire more labour at the current wages# 
This does not, however, moan that all workers are  effectively and 
fully used. As mentioned ea rlie r, there is a great deal of relative 
undaremployment: Mai^ workers, particularly in the traditïbnàl''
sector, are  employed at very low wages, as compared to workers 
in the modern sector, and their productivity Is also low, so that they 
can more effectively be used if they arc  moved to a more productive 
sector#
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Table 8 - 3  
Employment Index by Industry
U.K. 
1859 - 68 
<1959 « 100)
Japan 
1968 .  69 
<1958 •  100)
Agriculture, forcatry, and fiahtng 
Mining and quarrying 
All manufacturing industrlea 
Food, drink, and tobacco 
Chemicals and allied industries 
Metal manufacture 
Iron and steel 
Non-ferrous metals 
Engineering and electrical goods 
Electrical goods 
Machinery
Instrument engineering 
Shipbuilding and marine engineering 
Vehicles
Metal goods not specified elsewhere 
Textiles
Clothing and footwear 
Leather, leather goods and fur 
Bricks, pottery, glass, cement, etc. 
Timber, furniture, etc.
Timber 
Furniture 
Paper, printing, and publishing 
Publishing and printing 
Paper, pulp, etc.
Other manufacturing 
Construction 
Distributive trades 
Gas, electric!^ , and water 
Transport and communication 
Finance, professional services 
Miscellaneous services 
Finance and insurance 
Services 
Public services
63
58
103
100
m
101
118
65
93
m
77
86
88
107
113
m
125
106
100
109
93
133
105
110
59*
40
184
132
159
176
179
335
238
195
214
253
104
252
199
193
192
277
158
151
245
387
313
135
166
226 
142 *
122 *
Figures based on 1959 « 100
Source;
Note:
Employment and Productivity Gasotte and Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics
The U.K. figures cover self-employed and unpaid family 
workers as well as employees, while the Japanese figures
are only for employee» except for agriculture and services.
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Tho level of labour donmud dooa not only differ between 
Industries but also varies among different tj^aa  of labour. Young 
workers are  in esceaa demand, while Job opportunities are Bcerco for 
older workers, in Britain and Japan. This is also reflected in the 
narrowing of wage differentials between Juvenile and adult workers and 
the falling off of wages for older workers, ae we have seen in Chapter
4. Young workers, especially new sehool-eavere and university 
graduates, usually have no power of directly regulating their pay and 
other conditions of work because they aro not yet affiliated to any
Table 8 - 4
Great Britain: ratio of the wholly 
unemployed to unfilled 
vacancie®,
March, 1960
Boys under 13 
Mon J8 and over
G irls under 13
Women 18 and over
0.84
4,80
0.15
2,00
Japan: ratio  of active job
applicants to unfilled 
vacancies,
October, 1967
Boys under 20 0.8
Mon 20-50 0.5
Men 51 m â over 4 .4
GtrlB under 20 0.4
Women 20-50 1.2
Women 51 and over 5.6
Source; Department of Employment and Productivity; Ministry 
of Laboin\
trade union. Their wages are , therefore, thought to be directly 
subject to market forces. From  this point of view we shall examine 
tho relationship between their wages and demand pressures for them 
la te r .
Bince the Second World War many W estern countries have 
experienced full emplo^^ment and labour shortages together with tho 
progress of unionisation among the workers. B ritain’s unemployment
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rate during the last two decades or so has beon well below the 3 per 
cent mai’k which was regarded by Lord Beveridge as fulfilling the 
full omploymenttàrget (1), although tho actual number of the unemployed 
increaood from a qitarier million to half a million during 1055-69. 
Japan’s unemployment rate was also below 3 por cent during the le»t 
16 y e a r s  (and below 2 per cent* if 1055, 1966, and 1058 are excluded)*
TM» figure. If taken at face value, moans super-full employment in 
Japan, but it concealed an enormous amount of disguised unemployment, 
without which it wouM hardly be possible to mobilise 3 - 4  million 
workers to expanding %ecotrs of the economy every yemr (2). 
Nevertholescj it is quite certain that unemployment, either in absolute 
term s or as pas’centago of tho labour force, declined in Japan during 
tho lS)SO*u, while In BritEdn unemployment tended to increase.
Towards tho close of the 1950’s there was oîüy one job vacancy for 
every school-leaver and for every four job applicants of other types 
but in I960 five job vacancies for every school-leaver and ten Job 
vucanoiea for every eight job applioanta of other tyjïcs in Japan <3)*
Thus labour shortages have become general mpd increasingly acute in 
roeont yeara there*
(1) Lord Beveridge, Full Employment in a  F ree Society (1944), p. 1,
(2) School-leavers and university graduates accounted for only less 
than one third of the newly hired employees during 1966 and 1967 
and the rem ainder were Job-clmngers (Source: Ministry of Labour,
Employment Trend Survey).
(3) Source: lü n ta try  of Labour, Employment Security S tatistics.
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2. Labour Demand and Wages Movements
The quantitative analysis ol the relationship between wages 
and probable explanatory variables has been developed rapidly since
A. W. Phillips f irs t showed, by way of what was la te r called the 
"Phillips curve", that in respect of sta tistica l data on wages and 
unemployment covering 1801-1057 in B-r itatn, tliere v/as a stable 
relatiOBship between the rate of change of money wage rates (AW) 
and the level of tmemployment (IT)* or the rate of change of unemploy­
ment i A Ü), ’except in or immediately aft^r those years in which 
there was a very rapid rime in import prices** (1) Thereafter 
K*0* XJpsey confirmed that a relationship Wtween A w and IT, 
existed, though that between A W and A IT wan negatived, but 
refuted that the reletionebip was stable over the whole period, as 
Phillips asserted , (2)* Llpscy found that the observations in the 
1950*$ ’definitely lie above t!ie curve fitted to the ninteenth-century 
data’ and suggested that for any given level of demand for labour, 
wages were now pushed up by increased union power faster than 
previously (which he called ’institutional shift’). <3) Other em pirical 
atudiea; also suggested that the level of labour demand was an 
important factor affecting wage movements in the post-v/ar years (4).
(1) A,W. Phillips, "The Relationship between Unemployment and The
Hate of Change of Money Wage Hates in the United Kingdom, 1861- 
1957". Economica vol. 25 (19Ô8), pp. 283-99,
(2) E .G . Ldpsoy, "Can There Be a Valid Theory of W ages?", Adv.
Soi. Vol. 19 (1965), pp. 105-12.
(3) ibid.
<4) For example, L.A . Bicks-Mireaux, "The Interrelationship between
Cost and Price Changes, 1946-1969: a Study of Inflation in Post­
war Britain", Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 13 (1961), pp. 267-02; 
and L .R . Kloln'sinîî E .J .  Balli"'"’*'Somo Econometrics of the 
Determination of Absolute P rices and w ages". Economic Journal, 
vol. 69 (1959), pp. 465-82.
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I:W tWe view hw been cUmlkuiged by Blae# who &rg%0& iliat 'excels
aa by thq level of utiomploymont doo% mot appear to
have muule a aigrilfioamt oox t^rlbuUon to the cKplamatlom of the variance 
in wage i'ate$ over tho period 1102I-61* * H) There ie yet mo alga for 
the oottlamemt of thi6! ooatroveray eyrroimdlng mnomployment (or 
m ùQ iîB  cleraaacl) and tmion power im  dotomtmant*:  ^ of mioaey wagoa.
For example, tho National limtitate BJoonomio fUwlew hao prookdmod 
tho opposing views that *the level of pEo-mjploymohl W fomnd to havo a 
atroag Mluonoo. * (2) and, in one of it.e later iosnos. tliat *tbo orthodox 
•PMIIipo’ typo explanation atmply doos not apply.^ (3), In Japan, 
there have also boon several attompta to apply a Pîülltpjg-Lîpaey^type 
model to tho Japanese labour rnarkat^ whioh rosnltod in a good 
statistical fit (4).
y/e have alao tested, by a simple correlation analysis, 
tho relationships between A W mid the level of labour demand (as
!.nea3«rod In to ram of Î1. At)', nnfillod vaoaacios. or a combination
of them! and between wage differentials and differ one 03 in the level of 
labour demand <5). Hero are oonie results from it. CkmeraUy. the 
wage level or A w i» found to he for moro strongly oasoeiatod with
(I) iUO. Bine*, op. eit.
V4) National Institute Economie IIoview. no. 45 (10001, pp. 53*07.
(31 ibETT'HondTïïM^
(4) T. vyntabe, ’^Cldngin Dukka no Kankei to anno Seioaliutaki Iml".
H. ïiuniagai and W. Watabe (e d s .) . Hlhon«sio Buhko (19501. pp. 
65*07. Be concluded that the rate of tmemployment imd Ih# rate 
of wage luerease were very strongly associi«ited v4tb each ether 
over tho years 1030*30 and 1055-‘64 but union donoity itse lf explained 
little  about clianges in W.
(&) Our aimlyaio covers mainly ■the laet decade or bo (8ee Appendices
X-XII, XIV, XVI and VIII.)
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the level of labour demand in Japan than in Britain, F irs t, tho rate 
of wageincrease is more related to the level of unemployment 
(correlation coefficient r  ” *0.3973 for the U.K. and r  -  - 0,7914 for 
Japan) than the rate of unemployment ( r f  « 0.3073 for the U.K. and 
r  “ * 0.6018 for Japan), But tho level of demand as m easured m term s 
of unfilled vacancies better explains changes in the rate of wage increase 
in both coiuitrioa (r 0,7153 for the U.K., and r  « « 0.0161 for Japan),
In Britain, as the ratio of unfilled vacancies to tho labour force 
increased, tho ra te  of wage increase rose as well in the 1960*s, In 
Japan, A W moved inversely with changes in the ratio  of Job 
applicants to unfilled vacancies, in other words* the dec line of this 
ratio  (the rate of excess supply) concurred with increases in AW.
In Britain, tho corrolation between the industry wage level 
and the industry unemployment rate or unfilled vacancies as percentage 
of tho labour force is not significant (r  ” 0,2636 and r  * « 0,1303) but 
that between the industry rate of wage increase and changes in the 
industry unemployment rate or ratio of unfilled vacancies to the labour 
force is a little better (r  = 0*3385 and r  ” * 0.3683 respectively)*
Although it may imply that wage increases in a given industry concurred 
with decreases in tho industry's labour demand, it seem s that the 
inter*iadustr)'^ wage differentials in Britain cannot bo accounted for 
very much by differences between industries in labour-demand pressures: 
in other words, it is obvious that the industry wage increases were not 
due to its excess demand for labour.
As regards the relationship between the regional wage level
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and the level of labour demand in the region, there is found only a 
very weak correlation between thorn in both Britain and Japan 
(r   ^ - 0.2733 for Britain and r  * 0.1236 for Japan). If wo fit a 
non-linear curve to them, like the Phillips curve (1), a better-fitted 
relation may be found, though with exceptions (Figure 8 - 2  and 
8 r. 3), But these exceptions are explicable: the South-Western
and East Anglia regions are both main agricultural regions, within 
which there is no important industrial centre, but close to an important 
industrial area , namely the South East; Northern Kanto, Orokai, and 
Sani«in are  also agricultural regions close to large industrial areas 
such as Tokyo, Nagoya, ami Osaka; so that in these regions an absence 
of industry (and thus lack of labour demand) and potential (relative) 
underemployment in agriculture have contributed to a low regional wage 
level and ease of access to industrial centres has eliminated overt 
unemployment. Northern Kyushu, another exception in Japan, was 
once a very prosperous region with coal «mining and heavy indiB tries 
so that ite ^regional wage level had traditionally been high despite the 
decline of those industries which, in turn, increased unemployment in 
the region. In this connection, we have found that the regional level 
of the starting pay of new school-leavers is fairly strongly associated 
with the regional level of demand for them in Japan (r  ” 0.6897) and 
that interregional differences in their pay level are  very em ail, despite 
largo differences in the x’egional level of labour demand, except for
(1) See A .P . Thirlwall; ’*Eegional Phillips Curve", in Oxford
University Institute of Economics and Statistics, Bulletin (February, 
1970).
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F i g u r e  8 - 2
Great  B r i t a i n :  R e g io n a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  median e a r n in g s  
o f  f u l l - t i m e  men pa id  f o r  a f u l l  week 
as p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  median f o r  whole  
B r i t a i n ,  September,  I 9 6 8  and r e g i s t e r e d  
unemployed as  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  l a b o u r  f o r c e  
(monthly a ve r age )  i n  I 9 8 8
100
W a.?e l e v e l
SE: South East
EA: E as t  A n g l i a
SW: South Western
WV; West Midlands
EM: East  M^’ d lands
YH: Y or k sh ir e  &
Humberside
NW : North Western
No: North
Wa: Wales
Sc: S c o t la n d
Unemployment  
r a t e  (^)
Wage l e v e l  
1 2 0  +
110
100
90
8 0
F i g u r e  8 - 3
Japan: R e g ion a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  a v e r a g e  annual  income  
from employment per employee i n  196Q, and 
th e  p e r c e n t a g e  r a t i o  o f  job  a p p l i c a n t s  to  
v a c a n c i e s  r e g i s t e r e d  w i t h  P u b l i c  Employment 
O f f i c e s ,  i n  I 9 6 8
A: Hokkaido
B: Tohoku
C: Southern Kanto
D: Northern Kanto
E: Hokuriku
F: Tokai
G: K eih a n sh in
H: Kinki
I : S a n - i n
J: San-yo
K: Shikoku
L: Northern Kyushu
M: Southern  Kyushu
M
L e ve l  o f  e x c e s s  
l a b o u r  demand
Source:  Employment and P r o d u c t i v i t y  G a z e t t e ;  Enployment S t a t u s  Survey  
and Year book o f  Labour S t a t i s t i c s .
2  Ly
Wage 
level 
HO
jffQ
(jo ■
no
Figure 8 - 4
Japan; Relationship between the regional level of the 
starting pay of school leavers and the ratio of 
job vacancies for them to applicants in 19^9
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Source; Ministry of Labour, Shinlci Gakusotsuha Shoninkyu Chosa,
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those rogioîia wMcU are rem otest from any industrial centre (like 
Hokkaido and Tohoku in the north and Kyushu in the e©uth)or 
traditionally low-wage and industry-absent regions (lilce San-in) and 
liavo a low level of labour demand (See Figure S - 4).
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CHAPTER 9 
C O N C L U S I O N
1. Findings
P rices
<1> The pace of price increase tended to accelerate gradually
in the 1900's in Britain, while the ra te  of increase in consumer 
prices in Japan rose rapidly in the f irs t half of the decade and 
remained at a high level thereafter.
<2> Consumer prices in Japan rose considerably faster in the
f irs t half of the 1960's and slightly faste r tlian in Britain.
<3) By contrast, other price indexes - wholesale. Import and
export - remained fairly stable in Japan, as compared to 
Britain where these prices rose relatively fast particularly 
after devaluation in 1967.
(4) The movements in prices, especially import, wholesale and 
export p rices, a re  more closely related to one another in 
Britain than in Japan where tlie association between wholesale 
and consumer prices is weak.
(5) The movements in import prices between the two countries 
a re , as might be expected, highly correlated  but not so for 
export p rices.
(6> One of the main differences in the im port price structure
between both countries is that the prices of foodstuff which 
constitutes one third of B ritain 's total im ports rose considerably.
(7) The prices of basic m aterials, fuel and capital goods in
Britain rose, while those in Japan remained almost stable.
2 2 2
<8) The wholesale prices of iron and steel and products of
engineering industries rose in Britain and remained fairly stable 
in Japan, while the prices of domestic farm  products remained 
almost stable in Britain and rose very much in Japan.
(9) Tho prices of housing and services rose rapidly, which 
contributed to the increases in the consumer price level in general 
in both counti'ies.
(10) One of the main differences in the consumer price structure 
is that the increases in the prices of food (which contributed most 
to the rise  of tho general price level) In Japan and in the prices 
of fuel and light in Britain were most rem arkable.
Wages
(1) The pace of wage increase accelerated in the la tte r half of 
the 1960's, an compared with the preceding decade, particularly 
in Japan and it was generally faster there than in Britain.
(3) Although a high rate of wage increase tended to be accompanied
by a higlî rate of price increase, the rate of increase in real wages 
was high when the increases in wages and prices were both slow, 
in both countriea during the laat two decades,
(3) Movements in wages were more closely related to consumer 
prices than wholesale prices, while the degree of association 
between those two variables is higher in Japan than in Britain.
(4) Wage dispersion, particularly downward spread, is generally 
much la rger in Japan than in Britain.
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<5) Apart from wider wage dispersion in Japan, the wage
structures of both countries are  alike in msuny ways: the ranking 
of occupations and industries (as far as manufacturing industries 
a re  concerned) is very sim ilar; large firm s tend to pay more 
than sm all firm s; the wage level la industrial areas with a large 
agglomeration of population is higher than that in agricultural 
areas; as fa r as male employees are  concerned, their sa laries 
tend to rise  with their age up to their th irties in Britain and to 
the ir forties in Japan; age differentials for female workers are  
narrow er than those for m ales.
(6) In both countries there is a tendency for wage differentials 
to narrow in the long run, although they seem  to have increased 
in the 19§0's in Britain.
(7) In Japan, the wages of workers in low-wage occupations, 
industries, regions or sm all firm s, or of female and young 
workers, rose faster than the average, which resulted in a general 
contraction of wage dispersion.
(8) The industry rate of wage increase was, though weakly, 
positively related to the industry wage level in Britain but 
negatively in Japan*
Productivity
(1) The industry wage level and rate of productivity growth are 
positively associated with each other in both countries but the 
association is much stronger in Japan than in Britain where it is 
not very significant,
(2) There is no correlation bot^veen the industry rates of wage 
increase and productivity growth in Britain but,, though weak, some
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negative correlation between them in Japan,
(3) Productivity growth is strongly ansociatod with output
expansion in both countries and price increases are  negatively 
associated with productivity growth in Japan but not In Britain,
Trade Unions
(1) In Britain the rate of increase in the general level of money 
wages and union density (the percentage of employees in trade 
unions), o r the rate  of change in it, are  positively associated, 
while in Japan the form er is negatively related to union density 
and positively to the rate of change in union density#
(2) In Britain the industry wage level is positively, though very 
weakly, associated with the industry union density, while In Japan 
there is a fslrly  good negative correlation between tho industry 
union density and the industry wage level o r rate of wage 
increase#
(3) On the whole, trade-union density, o r tho rate of change In 
it, does not explain very much about movements in wages, as 
the correlations between these variables a rc  not very strong*
But we can say with some confidence that in Japan union density 
is irrelevant to movements in wages (because the correlation 
between them is negative at both aggregate and industry levels).
Labour Demand
<1) In both Britain and Japan the rate of wage increase is
negativel)^ related to either the level o r rate of unemployment.
225
though the correlation coefficients for them are  very weak 
(perhaps not very significant) for Britain, as compared with 
those for Japan which are  quite high.
(2) Xn both countries the rate of unfilled vacancies is much 
more strongly associated with the rate of wage increase and the 
degree of association between them is very much higher for 
Japan.
(3) Differences between industries in the level of labour demand 
(as measured in term s of the rate of unemployment or unfilled 
vacancies) do not explain the industry wage level o r rate of wage 
increase but a high industry wage level tends to be associated
with a high hidustry rate of unemployment or a, low industry rate 
of unfilled vacancies, in Britain.
(4) The linear relationship between the regional wage level
and unemployment rate o r level of excess supply (as measured 
in term s of tho ratio of Job applicants to vacancies) lo weak for 
both countries but there seem s to be a significant non-linear 
relationship between them, like a "Phillips curve".
(5) On the whole, the level of labour demand far better
explains the movements in wages in Japan than in Britain,
Money supply, e tc .
(1) The rate of increase in wages is negatively (but positively
and moro strongly if we allow for tim e lags) correlated to that 
In money supply in Britain but there is no such correlation In 
Japan,
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(2) The movements in the wage level and money supply are
closely associated v/ith one another in both countries.
<3) The pattern of industrial concentration is sim ilar between
the two countries; The level of industrial concentration is high 
am ong the heavy and chemical industries and low among the 
light Industries, serv ices, distributive trades, construction, 
e tc ., with some exceptions.
(4) In oligopolistic industries, the degree of unionisation, the
wage level and the rate of productivity growth are generally high.
2. Wage Differentials and Labour Market Structure
Wage differentials spring from various source. In 
classical economic theory, which assumes perfect competition In 
both factor and product markots and homogeneity of labour, the wage 
diffex entials are essentially aacribed to differences between occupations 
in non-pecuniary advantages o r disadvantages incidental to the 
occupation and the cost of skill acquisition. This theory of 
occupational wage differentials explains nothing about other type» 
of differentials which do exist, except tliat these differential» arise  
from  differences in sk ill mix between firm s, industries o r regions. 
Even the existing occupational differentials seem  to be much wider 
than tho theory v/ould Justify. We have seen, in Chapter 4, that 
within a given occupation there is a wago dispersion which is often 
wider than that in the average wages between different occupations.
227
Wô have alao showed that there are genuine interregional, interindustry, 
o r in te r-firm  differentials: workers of a given oecupation in a high-
wage region, industry o r firm  earn  more ttmn their eounterparts in a 
low-wage region, industry or firm . To explain this, we have advanced 
a hypothesis that tîio labour m arket is structured or fragmented in 
varloiiD ways because of limited labour mobility and availability of 
m arket information. Apart from the occupational market# for certain 
types of labour which may bo organised on a nation-wdde basis, there 
are separate local m arkets catering for local industries and only 
weakly linked with one another by limited interregional migration of 
labour, and within the local market firme have developed an internal 
labour market which continuously and exclusive^ cetera for their own 
needs and which ia more or, less linked with tho external market ( i .e . 
local m arket as a  whole). Under these circum stances, some firm# 
or industries which h.avo advantages over others in profitability or 
labour productivity may, for various reasons (mentioned in Chapter 
5), pay their employees higher wages than the average. Capital and 
labour (including managerial and scientific talents) are  unevenly 
distributed among the regions. If new industries grow in some 
(usuaity urban) area , they draw labour and capital from within the 
area  or other areas but capital moves more swiftly between regions 
than labour does because the capital market is more highly developed 
by nation-wide financial institutions than the labour market and the 
cost of migration is much lower for the form er (except fixed capital) 
than the la tte r. As a resu lt, capital concentrates faster than labour
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in the prosperous area, while tho local labour m arket there tightens, 
despite tho presence of labour reserve elsewhere, so that wage 
differentials between the prosperous and other egions will widen.
Wider wage differentials in Japan than in Britain are 
essentially ascribed to larger differences in the level of labour demand 
and productivity (or profitability) between regions, industries or 
firm s owing to the rapid and unbalanced growth of the national economy. 
But at the same time the immaturity of tho labour market and relatively 
limited labour mobility Imvo retarded the narrowing of wage 
dlfferoatials. If a collective bargaining system, wore established on 
a national or industry-wide basis, as in Britain, it would play a role 
in reducing wage differentials between regions, industries, or firms 
within the industry in Japan as well. In this case, however, 
fundamental disequilibria between them would not be eliminated but 
could, on the coritrary, be aggravated: to put it in another way,
for example, artific ial wage levelling would increase unemployment 
in the low-wage, depressed area*, while labour shortages elsewhere 
rem ain unabated. In reality, fortunately (?) Japanese trade unions 
have not been in a position to play such a role so fa r, but the developing 
labour shortages have incroaeed labour mobility, which has resulted 
in a general contraction of wage differentials. Yet there remain 
gî‘eat ixnbalancea in the allocation of manpower and capital between 
regiona, industries or firm s.
It seem s that highly developed internal labour m arkets are  
.mo)/e common in Japan tliau in Britain. They have advantages and
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dtsadvantagos. Qm  of the snaln advantages iu. that the enployor iu 
more w iltog  to Bi.ako iHvestmonts In his employees in the form of 
Internal training o r othorwlae. This is haneflelal lo r not only tho 
employer Imt also hidivlclual employeoa Involved and tho nation m  a 
whole, for, from the employee's paint of view, it will load to his 
career development and from tho standpoint of the national eoonoîjiy.
It will lead to on increeso In the nnpply of jikllled labour and th%w 
the improvomont of the quality of tho nation's manpower. Another 
advantage \b that a stable and continuous employment eoupled with 
promotion prospocto within the firm  Is certainly oondoolve to the 
stability of management-labour relations there. à. third is that such 
a labour market strnotiire has contributed to tho development of 
multiple, sm all labour organisations and a doeentrali^ed collective 
bargaining syatem and thus prevented trade unlone from  monopolizing 
tho labour m arket. Wo therefore consider that tho Japanese 
labour market ki generally more competitive than the British counter­
part which is eharacterlood by Industry*wWo labour organisation# 
and a relatively centralised eolieetivo bargaining system . On the 
other hand, their most Important disadvantage Is that they impede 
labour mobility between firm s or industries and thu# an optimum 
allocation of manpower at maorooco?somic level. While there wa$ 
a largo labour reaerve, this was not a Borioutî problem. Now that 
full employment (in the sense that all workers are  In employment) 
hm  been roaliaed, however, the nmrt step is to eliminate pocket» of 
relative undoromploymout ( i .e . aubutcmclard-wage worker#) in tlie 
low-productivity sectors by shifting ouch workers to a more productive
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sector. But the fragmentation of the labour market at company level 
has made it difficult in Japan.
In any internal wage structure, if a particular pattern of wage 
relativities among the employees is strictly maintained by management 
or trade unions, irrespective of supply and demand conditions for each 
type of labour in the external market, wage drift may result from 
increases in the wages of particular groups of employees which are 
originally induced by changes in demand for them in tiie external 
market or otherwise. The system of age differentials in Japan and 
the systems of wage relativities between skilled and unskilled workers 
or between piece - and time - workers in Britain have often been 
important sources of wage drift.
3, Demand Pull or Cost Pmh7
The causes of price increases may be reduced to excess 
demand or cost push. As mentioned in Chapter 1, however, demand 
pull and cost push go hand in hand in the full-employment economy 
once Inflation gets under way. It is obvious that in Japan the pace at 
which consumer prices rose increased with accelerated economic 
growth in the IdGO's, but in Britain increases in consumer prices 
concurred with slow economic growth. This is one of the reasons why 
we suspect that price inflation in Japan has essentially been due to 
demand pull, while that in Britain may have been caused by cost push. 
Of course, economic growth brings about increases in production 
capacity and thus contributes to the elimination of excess demand.
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Ê vm  if  excess demand is eliminated by Increases in supply, however, 
certain  Increases in the price level may be inevitable with economic 
growth, because of the limited availability of resources and friction# 
Incidental to factor mobility. That 1# to nay, the transfer of labour 
(interregional migration and training) and capital (accelerated 
depreciation of fixed capital) entail# cost; and economic resource# 
like manpower, land, m inerals, water, etc, are  limited and have to 
be exploited in a more expensive way as what is easily available is 
exhausted, so that the marginal supply cost of national output may 
increase with its expansion, though technical progress may prevent 
the marginal supply cost from rising by making possible a more 
effective utilisation of these scarier, resources.
We Just suggested that price inflation in Britain might 
have taken place without a large excess of demand. This may be 
incorrect, however, for excess demand may Imve existed there; only 
it may not have been realised in output expansion for lack of Investment 
and production capacity. None the less there are  some evidence 
that excess demand, if any, might not be general (for example, 
unemployment level has tended to  drift upwards, particularly in retc.pnt 
years) in Britain, while demand generally increased in Japan becaume 
all industrie» expanded their employment there, Bxoe#» demand 
may arise  from, Investment, consumer expenditure, export# or 
government expenditure. During the laat decade, the increase In 
expenditure on domestic capital formation was most im pressive and 
its share In total national expenditure rapidly expanded in Japan,while 
it was less rem arkable in Britain.
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Tiible 9 - 1
Composition of Increases in National Expenditure 
Attributable to Various Sources, 1959 - 69:
U.K. Japan
Total expenditure 100 100
Consumer expenditure 43 43
Government exjsenditure 16 7
Gross domestic capital formation 25 40
Exports 10 10
Source; National Institute Economic Review and the Economic 
Planning Agency.
The increase in consumer expenditure can mainly be ascribed 
to rises  in income from emplojmxent. The sources of Investment 
funds are  undistributed profits, issue of securities, bank advances, or 
government loans. The issue of securities and undistributed profits 
a re  main sources of investment funds for B ritish firm s, whereas 
Japanese en terprises heavily depend on bank advances. Japanese 
firm s have been short of investment funds and banks, willing to make 
loans to them. Since Japanese banks also lacked money despite the 
high propensity of Japanese households to save, the central bank 
allowed tliem to overdraw. Thus the monetary authorities deliberately 
supplied money in quantities so as to encourage banks to lend inveatment 
funds to private enterprieea. As shov/n in Chapter 1, even if we 
allow for rapid economic growth in Japan, money supply rose s till 
considerably faster there than in Britain, It la , therefore, likely 
that excessive money supply contributed to tho r ise  in the price level 
through the creation of exceas demand, though the increase in money
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supply were not directly I'elated to rises  in the price level in Japan.
This is probably because the increases in money supply were used to
ca ter for investment, ra ther than for consumption, which created 
excess demand in the short run (sayq in the firs t half of the 1960's) 
but increased production capacity la ter (in the second half of the 
decade). Bank advances In Japan were concentrated in large manu­
facturing firm s, which brought about large improvements in p ro ­
ductivity and relative price stability there, as contrasted with rising 
prices of manufactured goods In Britain, while sm all firm s and 
agriculture which produced mainly consumer goods lagged behind in 
productivitjf grov/th and met mounting demand with price increases. 
These price increases cannot be accounted for by the assumption of 
oligopolistic market structure because these sectors a re  intrinsically 
competitive, though some of them are protected by government- 
initiated carte ls , in Japan. Wage costs in these traditional sectors 
also rose faster than those in the modern sector but this is due to 
labour shortages because workers employed in the form er are  not at 
all o r only poorly organised. Thus, the competitively determined 
prices rose fastest In Japan, while the prices of oligopolistic and 
high-productivity manufacturing sector rose as fast as those determined 
more competitively, in Britain.
In both Britain and Japan increases in consumer expenditure 
lagged behind those in other items (save government expenditure in 
Japan) in percentage term s and personal savings ratios rose during 
the last decade, so that we cannot ascribe general excess demand.
234
if any* particularly to the Increases In consumer expenditure. An 
excess of wage increases over productivity improvements causes a 
rise  in the cost of production. But these wage increases are not 
necessarily due to excessive wage claims by trade unions but maybe 
to labour sliortages. In Japan, wages rose faster in competitive, 
low-wage industries than in oligopolistic, high-wage industries in 
recent years . Since those low-wage Industrie» are not well 
organised, trade unions are not to blame for it. It seem s, therefore, 
moro roasonaîale to consider that labour shortages have pulled 
up low wages. In Britain wage advances in oligopolistic manufacturing 
industries were as large as o r sometimes larger than those in other 
industries and serv ices, In Japan increases in consumer price» 
mainly arose from excess demand for the products of lov/-productivity 
sectors like agriculture and sm all firm s in manufacturing and service», 
and the conseqiient rapid increases In the low wages of employees and 
the low incomes of self-employed persons working in these sectors 
and distributive trades (the la tte r increases were, of course, 
supported by excess demand for the products), Bore one might a»k 
why the prices of goods manufaetimed by the modern sector remained 
stable, instead of falling so as to offset the rises in the prices of 
those traditional secto rs. This may be better explained by the 
existence of the world m arket, which we shall discuss la te r.
Trade union influence on wages seem s to be much weaker 
in Japan ti^an in B ritain, We have also showed that the wage pattern» 
set by large firm s in leading industries did not have any great spill-
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over effect on tho wages of sm all firm s In Japan. Lastly, wage 
movements In Japan are most closely associated with changes in the 
level of labour demand, while the correlation between them in Britain 
was relatively very weakly. On the whole, we may conclude that 
Inflation in Japan has so far been more of a demand-pull type, while 
in Britain cost push elements have been more im portant,
4, Policy Implications
Inflation 1» a problem which almost all countries have 
suffered to a g reater or le sse r degree. This partly reflects the 
interdependence of national economies through international trade.
Tho higher the proportion of overseas trade in a country's national 
product, the more it will be affected by "inflation disease" prevailing 
in the world m arket. Rises in import prices push up the cost of 
domestic products and thus domestic prices and, perhaps, eventually 
export p rice s , In this connection, devaluation may red ress deficits 
in the balance of payment in the sliort run but at the same time have 
an adverse effect on domestic and export prices through rises in 
Import prices and induced wage increases in a longer run. This lias 
been shown by the British ease in recent y ea rs . Today nearly four 
fifths of the world's exports of manufactures are  supplied by six 
m ajor industrial countries, namely West Germany, the United States, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, France and Ital^’^ , We may well assume 
that each of them has a supply curve sloping upwards to the right 
( I .e . the price elasticity of supply is between zero and infinity) in 
the short run because of high employment prevailing in these countries
y
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or other lim itations. There Is reason to think that tho supply curve 
of tho root of the world also slope® upward® to the right in the short 
run. If one of the six induatrial countries puts up its export prices 
due to cost inflation at home ( o ,g  as in the United State® in the latter 
half of tho 1980’a), it will lose part of its share In the world market 
and other c-ountrlea will gain but at the same time the export price® 
of the gaining oountrios also tend to rise . If they do not raise 
their export prices, aurplusea in their balance of payments mount up 
and it must end up with the revaluation of their currency; the result 
will be a rise  in their export prices anyway. From  the standpoint 
of importing countries, a rise  in the export prices of manufactured 
goods is a rise  in their import prices, which may trigger off domestic 
inflation In these countries o r mako their term s of trade unfavourable. 
This produces further repercussions among them. For example, 
faced with rising import prices of manufactures, Arab oil-producing 
countries recently took a concerted action against industrial countries 
in putting up their export prices of oil, lntorn®tional oil companies 
have passed this price Increase on to consumers in industrial countries. 
Under these circumstances it is almost impossible for any free-trade 
country to stay immune from world-wide Inflation m easles and 
eradicate domestic inflation by its Own efforts alone, though it can 
reduce its rate of Inflation at home by absorbing increases in import 
prices through productivity improvements, Thus domestic anti- 
inflationary policies like monetary, fiscal or incomes policies are 
Inevitably viîlîiorable to inflationary trends in tho world m arket. V7e
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are , therefore, obliged to consider curbing domestic inflation 
within these lim its, unless there is a world-wide concerted attack 
against inflation (wMch is difficult to achieve because of great 
differences in national interests among the countries).
In this conte3£t Japanese industry ims so fa r  benefited 
from world-wide inflation, for it  has been able to expand it» exports 
without serious price competition abroad and import basic materials 
at relatively stable p rices. But this, in turn, implies that it has 
had no incentive to cut the prices of its manufactured goods at home, 
despite rapid productivity growth and output expansion in industry.
Bearing the above arguments in mind, we ohall discuss 
domestic anti «inflationary policies. F irs t, an incomes plicy is 
not effective except in those oomitries where there are strong 
national centres of trades unions and employers* associations which 
have control over their members and a centralised system  of 
collective bargaining. This is confirmed by the experiences of 
Britain whei'o thane conditiona have not been met and by those of 
Netherlands and Sweden which, with well.organised national federations 
of trade union® and employers* associations and a centralised 
collective bargaining syatom, have achieved aomo success in the 
implementation of incomes policies (1). In order for an incomes 
policy mainly directed towards the regulation of wages and sa la ries , 
like that in Western countries, to be effective in controlling cost push,
(1) Sec II.A . Turner and D .A .S. Jackon, "On tho Stability of Wage
Differences and Productivity-baaed Wage Policies: an Internatimial
Analysis", British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. vii, no. 1 
(1969), pp. i  I  17." .....
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Uvo oomUtiom aro nocoasary: CD wages and sa laries must 
constitute by far the greatest part of national income (Otherwise 
increases in other incom fs, which may also bo important sources 
of coot push, rem ain out of control); (ii) the collective bargaining 
system  must be centralised and the collective agreements stn iek 
under this system , muet regulate all importaxit components of the 
actual earnings of employees (Otherwise wage drift might undermine 
the regulatory effects of collective agreem ents), vVlten we look at 
the structures of trade unions and em ployers' associations and the 
collective bargaining system  in Japan, we cannot help but feel doubt 
about the likely effectiveness of an incomes policy, A voluntary 
incomes policy could have much leas chances of success because of 
the wide differences of opinion which exist between trade unions, 
OixiployerB and the government. To points to add are  that labour's 
share of national income in Japan is s till sm all, though increasing, 
as compared with Western countries (1) and that a considerable p a it 
of actual earnings or labour costs is outside the regulation of 
collective agreements in Japan. In order for an incomes pflicy to 
bo effectively imploxnented there (which the present cirGumstances 
do not seem  to I’equiro or justify), it will be essential to strengtiien 
o r create those national centres of trade unions and em ployers' 
associations which will have strong control over a substantial part 
of incomes from employment, and to establish a centralised
(1) Labour's sW re of national income (Income from employment as 
percentage of national income) was 70.0 per cent in 1969 in the 
U.K. and 55.0 per cent In 1007 in Japan (Source; Annual Abstract 
of Statistics and the Economic Planning Agency publication).
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coHoctï-Vü bargaining wyuWm and promote mutual uuderatandlng 
between trade imiouu, employers and the govomxneut.
S o o o m lly , tUo o ffa o t iv e u e s»  o f  d o m cn d -a cm tro l paM olc*
UR designed to ommtei' inflation may only bo tem porary. Tho 
Bqmom of gowmimont invostmont expenditure and money supply in 
general will curtail invcdtmont and re tard  oapittti formation which is 
essential to an increase in production capacity and producilvity, bq 
that it will weaken tho ability of a counlry to cope with wage advance» 
at home or inflation imported from abroad. This is proved by the 
Britlah experience in the past. In this context, to put a curb on 
consumer expenditure by increased tmm& may bo the best vmy to 
control demand in a longer run, though it ia politically moat unpopular. 
Thirdly, in tW em o  of Japan, as the oxpaneiou of demand and 
output and the changée In the Inchistrial structure have been rapid 
and great, aootoral escoea demand® have frequently arisen and 
fiioîtona Incklental to factor rmhüUy have boon large. We need 
more drastic policy m ew urm  for the facilitation of factor mobility 
than in a slow-growing economy îf price stability is to be achieved 
concurrently with rapid economic growth. The relative under- 
development of the labour market In Japan is partly reflected in wide 
wage dlfforontiaij there, l,,cibaur Is slow to u’love in response 
to excoas dommad mid high wages?. In tlda connection, the 
contraction of wage illfferentlala chouM be realised through labour 
mobility rather than tho raising of minimum wages or trades unions* 
initiatives because the la tte r may prevent tîie optimum allocation of 
labour among î-eglona, îîidu^trîea or ü n m t  îii oth#r word», if the
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wage level of the low «wage regions or Industries is artificially 
raised, imemployment may only laereaao tiiere, despite labour 
shortages elsewhere, and fundamental dîsequîlîbria will not be 
eliminated*
A p p e n d ix  I
IndiJE t r i a l  C o n c e n t r a t i o n  R a t i o s  i n  B r i t a i n  and J  a  nan;
The s h a r e  o f  t h e t h r e e  l a r g e s t  f i r m s  i n  t h e  t o t a
o u t p u t  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r y ,  i n 1958
U n i t e d  Kinpcdomî J  a p a n :
I n d u s t r y  g r o u p P e r  c e n t I n d u s t r y  g r o u p
Coal 100 Coal
(hood  ma nu f  a.c t u  r  i  ng  )
U i l k  p r o d u c t s 28 M ilk  powder
B u t t e r
F r e s h  m i l k
Bacon ,  m ea t  & f i s h  p r o d u c t s 21 Ham and s a u s a g e
G r a i n  m i l l i n g 35 F l o u r
Bre a d  & f l o u r  c o n f e c t i o n e r y 22
S u g a r 79 S u g a r
B i s c u i t s 39 B i s c u i t s  and c r a c k e r s
Cocoa ,  c h o c o l a t e  & s u g a r
c o n f e c t i o n e r y 42 Cocoa  and  c h o c o l a t e
Bre w ing  and  m a l t i n g 19 Beer
S p i r i t  d i s t i l l i n g  and S e i s h u  ( s a k e )
com pound ing 50 - 6 0 Shochu
Whisky
Y e a s t
V e g e t a b l e / a n i m a l  o i l s  & f a t s 55 S o y a - b e a n  o i l
S h o r t e n i n g s
M a r g a r i n e 71 M a r g a r i n e
S o f t  d r i n k s ,  c i d e r s ,  e t c d 33 M ayonna i se
S t a r c h  & m i s c e l l a n e o u s  goods  22 Soya  s a u c e
F r u i t s  & v e g e t a b l e  p r o d u c t s 34 Monosodium g l u t a m a t e
Tobacco 81 Tobacco
( T e x t i l e s  and c l o t h i n g )
C o t t o n / r a y o n  s p i n n i n g  & Raw s i l k
d o u b l i n g 22 C o t t o n  y a r n
C o t t o n / r a y o n  w e a v i n g 11 Rayon s t a p l e  y a r n
W ooll en  and  w o r s t e d 8 W oo l le n  y a r n
W ool len  f a b r i c s
J u t e 42 Hemp y a r n
ITa.rrow f a b r i c s 15 C o t t o n  f a b r i c s
M i s c e l l a n e o u s  t e x t i l e s 15 S i l k  & man-made f i b r e
T e x t i l e  f u r n i s h i n g 20
Men and b o y s ’ o u t w e a r 22
Women’ s / g i r l s '  o u t w e a r 10
H o u s e h o ld  t e x t i l e s 7
D r e s s / l i n g e r i e ,  e t c . 3
O v e r a l l s ,  s h i r t s ,  e t c . 8
W e a t h e r p r o o f 10
H o s i e r y  & k n i t t e d  goods 9
Lace 11
C o r s e t s  & m i s c e l l a n e o u s d r e s s  12
Rope ,  n e t  and t w i n e 33
p e r  c e n t  
2 7 . 0
75.8
84.4
3 3 .6  
2 6 . 1*
53.9
31.4
27.7
2 9 . 1 *
9 8 . 1
3 . 0
3 6 . 7  
92. 7*
5 4 . 8  
2Ü.3
4 9 . 3
5 3 . 3  
9 2 . 9 *
2 0 . 4  
8 9 . 3
100
17.5
13.2
24.7
9 . 9*
6 4 . 4
7.7
4 . 1*
11
C a r p e t s  29
B e d d i n g ,  e t c .  22
C a n v a s s  g o o d s ,  s a c k s , e t c .  15
Kelts,  c a p s  & m i l l i n e r y  13
( C h e m i c a l s  and a l l i e d  p r o d u c t s )
F e r t i l i s e r s  & p e s t i c i d e s
G e n e r a l  c h e m i c a l s
B y e s t u f f s
S y n t h e t i c  p l a s t i c s  & r e s i n s  
C o a l - t a r  p r o d u c t s
Soap ,  d e t e r g e n t s ,  e t c
T o i l e t  p r e p a r a t i o n s  
P o l i s h e s  
Man-made f i b r e s
P a i n t  & p r i n t e r s ’ iiBc
F x p l o s i v e s  & f i r e w o r k s
M i n e r a l - o i l  r e f i n i n g
L u b r i c t i n g  o i l s  & g r e a s e
R ubber
G l a s s
Cement
B r i c k s  & r e f r a c t o r y  goods
A s b e s t o e s
A b r a s i v e s
C h a l k ,  c l a y ,  s a n d  & g r a v e l  
P o t t e r y
(M e ta l  m a n u f a c t u r e )
I r o n  and  s t e e l  ( g e n e r a l )  
I r o n  c a s t i n g s
54
33
74
54
41
69
P h a r m a c e u t i c a l  p r e p a r a t i o n s  23
25
50
89
23
75
43
32
50
70
22
62
61
18
15
30
18
Ammonium s u l f a t e  
U r e a
Lime n i t r o e g e n  
C a lc ium  s u p e r p h o s p h a t e  
BHC powder  
C a u s t i c  s o d a  
C a lc ium  c a r b i d e  
S u l p h u r i c  a c i d  
P h e n o l  ( s y n t h e t i c )
S y n t h e t i c  dye s t u f f s
P h e n o l i c s
P o l y u r e t h a n e s
Phtha.1 i c  a l k y d
P o l y - v i n y l  c h l o r i d e
U n s a t u r a t e d  p o l y e s t e r s
C e l l u l o s e  b a s e
E t h y l e n e
P o l y e t h y l e n e
S t y r e n e  u o l y m e r s
S y t h e t i c  d e t e r g e n t s
P h a r m a c e u t i c a l  p r e p a r a t i o n s
Rayon f i l a m e n t  y a r n  
Rayon s t a p l e  
S y n t h e t i c  f i b r e s  
P a i n t
P r i n t e r ’ s i n k  
I n d u s t r i a l  e x p l o s i v e s  
P h o t o g r a p h i c  f i l m  
P e t r o l e u m  p r o d u c t s
S y n t h e t i c  r u b b e r
G1 as  s
Cement
R e f r a c t o r y  b r i c k s
Wire  & w i r e  m a n u f a c t u r e s  
k i s c s l i a n e o u s  m e t a l  goo d s
23
7
P i g  i r o n
I r o n  t u b e s
S t e e l  t u b e s
S t e e l  i n g o t s
Hot  r o l l e d  p r o d u e d s
C old  r o l l e d  p r o d u c L s
L i g h t  r o l l e d  p r o d u c t s
T i n p l a t e
Wire
Copper  p r o d u c t s
37 .7
59 .0
7 4 .5  
4 3 . 9
6 0 . 7
32 .5  
4 2 . 3*
24.6 
9 2 . 1* 
58.3 
43. 9* 
4 0 . 1* 
4 8 . 2 *
38 .1  
7 2 . 3 *  
7 1 . 0  
8 0 . 3 *  
80 . 6*
100 *
5 9 . 3 * *
2 6 .8 * *
6 2 . 8
30.9
76.4 
27. 3*
48.3
79.5
100
3 7 . 3
100
100
4806
2 3 . 9
7 1 . 8
9 2 .3  
5 9 .1
5 2 .4  
5 2 . 0  
5 8 .4 *  
6 1 .9 *  
8 3 .5 *
2 1 .9 *
I l l
N o n - f e r r o u s  m e t a l s 21 E l e c t r i c  c o p p e r 6 5 , 8
E l e c t r i c  s i n e 7 7 . 7
Aluminium 100
F a b r i c a t e d  a lu m in iu m 4 3 . 7
I n s u l a t e d  w i r e  & c a b l e 57 I n s u l a t e d  w i r e  & c a b l e 3 9 .1
Cens and m e t a l  b o x e s  45“ 60 Cans 7 9 . 9*
I n d u s t r i a l  p l a n t  & s t e e l w o r k 16 S t e e l w o r k 1 4 . 6 *
E n g i n e e r s ’ s m a l l  t o o l s ,  e t c . 12 B r i d g e - g i r d e r s 4 5 . 6*
T o o l s  and  i m p l e m e n t s 19 W eld ing  s t i c k s 7 7 . 9*
B o l t s ,  n u t s ,  r i v e t s ,  e t c . 29
C u t l e r y 49
( E n g i n e e r i n g  i n d u s t r i e s )
I n d u s t r i a l  e n g i n e s 42 T u r b i n e s 7 8 . 2*
E n g i n e s  f o r  l a n d  t r a n s p o r t
m a c h i n e r y 5 1 . 0
A g r i c u l t u r a l  m a c h i n e r y 46 Power c u l t i v a t o r s 5 5 . 3*
( e x c e p t  t r a c t o r s ) T r a c t o r s 9 3 . 5*
E x c a v a t o r s 8 5 . 6
Machine  t o o l s 18 L a t h e s 4 0 . 5
F r a i s e s 67 06
M e c h a n i c a l  h a n d l i n g 22 M e ta l  p r e s s 3 8 . 4*
G e n e r a l  m e c h a n i c a l  e n g i n e e r i n g  , T e x t i l e  m a c h i n e r y 4 3 . 4
10 Pumps 4d.O*
M i s c e l l a n e o u s  m a c h i n e r y 8 Sewing  m a c h in e s 2 7 . 3
T e x t i l e  m a c h i n e r y 38 G a n t r y  c r a n e s 3 7 . 7*
O f f i c e  m a c h i n e r y 40 C opy ing  m a c h i n e s 9 3 . 3*
O rdna nc e  & s m a l l  arms 60 B a l l  b e a r i n g s 7 0 . 1
E l e c t r i c a l  m a c h i n e r y 43 E l e c t r i c  g e n e r a t o r s 6 9 . 5
E l e c t r i c  m o to r s 5 3 . 7
M i s c e l l a n e o u s  e l e c t r i c  goods 30 T r a n s f o r m e r s ( s t a n d a r d ) 5 4 . 4
T r a n  s fo rm e  r s ( n o n - s  t  a n d a r d ) 6 6 .3
E l e c t r i c  a p p l i a n c e s  ( d o m e s t i c )  45 E l e c t r i c  r e f r i g e r a t o r s 7 1 . 4
F l u o r e s c e n t  l am ps 8 1 . 1
T e l e p h o n e  & t e l e g r a p h A u t o m a t i c  t r a n s m i t t e r s 7 9 . 8*
a p p a r a t u s 58 R a d a r s 6 2 . 0 *
R a d io  & e l e c t r i c  a p p a r a t u s 19 T e l e v i s i o n  s e t s 5 2 . 4
T r a n s i s t o r i s e d  r a d i o  s e t s 7 3 . 8 *
B a t t e r y 6 9 . 6*
M oto r  v e h i c l e s 47 O r d i n a r y  goods  v e h i c l e s 7 4 . 8*
M oto r  c y c l e s  & c y c l e s 57 L i g h t  goods  v e h i c l e s 9 2 . 8*
L o c o m o t i v e s  & t r a c k O r d i n a r y  p a s s e n g e r  c a r s 8 3 . 9*
e q u i p m e n t  60 -  82 L i g h t  p a s s e n g e r  c a r s 100 *
R a i l w a y  c a r r i a g e s  & wagons 62 Motor  c y c l e s 5 5 . 7*
S h i p b u i l d i n g  & m a r i n e E l e c t r i c  l o c o m o t i v e s 7 1 . 6
e n g ! n e e r i n g 30 R a i l w a y  wagons 5 7 . 2
A i r c r a f t  p r o d u c t i o n  & r e p a i r  42 S t e e l  s h i p s 3 1 . 8
W atches  and c l o c k s 65 W atches 100
S c i e n t i f i c  i n s t r u m e n t s 24 P h o t o g r a p h i c  c a m e r a s 3 7 . 3
P i a n o s 81 .  5*
M a tc h e s 1 9 . 8
( o t h e r  m a n u f a c t u r i n g )
P a p e r  and  b o a r d 32 P a p e r 3 6 . 0
P a p e r  and  b o a r d  p r o d u c t s 21 N e w s p r i n t 5 8 . 4*
I V
S t a t  I o n e r s ’ goods 27 Board 1 9 . 3*
C a r d b o a r d  b o x e s ,  c a r t o n s 25 C a r d b o a r d 2 9 . 9*
Tim h e r 4 Plywood 9 . 6*
Wooden c o n t a i n e r s  5c b a s k e t s 7 S o l u b l e  woodpulp 7 1 . 0*
H i s c o l 1 a n e o u s  w o o d / c o r k
p r o d u c t s 6 Woodpulp f o r  p a p o r m a k in g 3 1 . 2*
F u r n i t u r e  & u p h o l s t e r y 8 S c h o o l  t e x t b o o k s 3 8 . 5*
G e n e r a l  p r i n t i n g  & p u b l i s h i n g 8
Newspaper  & p e r i o d i c a l s 26
F u r 10
L e a t h e r  t a n n i n g  d r e s s i n g 10 B u i l d i n g  c o n s t r u c t i o n 1 3 . 6 *
L e a t h e r  goods 9 C i v i l  e n g i n e e r i n g 6 . 5
Li  lie oleum & l e a t h e r  c l o t h 53 D e p a r t m e n t  s t o r e s 2 7 . 2*
F o o t w e a r 10 B a n k in g  b u s i n e s s 2 1 . 8
F a b r i  G a te d  n i a s  t  i. c s 10 S e c u r i t i e s  h a n d l i n g 4 7 . 4*
G e l a t i n e ,  a d h e s i v e s ,  e t c . 42 L i f e  i n s u r a n c e 4 2 . 9
M i s c e l l a n o o u s  m a n u f a c t u r e s 38 A c c i d e n t  i n s u r a n c e 3 4 . 8
î l a n d t r u c k ,  p e r a m b u l a t o r s , e t c . 32 S h i p p i n g 2 8 . 1*
Toys and  s p o r t s  goo d s 31 W a re h o u s in g 2 0 . 5
J e w e l l e r y ,  p r e c i o u s  m e t a l s 22 Com merc ia l  TV b r o a d c a s t i n g 3 5 . 6*
G l o v e s 19 E l e c t r i c i t y 5 1 .1
Shop and  o f f i c e  f i t t i n g 13
B r u s h e s  and b r o o m s . 21
Q u a r r y i n g  & c o n t r a c t o r s '
p l a n t 27
M i s c e l l a n e o u s  b u i l d i n g
m a t e r i a l s 19
C o n s t r u c t i o n 4
N o t e s — The f i g u r e s  w i t h  one a s t e r i s k  
two a s t e r i s k s ,  f o r  1 9 6 3 .
i re  f o r  I 96O and  t h o s e  w i t h
S o u r c e :  F o r  t h e  U.K. f i g u r e s ,  A. H u n t e r ,  Monopoly and  C o m p e t i t i o n  ( i 9 6 0 ) 
p p . 1 0 3 - 7 ;  and  f o r  t h e  J a p a n e s e  f i g u r e s ,  F a i r  T r a d e  Com m iss ion ,  
N ihon  no S a n g y o s h u c h u , 1963 -19o6  ( 1 9 0 9 ) ,  p p .  I 6 I - 8 7 ,
Appendix II
I n d e x  NumbcrG o f  I n d u s t r i a l  P r o d u c t i o n  i n  I 9 6 7 , t n k i n r  
i 960 (1963  f o r  J a p a n )  a s  a b a s e  y e a r
U n i t e d  Kingdom: I 9 6 0  = 100 J a p a n :  I 963 = 100
T o t a l  118
M in in g  91
T o t a l ,  a l l  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  119
Food 113
Coke,  o v e n s , o i l  r e f i n e r i e s  125
G e n e r a l  c h e m i c a l s  142
E n g i n e e r i n g  & a l l i e d ,  t o t a l  I I 8
E n g i n e e r i n g  & e l e c t r i c a l
g o o d s  134
S h i p b u i l d i n g  & m a r i n e
e n g i n e e r i n g  87
V e h i c l e s ( i n c .  a i r c r a f t )  103
Met a l  goo d s  n . e . s .  98
M e ta l  m a n u f a c t u r e  
F e r r o u s  97
f o n - i e r r o u s  98
T e x t i l e s  IO4
L e a t h e r ,  f u r ,  e t c ,  87
C l o t h i n g  and f o o t w e a r  102
E r i . c k s ,  p o t t e r y ,  g l a s s , e t c .  133
T i m b e r ,  f u r n i t u r e ,  e t c .  145
P a p e r ,  p r i n t i n g  & p u b l i s h i n g  I I 8
O t h e r  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  103
T o t a l
M in in g
A l l  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
Food
P e t r o l e u m  & c o a l  p r o d u c t ;
C h e m ic a l s
M a c h i n e r y
I r o n  and  s t e e l  
N o n - f e r r o u s  m e t a l s  
T e x t i l e s
L e a t h e r  & l e a t h e r  goods
C e r a m ic s
T imber
P a p e r  and woo d - p u 1 p 
Ot h e r  m a n u f a c t u r i n g
161
104
164
134
188
164
187
192
165
143
113
151
123
145
161
S o u r c e :  M o n th ly  D i g e s t  o f  S t a t i s t i c s  and  S t a t i s t i c a l  A b s t r ; c t  o f  J;
V I
Appendix III
Changes  i n  S t r u c t u r e  o f  R e l a t i v e  P r i c e s
lo  Consumer  P r i c e s
Changes  i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  p r i c e  l e v e l  have  b e e n  a c co m p a n ie d  by 
c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  and i n  t h e  l a t t e r  a g a i n  
t h e r e  a r e  some r e m a r k a b l e  c o n t r a s t s  b e tw e e n  B r i t a i n  and  J a p a n ,  As 
a l r e a d y  m e n t i o n e d  i n  C h a p t e r  3 ,  c onsum er  p r i c e s  h a v e  b e e n  r i s i n g  a t  a 
h i g h e r  r a t e  i n  J a p a n  t h a n  i n  B r i t a i n  s i n c e  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  19 e O ’ s ,  
Among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  f o o d  p r i c e s  showed t h e  h i g h e s t  r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  and  
c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  a  l a r g e  p a r t  o f  t h e  r i s e s  i n  t h e  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  l e v e l  i n  
J a p a n ,  w h i l e  t h e  B r i t i s h  r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  i n  f o o d  p r i c e s  was much more 
m o d e r a t e  (See  T a b l e  I I I  -  1 i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p a g e ) .  The i t e m  which  
d i s p l a y e d  by f a r  t h e  l a r g e s t  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e  among t h e  B r i t i s h  consum er  
p r i c e s  i s  h o u s i n g ,  f o l l o w e d  by f u e l  and l i g h t ,  s e r v i c e s ,  and m i s c e l l a n e ­
o us  g o o d s .  But  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t  may be m i s l e a d i n g  b e c a u s e  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  
some s u b - i t e m s  w i t h i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  i t e m ,  l i k e  ' b o o k s ,  n e w s p a p e r s  and 
p e r i o d i c a l s ’ among t h e  m i s c e l l a n e o u s  g o o d s ,  i n c r e a s e d  much f a s t e r  t h a n  
t h o s e  o f  o t h e r  s u b - i t e m s  i n  t h e  same commodity g r o u p ,  a s  showed i n  T a b l e  
I I I - 2 c  The i t e m s  " h o u s i n g "  arm " m i s c e l l a n e o u s  goods  and s e r v i c e s "  
r e g i s t e r e d  t h e  s e c o n d  h i g h e s t  r a t e  o f  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e  i n  J a p a n ,  th o u g h  
t h e  a c t u a l  m a g n i t u d e  o f  t h e  r i s e  i n  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  h o u s i n g  i n  J a p a n  
seems t o  ha v e  b e e n  u n d e r v a l u e d  by B r i t i s h  s t a n d a r d s  b e c a u s e  i t  i n c l u d e s  
d u r a b l e  h o u s e h o l d  goods  w h ic h  i s  a  s e p a r a t e  i t e m  i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  c l a s s i ­
f i c a t i o n  and whose p r i c e s  ha v e  b e e n  among t h e  s t a b l e s t  i n  J a p a n  a s  w e l l  
a s  i n  B r i t a i n .  The l a n d  p r i c e s  i n  J a p a n  h a v e  be e n  s o a r i n g  t o  s u c h  an 
e x t e n t  t h a t  t l i e i r  l e v e l  i n  t h e  u r b a n  a r e a  i n  19&9 was a l m o s t  t w e l v e  t i m e s  
as  h i g h  a s  t h a t  i n  1955 ( l ) ,  wh ich  was ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  r i s i n g  c o s t  o f  
b u i l d i n g  ( 2 ) ,  i n e v i t a b l y  r e f l e c t e d  i n  h i g h  p r i c e s  o f  h o u s i n g .  The r a p i d
( 1 ) f l . F u j i n o ,  " G h i k a - j o s h o  t o  Z a i s e i s e i s a k u " , E k o n o m is to  (March 20 ,
1 9 7 0 ) ,  p .  1 4 4 .
( 2 ) II. K a t o ,  " K i m e t e - k a k u  Bulhca-ronso"  E konom is to  ( o p .  c i t . ) ,  p . 6 0 . 
A ve ra ge  a n n u a l  r a t e s  o f  i n c r e a s e  i n  l a n d  p r i c e s  and  b u i l d i n g ;  c o s t  
o f  wooden h o u s e s :
19 5 5 -6 0  1 9 60 -65  l p u p - 6 8  19 6 8 -9
Land p r i c e s  i n  u r b a n  a r e a  % 2 5 .5  I 9 .O 1 0 . 8  1 9 . 2
B u i l d i n g  c o s t  % 4 . 7  9 . 6  8 . 9  I 4 .O
v i l
Table III - 1
P e r c e n t a g e  I n c r e a s e s  i n  Consumer  P r i c e s  o v e r  1 9 5 8 - 6 8  
by Broad  Group o f  Consum er Goods
U n i t e d  Kingdom: R e t a i l  P r i c e s J a p a n :  Consumer  p r i c e s  i n  c i t i e s
W e ig h t s w:i. t h  5 0 , 0 0 0  i  nha  more
b i t a n t s  o r
A l l  i t e m s 35 1000 A' Wei g'
Food 27 263 T o t a l  a v e r a g e 63 1000
A l c o h o l i c  d r i n k 30 63 Food 72 425
Tobacco 44 66 H o u s i n g  * 62 107
B o u s i n g 63 121 iUiel and l i g h t 15 50
F u e l  and  l i g h t 54 62 C l o t h i n g 38 128
D u r a b l e  h o u s e h o l d  goods 15 59 M i s c e l l a n e o u s  g o o d s
C l o t h i n g  & f o o t w e a r 18 89 and  s e r v i c e s 62 291
T r a n s p o r t  & v e h i c l e s 34 120
M i s c e l l a n e o u s  goo d s 41 60 * H o u s in g  i n c l u d e s  d u r a b l e h ou s e ­
S e r v i c e s 51 56 h o l d  g o o d s .
Ta b l e I I I  - 2
U n i t e d  Kingdom; P e r c e n t age i n c r e a s - J a p a n :  P e r c e n t a g e  i n c r e a s e s i n
e s  i n  r e t a i l  p r i c e s  o v e r 1 9 6 2 - 6 8 c o n s u m e r  p r i c e s o v e r 1965 .
A l l  i t e m s 25 T o t a l  a v e r a g e 11
Food 24 Goods 9
B r o a d ,  f l o u r ,  e t c . 30 F a r m i n g  & a q u a t i c  p ro d u c t s 15
Meat  and  b a c o n 31 R i c e ,  w h e a t , e t c . 15
M i l k ,  c h e e s e  and e g g s 14 F r e s h  v e g e t a b l e s  and
V e g e t a b l e s 36 f r u i t  and raw f i s h 14
H o u s i n g 41 M a n u f a c t u r e d  g o ods 7
R e n t 45 F o o d s t u f f  p r o c e s s e d  o r■ c a n n e d  7
R a t e s  and  w a t e r  c h a r g e s 46 B i g - f i r m  p r o d u c t s 4
F u e l  and l i g h t 31 S m a l l - f i r m  p r o d u c I s 8
C oa l  and coke 26 T e x t i l e s 7
Gas 20 D u r a b l e  h o u s e h o l d  good s 2
E l e c t r i c i t y 45 O t h e r  m a n u f a c t u r e s 8
D u r a b l e  h o u s e h o l d  g o ods 13 S e r v i c e s 14
T r a n s p o r t  and  v e h i c l e s 20 R e n t  on p r i v a t e  h o u s i n g 21
M o t o r i n g  and c y c l i n g 13 F a r e s ,  w a t e r  c h a r g e s ,  e t c . 9
F a r e s P e r s o n a l  s e r v i c e s 17
M i s c e l l a n e o u s  goo d s 25
Books ,  n e w s p a p e r s  and
p e r i o d i c a l s 58
S e r v i c e s 31
P o s t a g e  and t e l e p h o n e 23
E n t e r t a i n m e n t 26
O t h e r  s e r v i c e s 38
S o u r c e ;  Employment  and  P r o d u c t i v i t y  G a z e t t e ;  S t a t i s t i c ^  B u r e a u ,  t h e  
P r im e  M i n i s t e r ' s  O f f i c e .
V I 1 1
and c o n t i n u o u s  r i s e  i n  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  h o u s i n g  and s e r v i c e s ,  which  seems  
t o  he a  common phenomenon i n  i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s ,  i s  e x p e c t e d  to  
o r o c e e d  w i t h  t h e  f u r t h e r  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  i n t o  b i g  c i t i e s  
and t h e i r  s u r r o u n d i n g  a r e a  and  t h e  r i s e  o f  p e r - c a p i t a  income l e v e l  
w h ich  b r i n g  a b o u t  more demand f o r  b e t t e r  s t a n d a r d s  o f  h o u s i n g  and  s e r ­
v i c e s .
The p r i c e s  o f  c l o t h i n g  r o s e  much f a s t e r  i n  J a p a n  t h a n  i n  
B r i t a i n ,  t h o u g h  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  t e x t i l e  goods  h a d  f a l l e n  s i n c e  1955 r n d  
t h o s e  o f  B r i t a i n  h a d  r i s e n  s l o w l y ,  a s  wo s h a l l  s e e  l a t e r .  The r e a s o n  
i s  p r o b a b l y  t h a t  t h e  J a p a n e s e  c l o t h i n g  i n d u s t r y  c o n s i s t i n g  m a i n l y  o f  
s m a l l ,  i n e f f i c i e n t  f i r m s  h a s  n o t  b e e n  a b l e  t o  c o v e r  i n c r e a s i n g  wage 
c o s t s  w i t h  p r o d u c t i v i t y  i m p r o v e m e n t s ,  w h i l e  a  l a r g e  p a r t  o f  t e x t i l e  
g o o d s  a r e  i m p o r t e d  f rom  a b r o a d  o r  p r o d u c e d  by l a r g e - s c a l e  e f f i c i e n t  
f i r m s .  Many s m a l l  f i r m s  p r o d u c i n g  o t h e r  consum er  g o o d s  have  be e n  f a c e d  
w i t h  t h e  same s o r t  o f  p r o b l e m .  ' I n  t h e  J a p a n e s e  f o o d - p r o c e s s i n g  i n d u s t r y ,  
f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  s m a l l - f i r m  and l a r g ; e - f i r m  p r o d u c t s  
i n  t h e  r a t e  o f  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e  ha v e  b e e n  r e m a r k a b l e  ( S e e  T a b l e  I I I - 2 ) .
T h i s  phenomenon d i d  n o t  p r e v a i l  b e f o r e  1958 ( l ) »  The i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  
p r i c e s  o f  a l c o h o l i c  d r i n k ,  t o b a c c o ,  f u e l  and  l i g h t  were  much f a s t e r  i n  
B r i t a i n  t h a n  i n  J a p a n  where  t h e s e  p r i c e s  f e l l  d u r i n g  1951-64» Among 
o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  t h e  r i s e  i n  t h e  p r i c e  o f  e l e c t r i c i t y  i n  B r i t a i n  i n  t h e  
1 9 6 0 ' s  was r e n n i r k a b l e .
2 .  J h o l o s a l e  P r i c e s
The B r i t i s h  w h o l e s a l e  p r i c e  l e v e l  o f  m a n u f a c t u r e d  goo d s  r o s e  
by 40 p e r  c e n t ,  a s  com pared  w i t h  5 p o r  c e n t  f o r  t h e  J a p a n e s e  c o u n t e r  l a . r t ,  
o v e r  1 955 - 6 9 , a s  shown i n  T a b l e  I I I  -  3 ,  and  T a b l e  I I I  -  4» I n  B r i t a i n ,  
above  a l l ,  t h e  l a r g e s t  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e s  t o o k  p l a c e  i n  t h e  s t e e l  and 
e n g i n e e r i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  whore modern  t e c h n o l o g y  i s  m os t  a p p l i c a b l e  and 
l a r g e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  im p r o v e m e n ts  a r e  f e a s i b l e ,  t h o u g h  t h e  e n g i n e e r i n g  
i n d u s t r i e s  s u f f e r e d  from l a r g e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  b a s i c  r. t e r i a l s  
and f u e l .  I n  J a p a n ,  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  p r o d u c t s  o f  t h e  l e a d i n g  "arrowth" 
s e c t o r s ,  s u c h  a s  c h e m i c a l s ,  p e t r o l e u m  and a l l i e d  p r o d u c t s ,  m a c h i n e r y ,  
e t c .  wore  a l m o s t  c o n s t a n t  o r  ev e n  on t h e  d e c r e a s e  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  u n d e r  
c o n s i c e r a . t i o n .  The p r i c e s  o f  f o o d ,  t i m b e r ,  p a p e r ,  c l o t h i n g ,  c a r r m i c a ,  
e t c .  i n c r e a s e d ,  g r a d u a l l y  a c c e l e r a t i n g  t h e i r  p a c e  o f  i n c r e a s e .
; l )  a . Y a s u i ,  " h a g a - k u n i  no Bukka S h i s u " ,  i n  H. kum aga i  and T. Watabo 
( o d s . ) ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  149»
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Tabic III - 3
P e r c e n t a g e  Changes  i n  W h o l e s a l e  P r i c e s  o v e r  19 5 5 -6 9  
by S e l e c t e d  S e c t o r s  o f  I n d u s t r y ,  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  Kinxdom:
A l l  m o n u f a c t u r e d  p r o d u c t s  (h o n e  m a r k e t  s a l e s )  40
Pood r.K.nui ; c t u r i  n r  i n d u s t r i e s  33
C h e m ic a l  ; nd a l l i e d  i n d u s t r i e s  12
S t e e l  i n d u s t r i e s  43
E n g i n e e r i n g  a nd  a l l i e d  i n d u s t r i e s  46 "^
T e x t i l e  o t h e r  t h a n  c l o t h i n g  i n d u s t r y  1 ?
C l o t h i n g  and  f o o t w e a r  i n d u s t r i e s  24
T im b e r  i n d u s t r y  38*
P a p e r  i n d u s t r y  26
* F i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  p e r i o d  b e tw e e n  1954  and  I 9 6 ;
S o u r c e :  Annua l  A b s t r a c t  o f  S t a t i s t i c s .
T a b l e  I I I  ~ 4
P e r c e n t a g e  C hanges  i n  W h o l e s a l e  P r i c e s  o v e r  1 9 5 5 - 6 9  
by S e l e c t e d  Groups  o f  C o m m o d i t i e s ,  i n  J a p a n :
A l l  m a n u f a c t u r e d  p r o d u c t s  5
Food  32
C h e m i c a l s  -  21
I r o n  and s t e e l  0 , 5
No n - f e r r ou s me t  a l s  34
M e ta l  goods  n o t  e l s e w h e r e  s p e c i f i e d  31
M a c h i n e r y  2 . 5
T e x t i l e s  -  5
T im b e r  and wooden p r o d u c t s  138
P a p e r ,  p u l p  and a l l i e d  p r o d u c t s  5
C e r a m i c s  2:-’
O i l ,  c o a l  and a l l i e d  p r o d u c t s  -  8
M i s c e l l : n c o u s  g o o d s  24
N o n - m a n u f a c t u r e s  43
S o u r c e ;  Banla o f  J a p a n .
The p r i c e s  o f  b a s i c  m a t e r i a l s  and  f u e l  u s e d  i n  i n d u s t r y  a l s o  
i n c r e a s e d  much f a s t e r  i n  B r i t a i n  t h a n  i n  J a p a n  i n  t h e  I C o O ' s ,  The r i s e
i.n t h e  p r i c e s  o f  f u e l  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  l a r g e  i n  t h e  f o r m e r  c o u n t r y .  The 
o r i c e s  o f  c o n s t r u c t i o n  m a t e r i a l s  and  c a p i t a l  goods  a l s o  r o s e  s t e a d i l y  
a t  a  good p a c e  t h e r e .  On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i n  J a p a n ,  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  b a s i c  
m a t e r i a l s  and c a p i t a l  goods  and f u e l  and power  r e m a i n e d  a l m o s t  s t a b l e ,  
e x c e p t  t h a t  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  b u i l d i n g '  m a t e r i a l s  r o s e  r a p i d l y  i n  t h e  l a t L o r  
h a l f  o f  t h e  1 9 6 0 ' s .  T h i s  i s  i n  sha.rp c o n t r a s t  t o  a s t e a d y  r i s e  i n  t h e  
B r i t i s h  p r i c e s  o f  p r o d u c e r ' s  goods  d u r i n g  she  o e r i o d .
Table III
P e r c . n t r g e  Cln n^pos i n t h e  Who l e s a l e P r i c e s  o f P r o d u c e r ' s
and C a p i t a l  Goods o v e r 1 9 6 0 - 69
U . k 0 J  a pain
B a s i c r a a t e r i  a l s 23 5
F u e l  and power 29 -  0 . 5
C o n s t r n o t i o n  m a t e r i a l s 26 25
C a p i t a l goods 29 1
N o t e ; — 1 .  The U . K 0 f  i. gu r e s a r e  f o r ba.s i c m a t e r i a l s and  f u e l  p u r c h a s e d
by m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r y on l y .
2 .  C a p i t a l  goo d s c o n s i s t o f p i  an t , v e h i c l e s ‘ ? b u i l d i n g ,  a/.d
o t i i c r  f i x e d  a s sc t s .
S o u r c e  : Annual  A b s t r a c t o f S t a t i s t i c s and Bank o f J a.pan.
3 . Impo r t  and  E x p o r t  P r i ce s
The i X p e r t  p r i c e  l e v e l  r o s e  much f a s t e r  i n  B r i t a i n  t h a n  i n 
J a p a n  i n  t h e  I f o O ' s ,  p a r t l y  b e c a u s e  o f  d e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  pound s t e r l i n g  
i n  1967 i n  B r i t a i n .  One o f  t h e  most  i m p o r t a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  
i m p o r t  p r i c e  s t r u c t u r e  b e tw e e n  t h e  two c o u n t r i e s  i s  t h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  
i m p o r t  p r i c e s  o f  f o o d ,  b e v e r a g e  and t o b a c c o ,  whoso w e i g h t s  were more 
t h a n  30 p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  w h o l e ,  r o s e  i n  a, c o n s i d e r a b l e  m e a s u r e ,  w h i l e  
t h e i r  J a p a n e s e  c o u n t e r p a r t s  r e m a i n e d  a l m o s t  s t a b l e .  I n  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s ,
T a b l e  I I I  -  6
P e r c e n t ' g e  I n c r e a s e s  i n  I m p o r t  P r i c e s  o v e r  1959 69
Uni  t e d  k ingdom ; J a n an :
h c i  h i t s
( IW S ' )
T o t a l 24 1000 T o t a l
Food ,  bevera-,go & t o b a c c o 18 327 F o o d s t u f f
B a s i c  m a t e r i a l s 15 222 M e t a l s ,  o r e s ,
F u e l - 1 0 106 M i n e r a l  f u e l
M a n u f a c t u r e d  goods 45 337 T e x t i l e s
h e i g h t s
e t c .
M a c h i n e r y  
Chemi c a l s
M i s c e l l a n e o u s  goods
(1969
6 1000
1 185
22 180
-2 7 205
3 114
64. 91
- 2 6 51
22 174
S o u r c e :  Board  o f  T r a d e  and Bank o f  J a n a n .
t h e  i m p o r t  p r i c e s  o f  m a n u f a c t u r e d  g o o d s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  m a c h i n e r y ,  r e g i s t e r e d  
t h e  l a r g e s t  p e r c e n t a g e  i n c r e a s e ,  and t h o s e  o f  f u e l  d e c r e a s e d  d u r i n g  t h e  
p e r i o d  a s  a w h o l e , t h o u g h  t h e y  t u r n e d  upw a rds  i n  t h e  s e c o n d  h a l f  o f  t h e
X I
I Q o ü ' s  i.n B r i t a i n .
I n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  a  s l i g h t l y  downward t e n d e n c y  i n  t h e  J a p a n e s e  
e x p o r t  p r i c e  l e v e l ,  a l l  B r i t i s h  e x p o r t  p r i c e s  o f  m ain  i t e m s  i n c r e a s e d  
more o r  l e s s ,  i n  t h e  I G o O ' s .  The e x p o r t  p r i c e s  o f  c h e m i c a l s ,  m a c h i n e r y ,  
and m e t a l s ,  w h ich  c o n s t i t u t e d  more t h a n  60 p e r  c e n t  o f  h e r  e x p o r t s ,  
d e c r e a s e d  i n  J a p a n ,  w h i l e  t h e  e x p o r t  p r i c e s  o f  t h e s e  g o o d s ,  which  a l s o  
c o n s t i t u t e d  more t h a n  60 p e r  c e n t  o f  B r i t a i n ' s  e x p o r t s ,  i n c r e a s e d  c o n ­
s i d e r a b l y  t h e r e .  The e x p o r t  p r i c e s  o f  s u c h  goods  a s  f o o d s t u f f ,  c h i n a ,  
and  o t h e r  m i s c e l l a n e o u s  goo d s  r o s e  f a i r l y  r a p i d l y  i n  J a p a n  a s  w e l l  b u t  
t h e i r  s h a r e  i n  h e r  e x p o r t s  was l e s s  t h a n  20 p e r  c e n t  i n  1 9 6 9 -
T a b l e  I I I  -  7
P e r c e n t a g e  C h a n g e s  i n  E x p o r t  P r i c e s  o v e r  1 9 5 9 - 6 9  
U n i t e d  Kingdom:
T o t a l
Non-m anu 1‘ a c t u  r  o s 
Hanu f  ac  t u  r e d  goods  
C h e m i c a l s  
T e x t i l e s
M e t a l s
M a c h i n e r y  & t r a n s p o r t  
e q u ip m e n t
O t h e r
W e ig h t s
( 1969 )
J a p a n : 'Weights
(19 6 9 )
30 1000 T o t a l . -  3 1000
11 145 F o o d s t u f f 45 41
34 824 C h e m ic a l s - 4 2 65
7 84 T e x t i l e s 7 187
33
40
63
121
M e t a l s  & a l l i e d  goods  ^
N o n - m e t a l  m i n e r a l
p r o d u c t s  25
206
32
35 417 M a c h i n e ry - 2 4 355
3Ü 139
n d  Bank o f  J;
M i s c e l l a n e o u s  g o o d s  
m a n .
27 114
Airpondlx IV
1 .  I n d e x e s  o f  Co nsum er  P r i c e s  and Money S u p p l y
UK : Consumer Money J a p a n :  Consumer Money
Year n r i c e s s u p p l y p r i c e s s u p p l y
( 1 951=1 0 0 ) ( 1 9 5 6 - 1 0 0 ) ( 1952=1 0 0 ) ( 1 9 5 6 =1 0 0 )
1955 112 8 9 - 5
1956 125 100 113 100
1957 130 102 116 104
1958 134 106 115 117
1459 134 110 116 136
i 960 136 115 120 164
1961 140 118 127 194
1962 146 122 135 226
1963 149 131 146 304
1964 154 138 151 344
1965 161 148 161 401
1966 168 154 169 462
1967 172 171 176 529
1968 180 183 186 600
1969 190 188 195 724
S o u r c e : Annual  A b s t r a c t  o f  S t a t i s t i c s ;  and  Bank o f  J a p a n  Economic
S t a t i s t i c s  M o n th ly .
C o r r e l : t i o n  c o f i f f i  c i o n t s  f o r I n d e x e s  o f  consum er p r i c e s  and money
1 . 0 . 9 9 2 2  f o r t h e  U n i t e d  JKingdom.
2 0 0 . 9 9 4 0  f o r J a p a n .
2 . P e r c e n t a g e Changes  i n Consumer  P r i c e s  and Money S u p p l y
o v e r  t h e  P r e v i o u s  Yea r
U K ;  Consumer Money J a p a n ;  Consumer Money
p r i c e s s u p p l y p r i c e s s u p p l y
1956 0 . 3 1 1 . 8
1957 3 .7 2 . 3 3 .1 4 - 2
1958 2 . 9 3-2 — 0 . 4 1 2 . 1
1959 0 . 5 4 - 4 1 . 1 1 6 . 7
i 960 1 . 0 4 -1 3-6 2 0 . 3
1961 3 .5 3-3 5 -3 1 8 . 4
1962 4 . 2 2 . 6 6 . 8 1 6 .6
1963 1 . 9 5 , 0 7 -6 34-5
1964 3-3 7 - 8 3 -8 1 3 - 0
1965 4 . 7 7 -6 7-6 1 8 . 2
1966 3 - 8 4-1 5-1 1 3 - 9
1967 2 . 5 1 0 . 6 3-9 14 -1
1968 4-7 7-2 5 - 4 1 3 . 4
1969 5 - 4 2 -9 5 . 2 2 0 . 6
S o u r c e : The same a s  a b o v e .
C o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  f o r p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e s  i n  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e :
and money s u p p l y :
-  0 .0 3 9 1  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  k ingdom ;  0 . 5 3 9 6  f o r  J a p a n .
Be tween  a n n u e l  r a t e s  o f  i n c r e a s e  i n  money s u p p l y  and wages  (See  
A p p e n d ! y e s h j X I  ) ;  -  0 . 4 5 5 4  ( f o r  r a t e s  o f  wage i n c r e a s e  one y e a r  
l a t e r ,  0 . 8 0 2 0 )  f o r  t h e  U.i-;. ;  0 . 0 0 8 2  f o r  J a p a n .
X I 1 1
A | ) p Gn d i x  V
P e r c e n t a g e  C hanges  i n  I m p o r t ,  
P r i c e s  o v e r  t h e  P r o v i e n s  Y e a r
W h o l e s a l e ,  Consumer,  and  E x p o r t
U n i t e d  Kingdom;
Y e a r  I m p o r t  
p r i c e s
w h o l e s a l e  
nr i  c e s  f o r  
h a s i  c 
m a t e r i a l s
W h o le s a lo  
p r i c e s  f o r  
f i n i  shod  
good s
Consumer E x p o r t  
p r i c e s  p r i c e s
1951 8 . 4 17 -6
1952 7 -7 2 . 0 8 . 9 4 - 4
1953 -  8 . 9 - 1 0 . 0 -  2 . 0 3-1 - 3 - 2
1954 -  1 . 0 -  2 .0 0 , 0 2 , 0 - 1 . 1
1955 3-0 5-1 3 -0 3 - 9 2 . 2
1956 1 - 9 2-5 4 . 2 5-7 3 - 2
1957 1 - 9 0 . 0 3-2 3-7 5 - 2
1958 -  7 - 4 -  7 - 8 0 . 6 2 . 9 - 1 . 0
1559 -  1 . 0 1 -3 0 . 4 0 . 5 - 1 , 0
i 9 6 0 0 . 0 0 . 1 1 . 3 1 . 0 2 , 0
1961 -  2 . 0 -  2 . 2 0 . 3 3-5 0 . 0
1962 -  1 . 0 -  0 . 6 2 . 2 4 - 2 1 . 0
1963 4 - 2 2 .6 1 . 1 1 - 9 2 . 9
196/1 /]. 0 3 -5 0 . 4  , 3 -3 1 , 9
1965 0 . 0 0 . 5 3 - 8 4-7 1 - 9
1966 1 - 9 2 -3 2 . 6 3-8 3-7
1967 0 . 0 -  1 - 9 1 . 2 2 -5 1 . 8
1966 1 0 . 4 1 0 . 1 3 - 9 4-7 7 - 8
1969 4-3 3-5 3-9 5-4 3 .2
J a p a n :
Year I m p o r t W h o l e s a l e Consumer E x p o r t
p r i c e s p r i c e s p r i c e s p r i c e s
1952 3-1 5-6
1953 0 . 0 6 , 3
1954 ~ 4-1 - 0 . 7 6 . 0 - 3 - 6
1955 0 . 8 - 1 . 8 - 1 . 0 0 . 0
1956 0 . 0 /I-. 4 0 . 3 4- 6
1957 0 . 0 3 -0 3-1 - 2 .7
1958 -  1 1 . 8 - 6 . 6 —0 0 4 - 9 .1
1959 1 . 0 1 . 1 4 - 0
i 9 6 0 -  T.O 1 . 0 3-6 0 . 0
1961 0 . 0 1 . 0 5 -3 - 3 - 8
I S 62 -  3-0 - 1 . 6 6 . 8 - 3 - 0
1963 3-1 1 . 8 7 -6 2 .1
1964 2 . 0 0 , 2 3-8 2 . 0
1965 -  2 - 9 0 . 8 7 - 6 - 1 . 0
1966 2 . 0 2 . 4 5-1 0 . 0
1967 -  1 . 0 1 . 8 3 -9 1 . 0
1968 1 . 0 1 . 8 5 - 4 0 , 0
1969 2 . 0 2 . 2 5 -2 3-0
S o u r c e ;  UN S t a t i n t i c a l  Y e a r b o o k ,  Annual  A b s t r a c t  oi  S tr- '  ’ 
Bank o f  J a p a n  Economic S t a t i s t i c s  M o n th ly .
t i c s  and
C o r r o i e  U on Coo i' f l e  i o n t  s
X  ' V
Boti.-f’on i n n o r t  -n-' c e s  r n d  vdiolGoele  c r i  coo { f o r  b a s i c  m a t e r i a l s  o n l y
f o r  t h e  T 'o fo ) ;  O.GuQb f o r  t h e  II . i; «, ; O .768I  f o r  J a p a n ,
Between w h o l e s a l o  p r i c e s  :f o r  b a s i c  ma. te r i  a I s  raid f i n i s h e d  I 'oons î n
t h e  UoL--, : 0 ,  v044-
Between  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e s  and . . h o l e s a l e  p r i c e s  ( f o r  f i n i s h e d  goods  i.n 
t h e  U . K . ) ;  0 , 5 2 2 7  f o r  t h e  U .K . ;  0 , 2 7 8 5  f o r  J a p a n .
Between  o x s o r t  p r i c e s  and  w h o l e s a l e  p r i c e s  ( f o r  f i n i s h e d  goods  i n  t h e  
U . K . ) :  0 . 7 8 5 1  f o r  t h e  U . n .  ; 0 . 7 3 1 8  f o r  J a p a n ,
Between  t h e  i m p o r t  n r i  c o s  o f  t h e  U.K.. and J a p a n :  0 . 7 9 3 7 °
B o t r e o n  t h e  o x n o r t  p r i c e s  o f  t h e  U.K.  and  J a p a n  : 0 , 3 2 5 4 °
Between the  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e s  o f  t h e  U . t v ,  end J a p a n ;  0 . 4 5 6 6 .  
bût ' . ;een t h e  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e s  and a n n u a l  r a t e  o f  wage i n c r e a s e  ( s e e  
Append i c o s  X and  X I ) ;  0 . 5 1 3 3  f o r  t h e  U . K . ;  0 . 6 3 4 0  f o r  J r o a n .
Between  t h e  w h o l e s a l e  p r i c e s  ( f o r  f i n i s h e d  goods  i n  t h e  U .K . )  and
a n n u a l  r a t e  o f  wage i n c r e a s e :  0 , 3 0 1 4  f o r  t h e  U . K . ;  0 . 4 5 5 0  f o r  J a n a n .
A ppe nd ix  VI
I n d u s t r y  Wage L e v e l  and A v e ra g e  S i z e  o f  E s t a b l i s h m e n t s  n  J a p a n
I n d u s t r y  g r oup
P e t r o l e u m  and c o a l  p r o d u c t s  
I r o n  and s t o o l
Ih ib l i  s h  i n g , p r i  n t i  ng  & a l i i  ed goods
N o n - f e r r o u s  m e t a l  goods
C h e m i c a l s  and a l l i e d  p r o d u c t s
T r a n s p o r t  e q u i p m e n t
M e c h a n i c a l  e n g i n e e r i  ng
P u l p ,  p a p e r ,  and  p a p e r  goods
I n s t r u m e n t  e n g i n e e r i n g
M eta l  goods  n o t  e l s e w h e r e  s p e c i f i e d
B r i c k s ,  p o t t e r y ,  g l a s s ,  c e m e n t ,  e t c ,
E l e c t r i c a l  eng i  n e e r i  ng
R u b b e r  p r o d u c t s
Food and k i n d r e d  p r o d u c t s
L e a t h e r  and l e a t h e r  goods
O t h e r  m r nu f  c t u  r  i n.g
F u r r i ' t u r e  cind f  i . x t u r e s
T im b e r  and wooden p r o d u c t s
T e x t ' l e s
C l o t h i  nq:
N o t e : -  The i n d u s t r y  wa 'o l e v e l  
a l l  e m p lo y e e s  working;  a t  
; s on i n d e x ,  t h e  a v e r a g e  
S o u r c e :  Y e a rbook  o f  L a b o u r  S t a t
s h e
W a ge A v e r a g e
l e v e l employe '
1967 e s t a b l i :
148 73
142 112
127 40
119 96
121 123
119 121
112 57
104 50
99 62
99 36
98 49
90 100
89 95
85 40
85 33
83 39
79 30
77 27
67 49
59 33
e a v e r a -FG m o n t  If
p e r
1966
i s  i o r  t h  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t s  w i t h  30 
f o r  a l l  m a n u f a c t u r ' n g  
i s t i c :
o r  more c  
n d u s t r i e s
;s 07 
I ployCO 
= 100 .
nd I n d u s t r i a l  C e n s u s ,
nd a v e r aCor  s o l g t ^ o n  c o e f i  i c i  o n t  b e tw e e n  t h e  i n d u s t r y  wage l e v e l
s i z e  o f  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s :  O . 5 7 8 4 .
ppcm'.-i X VII
’r .nk ing  o f  I n - u s t r i . e s  by . .ago L e v e l
U.K. J a p a n
Veiri c l  e s 1 5
P r o o r ,  u r i  n t  in  ' 1 p u b l i s h i  n, '^ 2 2
Mc t  a l  ÎÏÏ ■ 1 lu.f‘ c t u  ro 3 1
Chem I ClsI s s 3
En i n o e r ' i i g  and e l e c t r ' c d  g'ood 6 6
l.'ri Ci.s, n o i . t c r y , g l a s s , coment 7 7
' : o t 1 goods  n . e . s . 8 4
Food 9 9
'lex.t i  l e s 10 12
Ti m’-cr 11 11
L e a t h e r  goods  and f u r 12 10
C l o t h i n g 13 13
S o u r c e ;  Sec T o b i e s  4—6 end 4-7
t i e  r r n u c o r r o i e t i .on  coo.i'j i d o n t  i s  O.8698,
i von d i x  V I I I
I n d u o t r i a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  
Ir- r t  L r i t o . i n :  s e e  . l y  e a r n i n g s  o f  f u l l - t i m e  manuel  men p a i d  f o r  f u l l ,  
week i n  S e p t e m b e r ,  lS'o8
I n ( : u s t r y  .'-'.Toup Lowes t Li g;nes t
d e c i l e n e c i l e
£ £
A l l  r n a n u l ' a c tu r in g  i n d u s t r i e s 1 6 . 8 34 »
Veiri c l e s 1 9 . 3 3 S .9
P: p e r ,  n r i  n t i  ng and  p u b l i s h i n g ; 17 .4 4 0 . 5
M e ta l  m.' n n f .' c t u r o 1 8 . 0 3 i . 6
3h ' pbui Id  i n mad ma-.r i no on.gi n c e r  ' ng 1 6 . 5 3 s .  s
C h e m i c a l s  r l l i e d  i n d u s t r i e s l b . 7 34 .1
O t t ie r  nr .nuj 'ac Luring: i n r i u s t r i . e s 1 7 , 5 34 .  s
Fn.'si nc 'c r  ! n ’ ; nd e l c c t r i . c a l  "oods 1 6 . 8 3 S .9
Br ' ck s  , p o t  Lory,  '"1 a s s  , c e m e n t , e t c . 1 6 . 8 .3 J - 4
M eta l  goods  n o t  e l s e w h e r e  s o e c i f i e d 1 6 .1 3 ) .  5
Food , d r i nk .'■ n (: t o b a c c 0 1 6 .1 3 2 . 9
T e x t i l e s I S . 6 3 1 .6
Ti m h o r , f u r n i t u r o , e t c . 1 5 . 8 3 3 -3
C l o t h  i  n;; and j ' a t  w ea r i s . l 2 9 . 0
TrauL- s o r t  : nd c o m m u n ic a t io n 1 6 . 4 3 4 . 0
C o n s t r u c t i  on 1 6 . 4 35-4
GciS, e l e c t r i c i  t y  and w a t e r 1 6 .1 2 8 . 3
Pub l i c  Adm 1 n ' s t r r ; t ' o n 1 3 .7 2 9 . 5
S o u r c e ;  Employment  and P r o d u c t i v i t y  G a z e t t e .
in du  s t r y
C o r r e l a t i on c o e f f i c i e n t  b e tw e e n  t h e  l o s e s t - d e c i l e  and h ^ ^ h e s t - c e c i l e
e a r n i n g s  l e v e l s  ; 0 . 6 3 1 0 .
Appendix IX
J a p a n :  A ve ra ge  m o n t h l y  e a r n i n g s  o f  r e g u l a r  m ale  w o r k e r s ,  I 967 
hy s i z e  oi' e s t a b l i s h m e n t  and i n d u s t r y ,  a s  on i n d e x ,  
t h e  averag ;e  S ' fo r  a l l  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  = 100
No. o f  w o r i i e r s  employed:  
o r  more5 - 2 9 500
P e t r o l e u m  and c o a l  p r o d u c t s 116 121
I r o n  and s t e e l 114 113
P u b l i s h i n g ,  p r i n t i n g  and a l l i e d p r o d u c t s 108 133
C h e m ic a l s  an(: a l l i e d  p ro d u  t s 115 104
N o ' i - f e r r o u s  me 1 a l  goods 121 99
T r a n s p o r t  e q u ip m e n t 105 99
M e c h a n i c a l  engi  n e e r i n g 115 98
P u l . ' ,  p a p e r  and p a p e r  goods 102 102
I n s t r u m e n t  e n g i n e e r i n g 107 104
F a b r i c a t e d  m e t a l  goods 106 86
B r i c k s ,  p o t t e r y ,  g l a s s ,  c e m e n t , e t c . 89 98
E l e c t r i c a l '  goods 105 88
R ubber  p r o d u c t s 107 86
Food and k i n d r e d  p r o d u c t s 89 101
L e a t h e r  and l e a t h e r  goods 110 82
O t h e r  m a n u f a c t u r i n g ' 101 98
F u r n i t u r e  and f i x t u r e s 94 76
T im be r  and wooden p r o d u c t s 87 84
T e x t i l e s 97 91
C l o t h i n g 100 86
b o u r c e ;  M o n th ly  L a b o u r  S u r v e y .  
C o r r e l a t i o n  c o . f f i c i e n t  : 0 . 3 3 9 6 .
L D P e n d  I X
in ! boa ill "don:
Year R a t e  o f U n i on P 'c r cc n— Unemploy­ Unem­ U n f i l l e d
wage d e n s i  i y  t ' . 'gc ment p l o y ­ v a c a n c i e s
■' n c r e a s o ( T ) c h : n g o l e v e l  (U) ment as  p e r c e n ­
( A b ) i n  T ' ( i n  ’000) r r  t c t a g e  o f  t h e
o v e r  t h e ( A U ) l a b o u r
p r o v i  ous f o r c e  (v)
y e a r  (A T)
195.3 6 . 9 44 -6 — — ( 2 . 1 ) —
1954 5 . 8 44 »1 -  1 , 1 - ( 1 . 8 ) -
1955 9 . 5 4 4 , 4 0 , 7 200 ( 1 . 5 ) —
1956 8 . 6 4 4 . 1 -  0 , 7 217 ( 1 , 2 ) -
1957 3»5 4 4 . 0 -  0 , 2 264 ( 1 . 3 ) -
I 95Ü 4 , 6 4 ) . 2 -  1 , 2 408 ( 1 , 6 ) —
1959 3 , 9 4 3 .1 -  0 , 2 420 1 . 9 7 1 . 0 2
i 960 0 , 5 4 3 . 3 0 . 5 326 1 . 5 0 1 . 4 0
1961 0 , 0 43» 3 0 . 0 287 1 . 3 5 1 , 4 2
1962 4 . 0 4 3 .1 -  0 , 5 406 1 . 8 4 0 . 9 3
1963 3 , 0 4 3 . 0 -  0 , 2 497 2 , 1 7 0 . 8 5
19o4 9»1 4 3 .1 0 . 2 349 1 . 5 6 1 . 3 7
1965 7 . 5 4 3 .1 0 . 0 299 1 , 3 2 1 .6 4
1966 7 , 4 4 2 . 5 — 1 . 4 281 1 . 3 8 1 .5 7
1967 9 .1 4 2 . 7 -  1 , 2 503 2 ,2 1 1 . 0 7
1968 8 . 5 4 3 . 3 1 , 4 542 2 . 3 5 1 ,1 7
1969 7»5 4 4 .6 3 . 0 538 2 . 3 2 1 . 2 3
Note  : --1 , The r a t e 0 f  wage i n c r e a s e  i s a p e r c e n t ; .ge i n c r c a so  o f  ; .v erag :0
b o u r C G :
u o o k l y  e a r n i n g s  o f  a l l  manual  w o r k e r s  o v e r  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r .  
The u n i o n  d e n s i t y  i s  t h e  p e r c o n t a g e  o f  e m p lo y e e s  i n  t r a d e  
uni  o n s .
The unem ploym en t  l e v e l  i s  t h e  number o f  w h o l l y  u n e m ploye d  ■ 
p e r s o n s  r a g i s t o r c d ,
The unem ploym en t  r :  t e  i s  t h e  number  o f  r e g i s t e r e d  une m ploye d  
r s  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  l a b o u r  f o r c e .  The p a r e t h e e i s o d  i i g u r e s  
a r c  f rom  t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  La bou r  G a z e t t e  ( m o n t h l y  a v e r a g e s )  and 
o t h e r  f i g u r e s ,  f rom t h e  N a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  .Economic Rev iew ,
Employment  end P r o d u c t i v i t y  G a z e t t e  and  Lat ionc: : l  I n s t i t u t e  
j iconernic R e v i e w ,
C o r r e l a t  i on c o e f i i c l e n t s
do Lroen ^  a 
Be tworm A b 
Between k
nd
nid
nd
0 , 3622,
-  0.3973
0 . 7153.
2.  Between and & T : 0 ,4 277»
4 , B e t w e e n a n d  A U ; -  0 , 3604
6 . Be tween AU and Ai T : O . 4ISO.
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Appendix XI
J a p a n  :
Y ea r h a t e
wage
o f U nion
d e n s i t y
P e r c e n ­
t a g e
Unem­
p l o y ­
Unem­
p l o y ­
A p r i l  
va can
i ncj 'c
( a  b)
: : s 0 (T) c h a n g e  
i n  t ’ 
o v e r  t h e  
p r e v i o u s  
ye a r  (A T )
ment  
l e v e l  
( i n  ' 0 0 0 )
(IJ)
ment  
r a  t o  
( A l l )
r a t i o
(A)
1553 1 5 » 3 3 8 , 8 — 750 1 . 9 -
1554 6 , 5 3 7 .6 - 3 .1 920 1 , 6 -
1955 5 , 2 3 7 . 8 0 , 5 1 , 0 5 0 2 , 5 -
1956 7 . 5 3 5 . 4 - 6 , 4 980 2 . 3 -
1957 4 . 6 37» 2 5»1 820 1 . 9 -
1958 3»1 34» 8 - 6 . 5 900 2 , 1 3»7
1959 0 , 1 34»9 0 , 3 980 1»7 2 , 3
I 960 6 , 8 3 3 . 9 - 2 , 9 750 1 , 4 1 , 7
1561 1 1 , 3 34»5 1 , 8 660 1 . 3 1 . 4
1962 1 0 , 3 3 4 .7 0 , 6 590 1 . 3 1 , 5
1963 1 0 ,7 34,7 0 . 0 590 1 , 1 1 ,4
1964 1 0 , 0 3 5 . 0 0 , 9  ■ 540 1 , 2 1 . 3
1965 9 -5 3 4 . 8 - 0 . 6 570 1 . 2 1 .6
1966 1 0 , 8 34» 2 - 1 . 7 650 1 , 3 1 , 4
1967 1 1 , 8 34 .1 '=’0 a 3 630 1 , 3 1 . 0
1968 1 3 . 6 34»4 0 . 9 590 1 . 2 0 . 5
1969 1 5 . 6 3 5 . 2 2 , 3 570 1 , 1 0 . 8
N o te  : - 1 ,  The r a t e o f  wage i n c r e a s e  i s t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  i n c r e a s e 0:1 VGT: ,ge
m o n t h l y  e a r n i n g s  o f  a l l  w o r k e r s  o v e r  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r .
2 ,  The u n ' on d e n s i t y  i s  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  e m p l o y e e s  i n  t r a d e  u n ' on: 
3» The unem ploym en t  l e v e l  i s  t h e  number o f  w h o l l y  unem ployed  
p e r s o n s  r e g i s t e r e d  w i t h  P u b l i c  Employment  b o c u r  t y  O f i i o e s .
4° The unem ploym en t  r a t e  i s  t h e  a b o v e - d e f i n e d  unem ploym en t  l e v e l  
a s  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  l a b o u r  f o r c e ,
5- The a . p p l i c a n t - v a c a n c y  r a t i o  i s  j o b  a p p l i c a n t s  a s  p e r c e n t a g e  
o f  u n f i l l e d  v a c a n c i e s  r e g i s t e r e d  w i t h  P u b l i c  Employment  
S e c u r i t y  O f f i c e s ,
S o u r c e :  M i n i s t r y  o f  L a b o u r ,
C o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f  i i c i e n  i s
1 ,  b e t u e on A W and T : -  0 , 1 0 9 7 '  
3- Bet' .’e e n û h  and A T s 0 ,3 697»  
5» Between  A h and  U ; -  0 ,7 1 0 5 .
2 ,  Be tween AN and A U : -  0 . 6 0 1  j, 
4 ,  Be tween A V,' and  A : -  0 , 9 1 6 1 ,  
6 ,  Be tween  AU and  AT ; -  0 , 3 7 4 5 .
Appendix XII
U n i t e d  ICngdora: I n d u s t r i a l  a n a l y s i s o f  wa.ge l e v e l , u n ' on dens i i t y ,
u nem ploym en t  r a t e , a.nd u n f i l l e d  v a c a n c i e s
I n d u s t r y  g r o u p Wage Union Unemploy­ U n f i l l
l e v e l d e n s i t y ment  r a t e vacanc :
V e h i c l e s 115 ( 5 2 . 0 ) 1 . 4 1 . 1
P a p e r ,  p r i n t i n g  X p u b l i s h i n g 113 6 0 . 8 1 . 3 0 . 6
M e ta l  maniuli c t u r e 104 ( 5 2 . 0 ) 2 . 2 1 . 0
S h i p b u i l d i n g  d. m a r i n e  e n g i n e e r i n g 103 ( 5 2 . 0 ) 4 . 6 0 . 9
Chem' i c a l s  cc a l l i e d  p r o d u c t s 101 N 0 A. 2 .1 0 . 8
0 t h 01' m anu iac  L u r in g 99 N. A 0 2 . 4 1 . 2
E n g i n e e r i n g  & e l e c t r i c a l  goods 98 ( 5 2 . 0 ) 1 . 8 1 . 5
Br i c k s  , po t  t e r y , g l  a.s s , c e m e n t , e  t c . 98 N . A . 2 . 5 0 . 9
M e ta l  goods  n o t  e l s e w h e r e  s p e c i f i e d 97 ( 5 2 . 0 ) 2 . 8 1 . 8
Food ,  d r i n k  and t o b a c c o 94 9 .3 2 . 9 0 . 7
T e x t i l e s 89 33 -5 2 . 3 1 . 1
T i m b e r ,  f u r n i t u r e ,  e t c . 89 28 .5 3 . 0 1 . 1
L e a t h e r  goods  a.nd f u r 84 1 9 .2 3 .1 1 . 5
C l o t h i n g  and f o o t w e a r 84 39 .0 . 1 1 . 4
T r a n s p o r t  and c o m m u n ic a t io n 101 5 1 .7 2 .1 0 . 7
M in ing  anid n u o . r r y i n g 96 N . A . 6 . 0 1 . 0
C o n s t r u c t i o n 96 2 1 .1 7 - 8 0.9
Gas ,  e l e c t r i c i t y  anu w a t e r 89 N . A , 1 , 6 0 . 4
C e r t a i n  m i s c e l l a n e o u s  s e r v i c e s 83 5-1 1 - 9 0 . 6
N o t e : -  1 The wage l e v e l  ' s  t h e  i n d u s t r y ' s  
manual  m ale  i . o r k e r s  a s  on i n d e x .
. l y  e a r n i n g s  o f  
f o r  a d l  m a n u f a c -
a v e r e g e  wecj 
t h e  averaq 'e  
t a r i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  = 10 0 ,  i n  A p r i l ,  I 9 6 9 ,
2,  The u n i o n  d e n s i t y  i s  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  e m p l o y e e s  in  t r a d e
u n i o n s  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y ,  a t  t h e  end o f  I 9 6 8 . The p a r e n t h e s i s e d  
f i g u r e  i s  f o r  a . l l  e n g i n e e r i n g  and m e t a l  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  
b e c a u s e  u n i o n  m em bersh ip  i o r  e a c h  I n d u s t r y  w i t h i n  t h i s  g ro u p  
i s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e ,
3» The unem ploym en t  r a t e  and u n f i l l e o  v a c a n c i e s  a r e  t l ie r e g i s t e r e d  
w h o l l y  u n e m ploye d  and  u n f i l l e d  v a c a n c i e s  a s  p e r c e n t a g e  01 t h e  
l a b o u r  f o r c e  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y ,  i n  M arch,  I 9 6 9 .
S o u r c e s  Employment  and P r o d u c t i v i t y  G a z e t t e .
C o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i  c i e n t s
1 .  Between  t h e  i n d u s t r y  wage l e v e l  and uni .on d e n s i t y  : O . 2 6 3 6 .
2„ Be tween  t h e  i n d u s t r y  wage l e v e l  and unem ploym en t  r a t e  : 0 . 2 0 3 6 .
3 . Between  t h e  i n d u s t r y  wage l e v e l  and u n f i l l e d  v a c a n c i e s  ; O . I 8 0 3 .
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Appendix XIII
J a p a n :  Ihwge l e v e l ,  p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e s  i 
u n i o n  d e n s i t y  by i n d u s t r y  g r o u p
n i t o v e r  1958 - 6 9 , and.
I n d u s t r y  g r o u p W age l iage Uni on
l e v e l r i  s e s d e n s i  t y
P e t r o l e u m  and c o a l  p r o d u c t s 148 183 5 5 . 0
I r o n  and s t e e l 142 175 6 5 . 7
l i i b l i . s h i n g ,  p r i n t i n g ,  e t c . 127 184 3 0 . 3
C h e m i c a l s  and. a l l i e i :  p r o d u c t s 121 172 6 9 . 8
N o n - f e r r o u s  m e t a l  goods 119 182 6 2 . 4
T r a n s p o r t  e q u ip m e n t 119 153 0 8 , 0
M e c h a n i c a l  ongi  n e e r i n g 112 203 3 9 . 2
P u l p ,  p a p e r  rnc  p a p e r  goods 104 156 3 4 . 0
F a b r i c a t e d  m e t a l  goods 99 206 1 9 . 2
B r i c k s ,  p o t t e r y ,  g l a s s ,  c e m e n t ,  e t c . 98 194 1 3 - 2
E l e c t r i c a l  e n g i n e e r i n g 90 156 5 4 . 8
R u b b e r  p r o d u c t s 89 234 6 1 . 5
Food and k i n d r e d  p r o d u c t s 85 1 .  A * 11 -7
T e x t i l e s 67 214 3 9 . 2
E l e c t r i c i t y ,  g a s  and w a t e r 159 165 . 6 3 . 5
T r a n s p o r t  and c o m m u n ic a t io n 126 172 6 7 . 0
F i n a n c e  and  i n s u r a n c e 129 141 6 5 . 2
M in ing 109 165 5 7 a
C o n s t r u c t i o n 103 220 27-7
W h o l e s a l e  and r e t a i l  t r a d e s 99 160 8-7
N o t e s -  lo  The wage l e v e l  i s  t h e  a v e r a g e  m o n th l y  e a r n i n g s  o f  a l l  
e m p l o y e e s  w o r k i n g  a t  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s  wi t h  30 o r  more 
e m p l o y e e s  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y ,  s s  on i n d e x ,  t h e  a v e r a g e  f o r  
a l l  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  = 1 0 0 , i n  1 9 6 7 - 
2o The u n i o n  d e n s i t y  i s  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  e m p l o y e e s  i n  t r a d e  
u n i o n s  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y ,  i n  1 9 6 7 -
S o u r c e :  Y e a rb o o k  o f  L a b o u r  S t a t i s t i c s *
C o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s
lo  Be tween t h e  i n d u s t r y  wage l e v e l  and u n i o n  d e n s i t y  : -  0*4721 .
2o Be tween  t h e  i n d u s t r y  wag© i n c r e a s e d  and  u n i o n  d e n s i t y  : -  0 . 3 1 8 9 '
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U n i t e d  Kingdom: P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e s  i n  e a r n i n g s ,  u n e m ploym e n t  r a t e ,  
u n f i l l e d  v a c a n c i e s  o v e r  1 9 5 9 - 6 9  hy i n d u s t r y  g r o u p
I n d u s t r y  g r o u p
Veili c l e s
P a p e r ,  p r i n t i n g  and p u b l i s h i n g  
M e ta l  m a n u f a c t u r e  
C h e m i c a l s  and a l l i e d  p r o d u c t s  
O l h o r  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
B r i c k s ,  p o t t e r y ,  g l a s s ,  c e m e n t ,  e 
M e ta l  goods  n o t  e l s e w h e r e  s p e c i f i  
Food ,  d r i n k  and t o b a c c o  
T e x t i l e s
T i m b e r ,  f u r n i t u r e ,  e t c .
L e a t h e r  goods  and f u r  
C l o t h i n g  and f o o t w e a r  
C o n s t r u c t i  on
Gas ,  e l e c t r i c i t y  and  w a t e r
t c ,
ed
N o t e ; -  1 .  The e a r n i n g s  a r e  t h e  ay 
w o r k e r s  i n  A p r i l ,  19 6 8 .
2.  The unem ploym en t  r a t e  a 
t e r e d  w h o l l y  u nem ployed  
o f  t h e  l a b o u r  f o r c e  i n
E a r n i n g s Unemploy­ U n f i l l e d
ment  r a t e vace.nc i  e s
9 0 .6 2 7 . 2 5 7 .1
8 5 . 6 4 4 . 4 1 0 0 . 0
7 7 - 2 - 5 2 . 3 5 0 0 . 0
8 6 . 2 6 2 . 5 6 0 . 0
8 1 .1 5-1 1 4 0 . 0
8 2 . 2 - 1 0 . 7 8 0 . 0
75 -1 1 6 . 7 -
9 0 .1 1 1 . 5 7 5 . 0
8 2 . 5 - 3 6 . 1 1 7 5 . 0
7 5 - 5 - 1 1 . 8 8 3 . 3
7 0 . 4 1 9 - 2 11 4 - 3
7 6 . 1 -  8 . 7 1 0 0 . 0
8 4 . 3 5 6 . 0 -  1 0 . 0
7 8 . 5 4.5.5 4 0 0 . 0
g e  w e e k l y e a r n i n g s  o f manual  male
nd u n f i l l e d  v a c a n c i e s  a r e  t h e  r e g i s -  
and u n f i l l e d  v a c a n c i e s  a s  p e r c e n t a g e  
t h e  i n d u s t r y .
S o u r c e :  Employment  and  P r o d u c t i v i t y  G a z e t t e .
C o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s
1 .  Between  p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e s  i n  e a r n i n g s  and une m ploym e n t  r a t e  : 0 .3385»
2 . Between  p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e s  i n  e a r n i n g s  and  u n f i l l e d  v a c a n c i e s :  -  0 .3 6 8 3 .
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¥ age I n c r e a s e s  and P r o d u c t i v i t y  Growth i n M anu f a c t u r i n g I n d u s t r y
U n i t e d  Kingdom: J a p a n :
Y ea r R a t e  o f  wage R a t e  oi' r i s e n R a t e  o f  wage R a t e  o f  r i s e
i n c r e a s e i n  o u t p u t  p e r i n c r e a s e i n  o u t p u t  p e r
m an -h o u r m an-hou r
i 960 9-7 4-7 1 2 . 6 7-7
1961 6 . 1 0 . 0 1 2 . 5 8 . 4
1962 4 : 1 2 . 8 1 1 .1 2 . 2
1963 4 0 4 5 -2 1 0 . 8 8 .6
1964 7-6 5 - 9 1 1 . 0 1 1 . 0
1965 9-9 4 - 0 1 0 . 8 6 .3
1966 5-5 3-1 1 1 - 3 9-3
1967 4 -6 3-5 1 2 . 4 17 -0
1968 6*7 6 . 2 1 5 - 5 1 2 . 5
1969 8 . 3 3-0 1 7 - 9 1 5 . 2
N o t e : -  The r a t e  o f  wage i n c r e a s e  i s  t h a t  o f  h o u r l y  e a r n i n g s  (male  
w o r k e r s  o n l y  f o r  t h e  U . K . ) .
S o u r c e :  N a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  Economic Rev iew .
The c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  b e tw e e n  t h e  two s e t s  o f  o b s e r v a t i o n s  ii
0 . 2 0 3 5  f o r  t h e  U .K . :  0 . 5 8 9 5  f o r  J a p a n .
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P e r c e n t a g e  I n c r e a s e s  i n  Wages and P r o d u c t i v i t y  by I n d u s t r y  Group 
U n i t e d  Kingdom; 1 5 6 4 - 6 9
I n d u s  t r y I'f age  s P r o d u c ­
t i v i t y
A g r i c u l t u r e ,  f o r e s t r y ,
and  f i s h i n g 3 5 . 9 4 3 - 0
M in i n g  and q u a r r y i n g 2 9 -O 1 9 - 2
Pood ,  d r i n k  & t o b a c c o 3 9 . 8 1 7 . 1
C h e m i c a l s  & a l l i e d 4 0 . 0 33 -6
M e ta l  m a n u f a c t u r e 3 6 . 3 8 . 1
E n g i n e e r i n g  & e l e c t r i c a l  35 -7 27-1
S h i p b u i l d i n g 4 8 . 1 -  2 . 1
V e h i c l e s 3 6 . 8 14 -6
M e ta l  g o o d s  n . e . s . 3 7 - 0 4-2
T e x t i l e s 3 9 . 0 2 9 - 9
L e a t h e r ,  f u r ,  e t c . 2 9 . 5 1 . 4
C l o t h i n g  & f o o t w e a r 3 4 . 0 7-7
B r i c k s ,  p o t t e r y ,  e t c . 3 6 . 4 15,-4
T i m b e r ,  f u r n i t u r e ,  e t c - 3 3 - 0 -  1 - 5
P a p e r ,  p r i n t i n g  &
p u b l 1s h i n g 3 8 . 3 1 0 . 2
O t h e r  m a n u f a c t u r i n g 3 7 . 3 1 4 . 4
A l l  manuf  a: c t u r i  ng; 3 7 - 4 1 6 . 7
C o n s t r u c t i o n 3 8 . 5 1 6 . 5
G a s ,  e l e c t r i c i t y  &
w a t e r 2 8 . 1 3 2 . 4
T r a n s p o r t  & c o m m u n i c a t i o n  44- 6 1 9 - 5
M i s c e l l a n e o u s  s e r v i c e s 37-6 5 -2
J a p a n ;  I 96 4 -6 8  
I n d u s t r y Wages P r o d u c -
A l l  i n d u s t r i e s  and 
s e r v i c e s
M in in g  
C o n s t r u c t i o n  
Manuf ao t u  r i n g  
Pood
T e x t i l e s
P a p e r  and p u l p
P e t r o l e u m  r e f i n i n g
Cerami cs
C h e m i c a l s
I r o n  and s t e e l
M a c h i n e r y
E l e c t r i c a l  g o ods
T r a n s p o r t  e q u i p m e n t
I n s t r u m e n t  e n g i n e e r i n ' ;
D i s t r i b u t i v e s  t r a d e s
T r a n s p o r t
P r i v a t e  r a i l w a y s
E l e c t r i c i t y  s u p p l y
Gas s u p p l y
S e r v i c e s
S o u r c e ;  N a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  Economic R e v ie w ,  n o .  55 ( l 9 7 l ) ?  M i n i s t r y  o f  
L a b o u r ,  Rodo Haicusho.
C o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  b e t w e e n  a v e r a g e  e a r n i n g s  and  o u t p u t  p e r  employee:
-  0 . 0 0 1 6  f o r  t h e  U . K . :  -  0 . 2 0 3 7  f o r  J a p a n .
t i v i t y
1 2 . 1 10 . 2
1 3 . 1 7 . 9
1 5 . 7 8 . 0
1 1 . 9 11 . 6
1 1 . 7 7 . 5
1 1 - 9 1 0 . 7
1 1 . 4 12- 1
1 1 , 7 14- 5
1 1 . 4 9 . 6
1 1 . 2 1 C 06
1 0 - 9 13- 2
1 3 .4 ITA 8
1 4 . 0 1 2 . 6
1 0 . 6 1 2. 2
: 1 2 . 0 1 0 . 7
1 1 . 9 9 . 4
1 0 . 5 6 . 9
1 0 . 6 5- 9
1 3 - 2 1 2 . 0
1 2 - 0 1 4 - 4
1 6 . 7 7 . 0
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UK s R e g i o n a l  wage l e v e l  and 
unomoloyment  r a t e
J îogion t age  Unernpi o y -  
l e v e l  ment  r a t e
J a p a n ;  Wage l e v e l  and r a t i o  o f  j o b  a p e l ' 
c a n t s  t o  v a c a n c i e s  by r e g i o n
R eg ion
N o t e : -1
Ilokivaido 
Tohoku
S o u t h e r n  Kanto  
N o r t h e r n  Kanto  
H okur iku  
Tokai
K e i h a n s h i n  
Ki riki 
S a n - i n  
S an-yo  
Sh ikoku
N o r t h e r n  Kyushu 
S o u t h e r n  Kyushu
Tho r e g i o n a l  wage l e v e l  i n  B r i t a i n  i s  f o r  median  e a r n i n g s  o f  
f u L l - t l m e  a d u l t s  p a i d  f o r  a f u l l  week as  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  
median f o r  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  as  a  w ho le ,  Se a tem ber , IÇôS.
The r e g i o n a l  wage l e v e l  i n  J a p a n  i s  f o r  t h e  r .vorage  a n n u a l  income 
o f  e v p l o y o e s  i n  I 9 6 8 -
S o u th  E a s t 107 2 .1
E a s t  A n g l i a 93 2 .2
S o u th  W e s te rn 92 2 .7
West M i . l a n d s 104 2 .7
E a s t  M id la n d s 97 2 .3
Yorksh i . r e  &
numbers i  de 95 3 .2
Worth W e s te rn 99 3.1
N o r t h 96 5-7
iv a l  0 s 97 4 - 4
S c o t l a n d 95 4 . 6
I age 
l e v e l R a t i o
99 1 .1
82 2 . 9
119 0 . 7
84 0 . 6
84 1 . 2
94 0 , 4
114 0 . 8
96 0 . 7
76 1 . 5
92 0 . 9
83 2 . 0
91 3 .1
80 4 . 2
Gor - e l - t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  fo: t h o  r e g i o n a l  wave l e v e l  and unemployment  
r a t e  o r  a m i l i c m t - v a c a n c y  r a t i o ;
1 ,  -  Oa Py i j  f o r  B r i t a i n ,
2 .  -  0 .1 3 2 6  ( N o r t h e r n  K a n t o ,  T o k a i ,  and K i n k i  e x c e p t e d ,  -  0*5787)  
f o r  Japan*
S o u r c e ;  Employment  and  P r o d u c t i v i t y  G a z e t t e ;  and M i n i s t r y  o f  L a b o u r .
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The S t a r t i n g  Pay  and Demand f o r  M i d d l e - s c h o o l  L e a v e r s  d u r i n g  1958 -69  
and by R e g io n ,  1969 ,  i n  J a p a n
Year P e r c e n t a g e  
ch a n g es  i n
V a c a n c y -
a p p l i c a n t
( R e g i o n a l  a n a l y s i s )
Regi on S t a r t i n g  pay" V a c a nc y -
s t a r t i n g r a t i o .  : ■ l e v e l , 1969 a p p l i c a n t
pay r a t i o
1958 2 .2 1 . 2 Hokkaido 89 1 . 6
1959 5 . 3 1 . 2 Tohoku 86 1 -5
i 960 1 6 .1 1 . 9 S o u t h e r n  Kanto 103 6 . 4
1961 22 .7 2 .7 N o r t h e r n  Kan to 101 3 .5
1962 2 5 .0 2 . 9 H okur iku 98 3-3
1963 1 0 . 9 2 .6 Toka i 100 10 .6
1964 12 .8 3 .6 K e i h a n s h i n 102 9-7
1965 1 8 .6 3 .7 K i n k i 100 4 . 9
1966 6 c 8 2 . 9 S a n - i n 90 1 - 4
1967 1 0 .8 3 . 4 S an -yo 100 5-7
1968 1 3 . 9 4 . 4 Shikoku 97 1-5
1969 1 7 -2 4-8 N o r t h e r n  Kyushu 92 1 . 6
S o u t h e r n  Kyushu 76 0 . 8
S o u r c c ;  M i n i s t r y  o f  L a b o u r ,  Sh ' n i c i g a k u s o t s u s h a  S hon inkyu  Chosa .
C o r r e l a t i on c o e f f i c i e n t s
1,  0.  ;96T f o r  p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e s  i n  s t a r t i n g  pay and v a c a n c y - a p p l i c a n t  
r a t i o s  o v e r  t i m e .
0 .6 8 9 7  f o r  r e g i o n a l  s t a r t i n v  nay  l e v e l  and va c an  - a n n l i c a n t  r a '  . 0 .
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